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ABSTRACT
This dissertation offers the first full-length study of 
the Richmond Junto and its role in shaping politics in 
Virginia between 1815 and 1845. The Junto led the Jacksonian 
movement in Virginia and worked successfully to keep the 
state allied with the Democratic party of Andrew Jackson and 
Martin Van Buren until the early 1840s. The Junto 
represented an influential force in Virginia politics during 
this transitional period, and to a certain extent this small 
group of men, led by Thomas Ritchie, Peter V. Daniel, Andrew 
Stevenson, William H. Roane, and Richard E. Parker, 
epitomized the state's response to the turbulent events of 
the era. Its actions were expressive of the way in which 
Virginians chose to come to terms with the changes in 
American politics and society during the Age of Jackson.
The Junto's course was marked by ambivalence. It 
sought, for instance, to preserve both the rights of the 
states and a strong federal Union, and to revive Virginia's 
influence at the national level without compromising the 
state's political principles. To achieve these goals, the 
group consistently articulated a traditional states' rights 
position, but also moved to adopt the modern features of the 
second party system. This strategy produced mixed results. 
The Junto managed to maintain influence in the state for 
nearly three decades, and Virginia never cast its 
presidential ballot for a Whig candidate. At the same time, 
bitter factionalism and violent partisan debate came to 
characterize Virginia politics in the years after 1832.
The goal of this study is to reveal the pivotal role 
played by the Richmond Junto in defining and shaping 
political debate in Jacksonian Virginia. It offers an 
analysis of the group's political ideology and its methods 
of operation, as well as a discussion of the Junto's 
objectives, accomplishments, and failures.
vi
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Introduction
This dissertation offers the first full-length study of
the Richmond Junto and its role in shaping politics in
Virginia between 1815 and 1845. The Junto led the Jacksonian
movement in Virginia and worked successfully to keep the
state allied with the Democratic party of Andrew Jackson and
Martin Van Buren until the early 1840s. The Junto
represented an influential force in Virginia politics during
this transitional period, and to a certain extent this small
group of six to eight men epitomized the state's response to
the turbulent events of the era. Its actions were expressive
of the way in which Virginians chose to come to terms with
the changes in American politics and society during the Age
of Jackson. The members of the Junto viewed themselves as
caught between two worlds: the older, traditional world of
their fathers, the revolutionary generation, and a new world
of democratic change and economic expansion that they found
both appealing and foreboding. In confronting these new
political, economic, and social realities, the Junto
consistently used the yardstick of the past to measure the
strange new world unfolding before them. To a certain
*
extent, the members of the clique remained rooted in the 
world of their fathers and devoted to the revolutionary
2
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3political ideology that those men had formulated. Throughout 
much of this period, the Junto rarely thought of discarding 
or even of amending that ideology. Indeed, its members 
considered it their particular duty to preserve and protect 
that faith in republican government, devotion to liberty and 
equality, and insistence on personal independence that had 
been handed down as their most precious political legacy. As 
the members of the Junto moved to protect this legacy, first 
on the state and then on the national level, they discovered 
that many Americans did not share their devotion to the 
republicanism of the older generation. The emerging modern 
party system that the Junto slowly came to embrace in the 
1830s clearly valued party loyalty and unity over 
ideological consistency and purity. To a large extent, this 
work is an attempt to examine and evaluate how the Richmond 
Junto, and by extrapolation Virginia, altered its definition 
of republicanism and reconciled its political ideology with 
the realities of Jacksonian America and the second party 
system.
My interest in the Junto stemmed from a desire to 
understand more clearly the rise of Southern sectionalism 
between the Revolution and the Civil War. The changing 
nature of Southern life and thought during those decades, 
especially in the realm of political culture, provides the 
key to understanding growing sectional sentiment and the 
ultimate call for secession in 1860 and 1861. I chose to
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
examine Virginia for a number of reasons: in more ways than 
one, Virginia remained the leading state in the region, 
although its prestige and influence continued to slip 
throughout the era; very little modern scholarship outside 
of biography exists on post-Jeffersonian Virginia; and, 
finally, the Old Dominion and its leaders played prominent 
roles in both of the defining events of early American 
history, the American Revolution and the Civil War. An 
examination of Virginia between those two wars would thus 
help shed light on the sectionalizing forces that tore the 
nation apart in 1861.
Such an expansive topic required narrowing, and I soon 
realized that a detailed study of the actions and ideas of 
the so-called Richmond Junto, a shadowy informal clique of 
politicians, editors, judges, and bankers, offered a window 
through which larger developments across the state and 
nation could be viewed. The Junto was intimately involved in 
all of the great questions facing the nation in the first 
half of the 19th century: slavery, economic growth, 
constitutional debates, and political reform. Its members 
wrote extensively about how they and others felt on these 
issues, corresponded with national political leaders, and, 
on more than one occasion, helped shape Southern responses 
to them. The Junto presented, then, an ideal way to explore 
the response of countless individuals to the basic questions 
of the Jacksonian period.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5The clique's members were not, by and large, well known 
figures in Jacksonian America. None of them approached 
Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, or Henry Clay in stature or in 
influence. They were state and regional leaders, not 
national spokesmen. Because of this fact, few studies exist 
that document how these men attempted to resolve the 
fundamental questions facing them and their society. 
Scholarly examinations of the Richmond Junto are limited to 
a few journal articles, some of dubious merit. Most of these 
brief accounts focus on the origins and early career of the 
clique, dismissing entirely its influence after 1824.1 The 
only recent article on the group denies its existence, 
claiming that the Junto was merely a politically motivated 
rhetorical creation.2 There are published biographies of key 
Junto members - Thomas Ritchie, Peter V. Daniel, and Andrew 
Stevenson - but these works are of limited significance for 
my purposes because they focus on telling the story of one 
man's entire life and seldom dwell at length upon their 
experiences as Junto associates.3 A handful of monographs
‘Harry Ammon, "The Richmond Junto, 1800-1824," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 61 (1953), 395-418; 
Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," William and 
Mary Quarterly. 2nd series, Vol. 22 (1942), 1-17; Joseph H. 
Harrison, Jr., "Oligarchs and Democrats: The Richmond Junto," 
VMHB. vol. 78 (1970), 184-198.
2F. Thornton Miller, "The Richmond Junto: The Secret All- 
Powerful Club - or Myth," VMHB. Vol. 99 (1991), 63-80.
3Charles Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia 
Politics (Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913) ; John P. 
Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V.
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6and dissertations mention the Junto and its role in 
Jacksonian politics, almost all of them following the 
interpretation laid out by Charles Ambler early in the 
twentieth century.4 Ambler's work on Thomas Ritchie and on 
sectionalism in antebellum Virginia remain valuable, but 
surely it is time to reexamine the dynamics of party 
politics in Jacksonian Virginia.
Historians have written some fine biographies of 
prominent early nineteenth century Virginians, including 
Littleton Waller Tazewell, David Campbell, Charles Fenton 
Mercer, William Cabell Rives, James Barbour and Henry Wise.5
Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); 
Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and Diplomat. 
1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1949).
4Charies Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia From 1776 to 
1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) ; Harry Ammon, "The 
Republican Party in Virginia, 1789 to 1824" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Virginia, 1948); Clyde C. Gelbach, "Spencer 
Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822: A Judicial Advocate of State 
Rights" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1955); 
Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of 
Jeffersonian Principles" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Minnesota, 1967); Bert Marsh Mutersbaugh, "Jeffersonian 
Journalist: Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond Enquirer. 1804- 
1820" (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1973); Norman 
Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age 
of Jefferson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
5Norma Lois Peterson, Littleton Waller Tazewell 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983); Norma 
Taylor Mitchell, "The Political Career of Governor David 
Campbell of Virginia" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967); 
Douglas R. Egerton, Charles Fenton Mercer and the Trial of 
National Conservatism (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1989); Raymond C. Dingledine, Jr., "The Political 
Career of William Cabell Rives" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Virginia, 1947); Charles D. Lowery, James Barbour: A
Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al: The University of
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7The focus of these works, however, remains on these men and 
their careers at the national level. Few of them deal 
extensively with state politics during the Jacksonian 
period. Also scarce are studies of particular regions or 
counties within Virginia during this period.6 We still know 
very little about political change and debate on the local 
level in the Old Dominion between 1790 and 1860. Three 
dissertations on Virginia political developments merit 
special mention. Lynwood Miller Dent has written a thorough 
and sound history of the Virginia Democratic Party that the 
Junto controlled in the 1820s and 1830s. The complicated but 
crucial debate over Martin Van Buren's subtreasury plan and 
its impact on Virginia politics is clarified by Harold 
Moser. Finally, Katherine Ruth Malone's study offers a 
thoughtful and penetrating examination of the role of 
"fundamental principles" in Virginia during the early 19th 
century.7 Each of these works helps to illuminate the nature
Alabama Press, 1984); Craig M. Simpson, A Good Southerner: The 
Life of Henry A. Wise of Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1985).
6One notable exception is Daniel W. Crofts, Old 
Southampton: Politics and Society in a Virginia County. 1834- 
1869 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992).
7Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic 
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1974) ; Harold D. Moser, "Subtreasury Politics and the Virginia 
Conservative Democrats, 1835-1844" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Wisconsin, 1977); Katherine Ruth Malone, "The Virginia 
Doctrines, the Commonwealth, and the Republic: The Role of 
Fundamental Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798-1833" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981).
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8of political culture in Jacksonian Virginia. This study 
seeks to expand upon these works and fill many of the gaps 
still remaining in the historiography of antebellum Virginia 
political history by examining the Richmond Junto and their 
role in bringing Jacksonian democracy to the Old Dominion.
Before charting the influence of the Richmond Junto, it 
must first be established that such an organization existed. 
There is no definitive proof of this: no secret diaries, no 
minutes of meeting, no confessions from supposed members. 
This is not unexpected, since no one, then or now, denied 
that the group lacked formal organization or structure. But 
substantial circumstantial evidence can be cited to support 
claims that the Junto was real and exerted influence over 
political affairs. Most important in documenting the 
existence of the Junto are widespread mention of such a 
group in newspapers and private correspondence, second hand 
accounts of meetings of the clique as described by friends 
or relatives, and various accounts of political meetings 
held in Richmond in which Junto members were in control of 
the proceedings from beginning to end. The men most 
frequently mentioned as Junto associates - Thomas Ritchie, 
Andrew Stevenson, Peter V. Daniel, William H. Roane, Philip 
N. Nicholas, John Brockenbrough, and Richard E. Parker - 
also served repeatedly on the Democratic Party's Central 
Committee, the most influential political body in the state.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9The Central Committee oversaw presidential campaigns in 
Virginia and enforced party discipline. In addition, these 
same men were among the very few Virginians who corresponded 
regularly with national party leaders such as Martin Van 
Buren. Given these pieces of evidence, it can be safely 
argued that an organization popularly known as the Richmond 
Party, or Junto, existed in Jacksonian Virginia.8
Scholars agree that the Junto emerged during Thomas 
Jefferson's presidential bid in 1800, when concerned 
Virginians banded together to assure their leader's victory 
at the polls. In its earliest incarnation, the Junto, led by 
Wilson Cary Nicholas and Spencer Roane, worked merely as a 
semi-formal organizing committee that oversaw Jefferson's 
campaign. Gradually, the scope of its operation and 
influence spread in the first two decades of the 19th 
century. But the group still lacked cohesion and was active 
only during the quadrennial presidential elections.9
8The Junto had many names, the most common of which were 
the Richmond Party and the Richmond Junto. But the group was 
also referred to as the Central Influence, the Central Junto, 
and the Junta. In naming the circle the Richmond or Central 
Junto, opponents drew upon traditional fears of a small clique 
of men secretly controlling the state's political affairs from 
the seat of power, the state capital. The word junto, or 
junta, entered the English language in the early 17th century 
and carried connotations of despotic rule and secret cabals 
like the "archetypal Whig Junto of William Ill's and Queen 
Anne's time." See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
(1991) and The Random House Unabridged Dictionary of the 
English Language (1981 edition). Quote from Harrison, 
"Oligarchs and Democrats," 186.
9Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," 1-17; 
Ammon, "The Richmond Junto," 395-418.
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A rejuvenated Junto emerged after the War of 1812 when 
Roane led an attack against the nationalistic policies of 
the federal government. In a series of widely read essays, 
Roane warned of the dangerous consequences of a loose 
construction of the Constitution and of consolidating power 
in the hands of the federal government. While Roane remained 
leader of the group, Thomas Ritchie, his cousin and editor 
of the Richmond Enquirer. was using his paper to reassert 
the primacy of the so-called "Virginia Principles" or 
"Principles of '98." Built around the ideas articulated in 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and James Madison's 
Report of 1799, the "Virginia Principles" Ritchie described 
rested squarely on the foundations of the state rights 
concept of government.10
After Roane and Nicholas both died in the early 1820s, 
Ritchie became the undisputed leader of the Junto, a 
position he never relinquished. In fact, after 1824 it would 
be more accurate to refer to the group as Ritchie's Junto. 
Ritchie had come to Richmond early in the century after 
briefly trying his hand at teaching, the law, and medicine. 
He finally found his calling when he began editing the 
Richmond Enquirer in 1804. Soon Ritchie's paper was the 
dominant one in the state, and the only one, Thomas 
Jefferson remarked, worth reading. Ritchie's intense support
10For a complete explication of the "Virginia principles", 
see Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines."
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for state rights and his familial connection with both 
Nicholas and Roane allowed him to gain stature both state­
wide and within the Junto.11
As leader and spokesman of the Junto and editor of the 
most widely read paper in the state, Ritchie exerted 
enormous influence in Virginia affairs between 1815 and 
1845, when he moved to Washington to edit the Union, the 
Polk administration paper. Throughout his career in 
Richmond, Ritchie's overriding political goals were to build 
party unity and to ease regional tensions in the Old 
Dominion. Despite his devotion to state rights, the editor 
treasured the Union and condemned those who threatened to 
tear it apart for petty reasons, such as South Carolina 
Nullifiers or northern abolitionists. Ritchie, an awkward 
looking man who lacked public speaking skills, astutely 
avoided the spotlight, never held elective office, and 
repeatedly turned down offers to move his base of operation 
to Washington. Thomas Ritchie was a force that virtually 
everyone in Jacksonian Virginia had to contend with at one 
time or another.
“Biographical account of Thomas Ritchie by Margaret 
Ritchie Stone, MS, [n.d.], Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College of 
William and Mary; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 9-12; Mutersbaugh, 
"Jeffersonian Journalist," 10-22. Ritchie was the cousin of 
Spencer Roane, John and William Brockenbrough, and the 
brother-in-law of Richard E. Parker. Stevenson married a 
Brockenbrough and Philip N. Nicholas courted Spencer Roane's 
daughter after his first wife died. Ritchie, Stevenson, P.N. 
Nicholas, Daniel, and John Brockenbrough were all neighbors in 
the Shockhoe Hill area of Richmond. Harrison, "Oligarchs and 
Democrats," 190; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 11-16.
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Ritchie's lieutenants, those who formed the inner 
circle of the Junto, were also powerful and respected men. 
Peter V. Daniel was a lawyer, judge, long-time Lieutenant 
Governor, and Supreme Court Justice from 1841 to 1860.
Daniel served as the inside source of information for the 
Junto on the General Assembly and the Executive Council. 
Daniel's devotion to Jackson and his party outmatched even 
Ritchie's. Andrew Stevenson, a professional politician, 
diplomat, and arch-intriguer, was elected Speaker of House 
in 1827 and later appointed Minister to Great Britain. By 
all accounts Stevenson was vain, pompous, and widely 
despised, but he was the Junto's man in Washington.12 A 
third member of the clique, John Brockenbrough, served as 
President of the Bank of Virginia for decades. Junto 
meetings were frequently held at his residence, which later 
became the White House of the Confederacy.13 His brother, 
Judge William Brockenbrough, was also a Junto associate at 
times. Two more men rounded out the inner circle of the 
Junto. William H. Roane, a planter and politician, son of 
Junto founder Spencer Roane and grandson of Patrick Henry, 
served as United States Senator from 1837 to 1841. Although 
a pale imitation of his father, William was a faithful
12Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting, viii-ix; Wayland, 
Andrew Stevenson. 1-77.
13Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 15-16, 27.
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supporter and party hack.14 Finally, Philip N. Nicholas, the 
popular younger brother of Wilson Cary Nicholas, wore many 
hats. As a planter, politician, judge and banker, Nicholas 
built up enough of a following across the state to run 
briefly as a vice-presidential candidate in 1832, against 
the Junto's wishes.15
The men who made up the Richmond Junto lived in a 
society marked by dramatic change. The story of Virginia in 
the years between 1815 and 1845 is largely one of people 
coming to terms with the remarkable transformations taking 
place in their daily lives. As the country developed and 
expanded, and as technology began to revolutionize every 
facet of life, Virginians struggled to adjust to these 
changes.16 The modern world seemed very different from the 
world of their fathers. Life had seemed simpler and purer 
then. Right and wrong were easy to distinguish. A man knew 
his place in society, and what was expected of him. People
14Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 146, 185; Ninety-Second
Congress, First Session, Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress. 1774-1971 (United States Government 
Printing Office, 1971), 1615.
15Thomas P. Abernethy, "Philip N. Nicholas", Dumas Malone, 
ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1962, originally published 1934), 7:484-485. 
Abernethy describes Nicholas as a member of the Junto and as 
"one of the guiding forces in the establishment of the 
Jacksonian party in Virginia."
16Historians have recently stressed the centrality of the 
Market Revolution in reshaping life during the Jacksonian 
period. For an excellent summary of the literature on this 
topic, see Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian 
America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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around the country admired Virginia and accepted its 
leadership in national affairs. But now all of the security 
and pride of that older order was being eroded by a society 
that revolved around impersonal social and economic 
transactions and political opportunism. Commercial centers 
like New York and Philadelphia were increasing their realm 
of influence, and Virginia's vaunted position in the Union 
was steadily slipping.
Virginians responded to these changes with words and 
actions marked by confusion, anger, and desperation. Strong 
feelings of nostalgia, of better days gone by, pervaded 
public discourse.17 The example of their fathers, the men 
who had fought for independence and forged a government and 
society unlike any other, was both an inspiration and a 
burden to them. While they could point to a firm set of 
goals to follow and ideas to emulate, the new generation of 
Virginians also realized that they could never measure up to 
the deeds and the wisdom of their fathers. No matter what 
the post-revolutionary generation accomplished, the memory 
of the Founding Fathers would forever overshadow them. The 
Junto operated within this framework, and many of its
17Robert P. Sutton, "Nostalgia, Pessimism, and Malaise: 
The Doomed Aristocrat in Late-Jeffersonian Virginia," VMHB. 
Vol. 76 (1968), 41-55; Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "The
Declension of Virginia, 1776-1860: An Historiographical
Perspective," unpublished paper, 1990. Daniel Jordan describes 
the essence of politics in late Jeffersonian Virginia as "a 
stressful blend of change and continuity." Jordan, Political 
Leadership in Jefferson's Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1983), 13.
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actions can be seen as an effort to recapture and 
reestablish what it believed was the purity of the founding 
of the nation.
In Virginia, the spirit of the revolutionary 
generation, including Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, 
must have been especially strong. Yet the new generation of 
state leaders had other concerns as well, more concrete ones 
that compounded their anxiety and confusion. The exodus of 
farmers from Virginia to the west and southwest continued 
unabated throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
The state's population, wealth, and prestige were all on the 
decline. Regional disputes between the farmers of the west 
and the planters of the east kept tensions high for decades, 
and during the 1829-1830 constitutional convention, threats 
of disunion were commonplace. Then Nat Turner's slave 
rebellion shocked the state, touching off a frank and 
painful debate on the future of the peculiar institution in 
the Old Dominion. Political struggles grew so intense that 
men were publicly assaulted for expressing their views. In 
short, the first half of the nineteenth century proved to be 
a stressful and confusing period to many in the Old 
Dominion.
As the world changed around them, Virginians maintained 
a profound ambivalence about progress and its consequences. 
They were delighted at the benefits of the Market Revolution 
and eagerly sought to partake of them. Men of all political
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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persuasions called for internal improvement projects, for 
stable banks, and for extended trade. Yet steeped as they 
were in a political culture that prided itself on stability, 
deference, and order, many Virginians were inherently 
suspicious of innovation. They understood clearly that their 
traditional society and way of life were under attack. Some 
welcomed the change, but many more were willing to fight to 
preserve their heritage, especially in the realm of 
political ideology. A great majority of politically-minded 
Virginians continued to cherish the ideas of classical 
republicanism as they had been formulated and expressed in 
Revolutionary America. Virginians, and the Junto, placed 
special emphasis on the dangers of the consolidation of 
centralized power and the necessity of virtue and 
disinterestedness in government.18 Failure to avoid either 
of these would inevitably lead to corruption, tyranny, and 
the destruction of the Union. Strict adherence to the tenets 
of this philosophy was necessary, then, in order to insure 
the independence, liberty, and equality of the people. So 
pervasive was this belief system in the state that those men 
who broke away from the Jacksonian ranks in the early 1830s
180n classical republicanism and its continuing influence, 
see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Robert E. 
Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," 
WMO. 3rd series, Vol. 29 (1972), 49-80.
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to form an anti-administration party chose to explain their 
actions by insisting that Jackson was abusing his executive 
powers and threatening to overthrow the government. Because 
of their commitment to this political ideology, Virginians 
resisted efforts to amend or discard it. They also moved 
slowly to accept the new definitions of party that were 
being formulated in the Jacksonian period. Experience, they 
argued, had proven that the precepts of classical 
republicanism represented the best guideline for the country 
to follow.
Early nineteenth century Virginians, then, tended to 
interpret their world through the ideas and beliefs of their 
fathers. The political philosophy forged in the 1770s to 
oppose British rule was still potent fifty years later. 
Indeed, the key to understanding Virginia's actions in the 
Age of Jackson is acknowledging its devotion to the 
revolutionary ideology of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison. The great tension in the lives of many Virginians, 
one that resonated in every facet of their existence, was 
the need to preserve, to conserve, their republican heritage 
in a modernizing society.
This brief examination of Virginia society helps to put 
into perspective the outlook and actions of the Junto. Two 
central goals bound the clique together and gave it purpose. 
The first and most important goal of the Junto was the 
articulation and preservation of the state rights argument.
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In 1830 Ritchie summed up the guiding sentiment of the group 
in a letter to William Cabell Rives. "You must not be 
surprized," the editor wrote, "to find us pressing at this 
time our old State Rights doctrine ...; believing that they 
alone will save the country from the gulf of consolidation - 
and that if we give up now, we are gone forever."19 Like 
many Jacksonians, Ritchie viewed the political world in 
terms of an apocalyptic struggle between the forces of 
liberty and the forces of power. An excess of either was 
dangerous; too much liberty produced anarchy; too much power 
led to autocratic rule.20 At times the Junto equated liberty 
with the rights of the states, and power with the federal 
government. The group believed that it must constantly be 
wary of attempts to augment the powers granted to the 
government in Washington.
The second major focus of the Junto was a desire to 
revitalize Virginia socially, economically, and politically; 
to restore the state to its former glory by increasing its 
influence in national councils, improving transportation 
networks, and by encouraging social and benevolent reform.
To achieve the latter two goals, Junto members joined and 
worked with a number of private and public organizations
19Thomas Ritchie to William Cabell Rives, April 15, 1830, 
William Cabell Rives Papers, Library of Congress.
20Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of
Jacksonian America (New York: Noonday Press, 1990), 43-44.
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dedicated to reviving the state's economy and culture.21 In 
political affairs, the Junto worked to boost Virginia's 
power by serving as the leader of the southern wing of the 
national Jackson party. This entailed maintaining party 
orthodoxy and following the dictates of party leaders, 
something that was not always easy for independent minded 
Virginians. Ritchie spent a great deal of time on issues 
involving party discipline and often met with strong 
resistance from the rank and file members of the party. At 
times, even he and fellow Junto members balked at the 
actions of Jackson and Van Buren. To a large degree, 
however, the Junto's efforts to link Virginia with the 
national Democratic party proved successful.
The Junto's actions were guided by efforts to achieve 
its two paramount objectives. Those policies and leaders 
most likely to preserve state rights and increase Virginia's 
influence were supported; those that did not were opposed.
In 1824, that logic led Ritchie and the Junto to back 
William H. Crawford for the presidency. During the campaign, 
the Junto joined with Martin Van Buren and his Albany 
Regency in an attempt to reforge the New York-Virginia 
alliance that had once controlled national politics. 
Crawford's crushing defeat at the national level led to a 
shakeup of Virginia's Republican Party, but did not
21Stevenson, Ritchie, John Brockenbrough, and Parker, for 
instance, were all board members of the Richmond Lancasterian 
School that opened in 1816. Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 34.
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significantly weaken the Junto. In fact, the notion of a 
"corrupt bargain" and John Q. Adams's nationalistic measures 
proved so unpopular in Virginia that the Junto moved 
gradually to support Jackson in 1828, despite the strong 
reservations that its members and most Virginians had about 
the military leader. By election day, these qualms had been 
forgotten, and Jackson was viewed as a crusading reformer 
who would return the country to its original purity and 
principles. The dramatic change in the way Virginians 
portrayed Jackson between 1824 and 1828 is one of the most 
striking developments of the period. Again, Ritchie and the 
Junto worked intimately with Van Buren during the campaign 
to help form the foundations of a national Jackson 
coalition.
Jackson's election in 1828 was a sweet victory for the 
Junto, but they had little time to relish it. Jackson's 
decisions concerning appointments and other actions in his 
first administration quickly produced a split in the 
Virginia Jacksonian party ranks that was exacerbated by the 
power struggle between Van Buren and John C. Calhoun in 1829 
and 1830. Some Virginians made it clear that they did not 
care for the New Yorker, but the Junto was determined to 
keep its strong ties with Van Buren, who by late 1830 seemed 
positioned as Jackson's successor. At the same time, a 
constitutional convention revealed the depth of sectional 
antagonism in the state. Ritchie supported many of the
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reform measures proposed by western Virginians, as did most 
of the Junto, except for those members who were closely tied 
to eastern plantations. A bitter debate on the future of 
slavery in Virginia and an aborted attempt to keep Van Buren 
off of the party's ticket in the state kept the Junto busy 
in 1831 and 1832. Despite defections from the Jacksonian 
ranks, Old Hickory himself remained enormously popular in 
Virginia, and he swept to an easy victory in 1832, capturing 
eighty percent of the popular vote.
After Jackson's re-election, the Junto enjoyed a 
commanding position in state political leadership. Then two 
events badly split the party and weakened the Junto's grip 
on political control. Jackson's handling of the 
Nullification Crisis - specifically, the Proclamation and 
the Force Bill - outraged many Virginians devoted to state 
rights. Both measures, critics claimed, smacked strongly of 
executive usurpation. Somehow, the Junto managed, to hold the 
party together during the crisis, but not before several key 
politicians had abandoned the Jacksonian coalition. Even 
more costly to the Junto was Jackson's decision to remove 
federal deposits from the Bank of the United States in 1834. 
Again, Virginians committed to state rights expressed their 
displeasure at this act of presidential high-handedness. The 
Junto was split itself on the question of banking, and 
failed to keep the party unified on this question.
Jackson's policies and flamboyant personality cost him
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support in Virginia. Defectors increased, and by 1834 
opposition to his rule had coalesced in the form of the Whig 
party, who exploited public dissatisfaction with the 
president and won control of the state legislature. The 
Whigs promptly stripped Ritchie of his position as public 
printer and removed fellow Junto member Peter V. Daniel from 
the state's Executive Council. The Junto countered by 
portraying the Whigs as wealthy and corrupt men and by 
returning to the old themes of reform and fundamental 
principles. Even though the Democrats recaptured control of 
the legislature in 1835, both the party and the Junto lacked 
the cohesion and unity of purpose that they had once had.
The Whigs tried unsuccessfully to defeat the Democrats 
in 1836 by claiming that Van Buren held abolitionist 
sentiments. The Junto denounced these charges sharply and 
backed the New Yorker in the strongest terms. When Van Buren 
carried Virginia that year, it was the first time that the 
state's vote had gone to a northern candidate. Economic 
problems early in his administration badly hurt Van Buren, 
and by 1837 a conservative revolt in Virginia, led by 
William Cabell Rives, began to draw people away from the 
traditional power base of the Junto. The Conservatives under 
Rives tapped into discontent with Van Buren and his economic 
policies and helped the Whigs to regain power in 1838.
Although the Junto managed to put together enough 
support to carry Virginia for Van Buren by the slimmest of
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margins in 1840, the nature of politics in Virginia was 
changing and the Junto's power was on the decline. The 
question of slavery, which Ritchie and the Junto had tried 
to keep out of public debate, was playing an increasingly 
prominent role in Virginia politics. An equally significant 
development was the reemergence of John C. Calhoun as a key 
player in the Democratic party. In the late 1820s and early 
1830s Calhoun was viewed as too radical by most Virginians, 
but by 1840 his ideas appealed to many men in the state who 
had experienced a decade of economic and political strife. A 
new generation of political leaders in the Old Dominion 
seemed especially interested in the South Carolinian.
Calhoun Democrats became potent enough in the early 1840s to 
challenge the Junto for control of the party.
Faced with attacks from both the Whigs and the Calhoun 
Democrats, the Junto attempted to redeem its standing in the 
state by severing its relationship with Van Buren over the 
question of annexing Texas in 1844. By then it was too late. 
The group no longer spoke for Virginia. The increasingly 
strident position of Southern spokesmen on the question of 
slavery left little room for compromise and conciliation, 
the forte of Ritchie and his group. The editor, dismayed by 
developments in his beloved state, finally agreed to leave 
Richmond in 1845 to run a national paper in Washington. With 
Ritchie's departure, the Junto breathed its last.
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This dissertation explores and assesses the ways in 
which one group of men confronted the tensions and 
contradictions facing Americans in the early nineteenth 
century. The Richmond Junto played a key role in shaping 
Virginia's actions during the period known as the Age of 
Jackson. Like many Virginians, the member's response to the 
transformations taking place in their society was 
ambivalent. The Junto, for instance, believed in preserving 
both the doctrines of state rights and a strong federal 
Union. While this may appear paradoxical, to the members of 
the Junto it seemed an appropriate response. Ritchie,
Daniel, and the others lived dual lives. They were 
Virginians first, heirs to a remarkably rich political 
tradition. But they were also Americans, the first 
generation to be raised as citizens of the United States. 
These men desired both a rejuvenated Virginia and a strong 
and prosperous country. They saw these goals as being 
interconnected, not antithetical. In his will, Ritchie 
reminded his fellow citizens to "Preserve both the Rights of 
the Union and the Rights of the States. These are the two 
great pillars of American prosperity and glory."22 Ritchie 
died in 1854, just a few years before the two things that he 
loved the most, Virginia and the Federal Union, dissolved 
their relationship and engaged in civil war.
22Cited in Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 300.
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Chapter I
"Sentinels of Liberty":
The Revival of State Rights, 1815-1824
In the years following the Treaty of Ghent, the rise of 
American nationalism prompted Virginia's republicans to 
reaffirm their faith in the Jeffersonian principles of state 
rights. Alarmed at the direction in which the nation and the 
commonwealth seemed headed after the War of 1812, the 
state's Republican party, guided by the Richmond Junto, 
fought tirelessly to stop the "fashionable heresies of the 
time" before they brought permanent ruin to the Union. The 
Junto, a small coterie of politicians headquartered in 
Virginia's capital, firmly believed that the best antidote 
to the consolidating tendencies of the central government 
was a revival of the fundamental principles of the 
republican faith.1 The Panic of 1819, the Marshall Court's
‘Richmond Enquirer (hereafter cited as RE), July 17, 
1821. The importance of the Enquirer to early 19th century 
Virginians, especially in the realm of politics, has been 
noted by historians, but bears repeating. Founded in 1804, the 
paper quickly became the medium through which most 
politically-minded Virginians got their information. Ritchie's 
paper had the highest circulation in the state until 1842. 
Robert Hume Tomlinson, "The Origins and Editorial Policies of 
The Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser. 1824-1865" (Ph.D. 
diss., Michigan State University, 1971), 3.
25
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decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Cohens v. 
Virginia (1821), Clay's American System, and the Missouri 
Crisis were all signs that the federal government, now under 
the control of northern politicians and capitalists, had 
dedicated itself to the destruction of the powers and 
liberties of the states.
Spencer Roane, an early leader of the Junto, summarized 
the sentiment of Virginia's political elite in 1819 when he 
noted that the "tendency of the general government to 
aggrandize itself and to sweep away the State authorities" 
was undeniable. "If a powerful counteraction is not made, 
every thing will be lost. Our confederation will be but a 
name, and the liberties of the people will fall with the 
State governments." Virginians, with their distinguished 
history of leadership in the nation, must again rise to the 
occasion and repel the assaults on the sovereignty of the 
states. "Whenever state rights are threatened or invaded," 
Junto spokesmen pledged, "Virginia will not be the last to 
sound the tocsin."2
A second and equally important motivation for 
recommitting the Old Dominion to the tenets of Jeffersonian 
republicanism concerned the declining influence of the state 
in national affairs. That Virginia's prestige had slipped 
seemed obvious to party leaders, as obvious as the challenge
2Spencer Roane to James Barbour, Dec. 29, 1819, William 
and Mary Quarterly, series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 7-8; RE, 
March 30, 1819.
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to the state's authority posed by the centralizing policies 
of the federal government. By spearheading a reaction 
against nationalism, the Junto hoped that Virginia, 
birthplace of Washington, Henry, Jefferson, and Madison, 
would resume its rightful place in the nation's councils.
The usually astute John Quincy Adams thought he discerned 
the true reasons for the state's actions when he noted that 
"Virginia opposition ... to implied powers ... is a 
convenient weapon, to be taken up or laid aside as it suits
the purposes of State turbulence and ambition."3
At the forefront of the movement to revive state rights 
ideology in Virginia stood Spencer Roane and Thomas Ritchie. 
Roane, judge of the supreme court of Virginia, guided the
Junto until his death in 1822. In his attacks on John
Marshall's Supreme Court, Roane provided an ideological 
rationale for anti-nationalistic sentiment in the state. By 
all accounts a zealous partisan and a throwback to an 
earlier age, the jurist looked to the past for his 
inspiration and deprecated the democratic urges of the day. 
Roane's arguments were derived largely from the ideas of the 
Old Republicans, men like John Randolph of Roanoke and John 
Taylor of Caroline, who can accurately be described as rigid
30ct. 28, 1821; quoted in Harry Ammon, "The Richmond
Junto, 1800-1824." Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 
Vol. 61 (1953), 409.
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conservatives and ultra-strict constructionists.4
After Roane's death in 1822, new leaders gained power, 
men who had different notions of how to wage the war on 
centralization. Thomas Ritchie, Roane's cousin and editor of 
the Richmond Enquirer. assumed leadership of the clique. 
Although he shared the same goals as Roane, the reawakening 
of a "spirit of republicanism" and the restoration of 
Virginia's influence at the national level, Ritchie 
exhibited more moderation and willingness to compromise than 
his kinsman. The editor believed that the Junto could best 
achieve its goals by keeping the Republican party, and the 
state, unified. That entailed making compromises, assuaging 
sectional tensions, and discarding some of the more extreme 
Old Republican principles.5 The Junto, now led by Ritchie, 
Andrew Stevenson, Peter V. Daniel, John and William 
Brockenbrough, Richard E. Parker, and William H. Roane, also 
worked diligently to reestablish the Virginia-New York
4Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," WMO. 
2nd series, Vol. 22 (1942), 1-17; Clyde C. Gelbach, "Spencer 
Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822: A Judicial Advocate of State 
Rights" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1955); 
Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of 
Jeffersonian Principle" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 
1967). Roane awaits a skillful biographer. For the Old 
Republicans, see Norman Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern 
Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965).
5,,A Virginian," RE, April 30, 1819. Charles H. Ambler, 
Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics (Richmond: Bell 
Book & Stationary Co., 1913); Bert Marsh Mutersbaugh, 
"Jeffersonian Journalist: Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond 
Enquirer. 1804-1820" (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 
1973) .
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alliance that had guided the country in its infancy. The 
state could never stand up to the federal government alone, 
they reasoned, especially when critics around the country 
were complaining about the influence Virginia had on 
national political affairs. Thus, when Martin Van Buren, 
leader of the Albany Regency and the New York Republican 
party, visited Richmond in 1822 and 1823 to discuss a 
possible alliance he found a receptive audience. As the 
presidential election of 1824 neared, the forces of the 
Regency and the Junto joined in an effort to elect William 
H. Crawford. Van Buren and Ritchie agreed that Crawford 
represented the best hope of saving the Republican party and 
the country in a time of such crisis.6
Crawford's defeat at the hands of John Quincy Adams 
proved a bitter blow to Van Buren, the Virginia Republican 
party, and the Junto, but not a fatal one. In fact, the 
inner circle at Richmond managed to retain a good deal of 
political power within the state. Moreover, their efforts to 
revive the state rights philosophy in the commonwealth had 
begun to bear fruit.7 Adams's victory had been a setback, to
6For Van Buren's trips to Richmond and the renewal of the 
Virginia-New York alliance, see Robert V. Remini, Martin Van 
Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959); Richard H. Brown "Southern 
Planters and Plain Republicans of the North: Martin Van
Buren's Formula for National Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Yale 
University, 1955).
7In 1819 Roane noted that a "revival of the spirit and 
principles of 1799 has ... taken place here." Roane to 
Barbour, Dec. 29, 1819, WMQ, series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 7-
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be sure, but the Junto refused to give up their fight to 
save Virginia from the dangers of consolidation. "There is 
yet a Spartan band to rally around the rights of 'the 
States' and of 'the people,'" Ritchie wrote in February of 
1825, "who though defeated, will persist.... The Old 
Dominion is firm, fearless and unshaken."8
The defiant tone of Ritchie's words was a hallmark of 
the Old Dominion's response to the events of the late- 
Jeffersonian era. Virginians spoke out so forcefully against 
the policies of nationalism because they believed that the 
stakes were so high. Since 1800 orthodox Republicans had 
accepted the doctrines of the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and Madison's Report of 1800 as the essence of 
their political creed. The notion of state sovereignty and a 
strict construction of the powers of the federal government 
constituted the most fundamental tenets of what was 
popularly known as the "Virginia principles." Intertwined 
with this devotion to state rights were concerns about the 
purity of the republican experiment. Many Virginians 
believed that efforts to increase the power of the general 
government fostered corruption and tyranny and threatened 
the independence of the individual citizen. If unchecked, 
such policies threatened to topple republicanism in the
8. Early in 1822 Ritchie spoke of the increased vigilance of 
the state in its efforts to stop the "march of usurpation." 
RE, Jan. 5, 1822.
8RE, Feb. 12, 1825.
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young nation.9
Virginia's political faith seemed to be under full 
attack as early as 1815. Economic nationalism and judicial 
review threatened to upset the delicate balance between the 
powers of the state and federal governments outlined in the 
Constitution. If these dangerous doctrines were not resisted 
and put down, the results would be catastrophic. A corrupt 
and powerful national government would reduce the states to 
a permanently subservient position and steadily reduce the 
sphere of liberty in the country. Something must be done to 
preserve the powers of the states, and Virginia, with its 
revolutionary heritage and prominent place in the Union, was 
uniquely qualified to lead the attack. The sense of urgency 
many Virginians felt during these years can be seen in the 
response of "Nestor*' to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohens 
v. Virginia (1821). Would Virginia "succumb" to the "usurped 
powers" of the court, he asked, or act to prove that "she is 
still a FREE, SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT state." The "eyes 
of the nation," he noted, "are anxiously looking toward 
Richmond" to see how the state would respond.10
9Kathryn Ruth Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines, the 
Commonwealth, and the Republic: The Role of Fundamental
Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798-1833" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1981), describes the state's 
devotion to the principles of 1798 and persuasively argues 
that they "served as the articulated outline of the ideology 
which shaped the political culture" of Virginia in the first 
three decades of the nineteenth century. (10)
10"Nestor," RE, Jan. 10, 1822.
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Despite the inflammatory rhetoric, "Nestor's" warning 
contained some truth. How the Old Dominion responded to the 
challenges posed by nationalism was important and was 
closely monitored across the nation. In 1822 a Virginian 
still occupied the White House, Jefferson and Madison still 
engendered national respect, and the state still ranked near 
the top in population and wealth. Developments in Virginia 
between 1815 and 1824 clearly had national significance.
The first signs of the state's uneasiness with national 
events came shortly after the War of 1812. Most Virginians 
had supported "Mr. Madison's war" and experienced the heady 
nationalism of the day. But as the fighting ended and the 
glow of patriotism faded, the state's political leaders 
found themselves confronted with a daunting series of 
problems. While events at the national level portended ill 
for the rights of the state, the discontent of western 
Virginians threatened to divide the state along regional 
lines and weaken the power of the inner circle at Richmond. 
Political leaders in western Virginia stepped up their call 
for improved transportation networks, expanded state banking 
facilities, and democratic constitutional reform. In 1816, 
the same year that Ritchie signalled the Junto's break with 
the national party by speaking out against the tariff and 
the rechartering of the Bank of the United States, 
disgruntled westerners convened in Staunton and proposed
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widespread changes to the state's constitution.11
The result of the nationalistic measures of Congress 
and of the Supreme Court and the grumblings within the state 
for reform was a headlong charge back into the particularist 
doctrines of the state rights school, led by the Junto. One 
sign of this return to the principles of 1798 was the 
restoration to party favor of Randolph and Taylor, who had 
kept the torch of the "Virginia principles" alive during the 
high-tide of nationalism. Both men had temporarily fallen 
from grace with party leaders earlier for criticizing 
Jefferson's second administration and opposing James 
Madison's presidential candidacy in 1808.12 Randolph's 
refusal to support the War of 1812 and his charge that the 
country was "enveloped in the toils of French duplicity" 
cost him at the polls as well, where his constituents ousted 
him from office for the only time in his long career. 
Taylor's warnings against the "wartime extension of federal
"Charles Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia From 1776 to 
1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), 93-102. For 
Ritchie's break with party leadership, see the Enquirer. 
March-August, 1816, passim.
12For Randolph's well-known break with Jefferson, see 
Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American 
Politics (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978); Robert Dawidoff, 
The Education of John Randolph (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1979), esp. ch. 5; for Taylor's opposition to Jefferson, see 
his letter to James Madison, Jan. 15, 1808, James Madison 
Papers, University of Virginia; Daniel P. Jordan, Political 
Leadership in Jefferson's Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1983), 19. Ammon discusses the 
two men's role in the election of 1808 in "The Richmond Junto, 
1800-1824," 403-405.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 4
powers" in An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the 
Government of the United States, published in 1814, went 
largely unnoticed amidst the celebrations of the Battle of 
New Orleans and the news of a peace treaty.13 But 
developments after the war vindicated Taylor and Randolph, 
and by 1817 they were being hailed as true republicans and 
restored to their rightful place as party spokesmen.14 With 
new found unity, the Republican party of Virginia marshalled 
its forces for the fight against the dangers of nationalism.
An early target of the Junto was the Supreme Court. 
Between 1816 and 1821, the high tribunal handed down three 
decisions that sparked controversy in Virginia and 
strengthened devotion to the principles of '98. In 1816, the 
court's verdict in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, concerning the 
fate of the Fairfax land grants, "did much to diminish
13John Randolph, "To the Freeholders of Charlotte, Prince 
Edward, Buckingham, and Cumberland," May 30, 1812, reprinted 
in Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke. 238-243, quote on 243; John 
Taylor, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the 
Government of the United States (Fredericksburg, Va: Green and 
Cady, 1814) , as discussed in Risjord, The Old Republicans. 
149; Robert Shalhope, John Tavlor of Caroline: Pastoral
Republican (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1980). On Randolph and Taylor's ostracism, see Ammon, "The 
Richmond Junto," 404-405.
14The timing of Randolph and Taylor's restoration is 
disputed. I agree with Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 160; 
Risjord, The Old Republicans. 177; and Jordan, Political 
Leadership. 19, that it came about by 1817 or so. Ammon, in 
"The Richmond Junto," 404-405, argues that reconciliation did 
not take place until 1320, as does Charles D. Lowery, James 
Barbour. A Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al: The
University of Alabama Press, 1984), 58, 133.
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nationalistic sentiment" in the state.15 When the justices 
ruled three years later in McCulloch v. Maryland that a 
state could not tax the Bank of the United States, political 
leaders in the Old Dominion spoke out strongly against both 
the Court and the bank it defended.16 Finally, in Cohens v. 
Virginia, Virginians expressed outrage when the Court 
accepted a case appealed from the highest court in the 
state.17
Each of the court's rulings, derived from a loose 
construction of the Constitution, elicited vigorous response 
from Virginia Republicans. Spencer Roane was especially 
active in attacking Marshall and his fellow justices. In a 
series of essays written under the pseudonym of "Hampden," 
Roane lambasted the reasoning of the McCulloch decision and 
began an extensive reformulation of the theory that the 
Constitution protected state sovereignty by clearly limiting
15Ambler, Sectionalism. 103.
16Chief Justice John Marshall, a neighbor of most of the 
Junto members and source of their irritation on this matter, 
commented extensively on the negative reaction in Virginia 
towards the Court's ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland. "Great 
dissatisfaction has been given to the politicians of Virginia 
by our opinion on the bank question," he told Bushrod 
Washington. They will attack the decision in the papers and we 
will be "condemned as a pack of consolidating aristocratics." 
Marshall to Washington, March 27, 1819, John Marshall Papers, 
College of William and Mary.
17Marshall thought that this decision "has been assaulted 
with a degree of virulence transcending what has appeared on 
any former occasion." Marshall to Joseph Story, June 15, 1821, 
Marshall Papers, William and Mary (typescript copy of original 
in Massachusetts Historical Society).
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the powers of the central government. Two years later, in 
1821, Roane wrote again, this time in response to Cohens. 
Thinly disguised as "Algernon Sidney," the jurist continued 
his attack on the high court and his campaign to instill a 
state rights ideology among his countrymen. Roane's essays 
constitute an excellent summary of the southern state 
rights' platform as it stood in the early 1820s. As such, 
they merit careful consideration.18
In his essays Roane set out to awaken his fellow 
countrymen "from the fatal coma which has fallen upon them" 
and to warn of the "progress of federal usurpation." In 
order to do this, to stop the dangerous expansion of the 
powers of the central government, Roane proposed a 
"recurrence to fundamental principles" and a reexamination 
of the nature of the Constitution.19
Roane argued that the compact that formed the Union in 
1789 represented the culmination of the ideals of the 
American Revolution. In their desire to create a strong and 
permanent union, the writers of the Constitution had been
18"Hampden," RE, June 11, 15, 18, 22, 1819, reprinted in 
John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College. 
Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 77-121; "Algernon Sidney," RE, May 
25, 29, June 5, 8, 1821, reprinted in Branch Historical
Papers. Vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1906), 78-183. Until recently, 
scholars had also attributed the "Amphictyon" letters (RE, 
March 30, April 2, 1819) to Roane. Gerald Gunther, in the
introduction to John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. 
Maryland (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), has
challenged that notion and named William Brockenbrough, 
another Junto member, as "Amphictyon."
19"Hampden," 121; "Algernon Sidney," 78-79.
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wise enough to place limits on the powers that the national 
government could wield. The states had given up some of 
their powers in joining the Union, but maintained their 
sovereignty. The first ten amendments offered further 
safeguards against abuses of power and delegated all 
unspecified powers to the people and to the states. The 
hallmark of the Constitution, Roane concluded, was its 
deliberate efforts to preserve state sovereignty.20
Since the adoption of the Constitution, there had been 
those who had attempted to subvert its true meaning by 
giving inordinate powers to the central government. In 1798, 
the threat of the Federalists had been turned back by 
Jefferson and Madison's brilliant rebuttal in the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions. The "Doctrines of '98" represented 
the "Magna Charta" of all true republicans and "its 
principles have only been departed from since by turn-coats 
and apostates." But the country was once again falling prey 
to the designs of the Federalists, who were even more 
dangerous now because they disguised themselves as 
Republicans. Under their influence, a "money-loving, 
funding, stock-jobbing spirit has taken foothold among us," 
Roane claimed. While the "liberties and constitution of our 
country are endangered," the people remained "sunk in
20"Hampden," 79, 83-93; "Algernon Sidney," 97-99.
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apathy. "21
To make his countrymen aware of the dangers that 
confronted them, Roane spelled out the implications of the 
court's rulings. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall and his 
fellow justices had sought "to adjudicate away the reserved 
rights of a sovereign member of the confederacy, and vest 
them in the general government." The consequences of this 
were plain for all to see. "If the limits imposed on the 
general government, by the constitution, are stricken off, 
they have, literally, the power to legislate for us 'in all 
cases whatsoever'; and then we may bid a last adieu to the 
State governments." Likewise, the Cohens decision 
"completely negatives the idea that the American States have 
a real existence, or are to be considered, in any sense, as 
sovereign and independent states.1,22 Here was the essence of 
Roane's argument. Virginians and their fellow countrymen 
must resist the federalist pronouncements of the high court 
by adhering closely to the fundamental doctrines of the 
republican faith. To do otherwise would be tantamount to 
rejecting the principles that underlie the Constitution. 
Ignoring the threat posed by the Court could prove fatal to 
the rights of the states and the cause of liberty.
21"Hampden," 82-83; "Algernon Sidney," 78. Roane chose his 
words well. His references to stock-jobbers and the evils of 
banking were clearly designed to evoke traditional opposition 
concern about the dangers of an artificial "paper 
aristocracy."
22"Hampden,1 80-81; "Algernon Sidney," 80.
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The "Hampden" and "Algernon Sidney" essays were widely 
applauded in Virginia and attracted the praise of Jefferson 
and Madison, but Roane was not alone in condemning the high 
court.23 In 1819 the state legislature adopted one 
resolution, introduced by Junto member Andrew Stevenson, 
that suggested a constitutional amendment to limit the scope 
of the Supreme Court's powers, and a second that instructed 
its senators in Congress to oppose the Bank of the United 
States. Two years later the legislature approved three more 
amendments designed to reduce further the court's 
jurisdiction.24
Letters and editorials criticizing the high court and 
pleading for action on the part of the states appeared 
frequently in the columns of Ritchie's Enquirer. One writer 
insisted that the Supreme Court had interpreted the 
Constitution in a "directly different manner" than that 
intended by its framers. Another bemoaned the court's
23Jefferson wrote Roane that the "Hampden" essays "contain 
the true principles of the revolution of 1800." Jefferson to 
Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 10:140- 
143. In 1821 Jefferson said of the jurist, "to him I look, and 
have long looked, as our strongest bulwark" against the 
forces of consolidation. Jefferson to Archibald Thweatt, Jan. 
19, 1821, Ford, ed., Writings of Jefferson. 10:184-185. For 
praise of the "Algernon Sidney" letters, see Jefferson to 
Roane, June 25, 1821, Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1, 
(June 1905), 138-139, and Madison to Roane, June 29, 1821, 
James Madison Papers, Library of Congress.
24Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia —  1819 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1819), 56-59; 
Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 209; Ammon, "The Richmond 
Junto," 408; Ambler, Sectionalism. 104.
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pronouncements and fretted over the declining "watchfulness 
and opposition" on the part of state rights' advocates. An 
anonymous poet, who made up for his lack of literary talent 
with partisan zeal, had a stern warning for the Chief 
Justice:
Old Johnny Marshall mind your ways, 
and let the States alone sir, 
or else before there are many days, 
you'll yield your place to Roane sir.25
Ritchie hinted at the partisan overtones involved in the 
Court's decisions. In October of 1819 he twice called upon 
his fellow Virginians to interpose their authority against 
the court's ruling in McCulloch in the same manner that the 
state had opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. 
"Crito" ended his diatribe on the Cohens decision with a 
challenge: "Defenders of the federal Constitution in its 
proper powers! - Defenders of state rights! - Sentinels of 
liberty! - to your posts!"26
25"Franklin," RE, April 23, 1819; "A Virginian," RE, April 
30, 1819; Anonymous, n.d. [1821?], Marshall Papers, William 
and Mary (photostat of original at University of Virginia).
26RE, April 20, 23, Oct. 15, 22, 1819; "Crito," RE, Feb. 
17, 1821. Apparently there were limits to Ritchie's devotion 
to this cause. When the editor and printer declined to publish 
in pamphlet form Roane's "Algernon Sidney" essays, the jurist 
snapped that "Ritchie and Gooch [co-owner of the Enquirer1 
have not liberality and public spirit enough to engage in the 
publication of books or pamphlets unless they conduce to their 
immediate emolument." Roane to Archibald Thweatt, Dec. 11, 
1821, Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 
140-141. For other evidence of a split between the two leaders 
of the Junto at this time, see Ritchie to Roane, M.S., n.d. 
[probably 1821 or 1822], Virginia Historical Society.
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Despite such enthusiasm, the popular response to 
Ritchie's plea for action and to Roane's abstract legal 
arguments proved disappointing. While Marshall's 
condemnation of Roane's writings was expected, the Junto 
leader complained bitterly of the "apathy of the times" and 
chided Jefferson and Madison for not taking a more prominent 
role in the struggle against the aggrandizing measures of 
the national government.27 Madison responded by claiming 
that "in the existing posture of things ... the latitude of 
jurisdiction assumed by the Judicial power of the U.S. ... 
is less formidable to the reserved sovereignty of the 
States, than the latitude of power which it has assigned to 
the Legislature." In other words, Roane was barking up the 
wrong tree.28 Other Virginians agreed. They found it 
difficult to get excited about obscure and legalistic 
debates on the limits of judicial powers, especially when
27Roane to Thweatt, Dec. 11, 24, 1821, Branch Historical 
Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 140-142. Marshall slammed 
Roane for his "coarseness & malignity of invention." Marshall 
to Joseph Story, June 15, 1821, Marshall Papers, William and 
Mary (typescript copy of original in Massachusetts Historical 
Society). What most upset Marshall about Roane's and the 
Junto's response to the Court's decision was their efforts to 
return the country to what he believed were the dark days of 
the Articles of Confederation. By 1821, Marshall was convinced 
that "A deep design to convert our government into a mere 
league of states has taken hold of a powerful & violent, party 
in Virginia. The attack upon the judiciary is in fact an 
attack upon the union." Marshall to Story, Sept. 18, 1821, 
Marshall Papers, William and Mary (typescript copy of original 
at Massachusetts Historical Society).
28Madison to Roane, May 6, 1821, M.S., General Collection,
UVA.
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more pressing matters confronted them. In 1819 and 1821 
people were much more concerned about the state of the 
economy.
The Panic of 1819 compounded the financial troubles of 
the South, and of the eastern portions of Virginia in 
particular. With the notable exception of the immediate 
postwar years, Tidewater and Piedmont Virginians had watched 
the value of their land and of their agricultural exports 
decrease dramatically since the 1790s. A steady exodus of 
farmers to the south and west served as a further reminder 
of the bleak conditions in the area. The economic panic that 
paralyzed the nation's commerce starting in 1819 accelerated 
the pace of both these phenomena. Between 1817 and 1830 the 
value of Virginia's exports dropped steadily, as did the 
total value of land in the state.29 More than 2,000 people 
left Richmond between 1817 and 1820, and at the height of 
the depression property in the city lost from one-half to 
three-quarters of its value. "The distress of Richmond has 
increased one hundred fold," one city dweller wrote in March 
of 1819. "The Banks are loosing [sic] all their specie - and 
have been obliged to stop discounts - men of the best credit 
today, are suspected tomorrow, and the next are found 
ruined." On top of everything else, much of Virginia
29Avery Craven, Soil Exhaustion As a Factor in the 
Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland. 1606-1850. in 
University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol. 
13, no. 1 (1925), 72-121.
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experienced a severe drought in the summer of 1819 that 
threatened to ruin many crops completely. Times had rarely 
been harder.30 John Randolph predicted, only half-jokingly, 
that the "day would come" in eastern Virginia "when the 
master would run away from his negroes and be advertised by 
them in the public prints."31
Those who remained behind responded to their plight in 
a number of ways. John Taylor and Edmund Ruffin experimented 
with new farming techniques. Planters banded together in 
agricultural societies, the most famous of which was the 
Albemarle Agricultural Association. At its meetings, 
regularly reported in the Enquirer. members of the 
Association presented reports on the results of their 
agricultural experiments.32 Eastern Virginians even tried to
30Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism. 1819-1848 Vol. 5 of A History of the South 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948) , 113. In 
chapter 5 of his work, Sydnor assesses the impact of the Panic 
on the South; William Dandridge to Dr. James Morris, March 22, 
1819, Morris Family Papers, UVA; RE, July and August, 1819. 
See editorial of Aug. 10, 1819 for anxiety over drought
conditions.
31Ambler, Sectionalism. 111. For similar expressions of 
despair, see Robert P. Sutton, "Nostalgia, Pessimism, and 
Malaise: The Doomed Aristocrat in Late-Jeffersonian Virginia," 
VMHB. Vol. 76 (1968), 41-55; Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "The 
Declension of Virginia, 1776-1860: An Historiographical
Perspective," unpublished paper, 1990.
“Taylor's Arator. first published in 1814 and republished 
in 1823, offered the most extensive discussion of new 
agricultural techniques. Ruffin's later work was equally 
influential. See Craven, Soil Exhaustion. 97-99, 105-106, 134- 
142. The Enquirer began printing speeches from the Ablemarle 
Association in 1818. See also "Minute Book of the Agricultural 
Society of Albemarle," Annual Report of the American
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grow cotton on their lands, and for a brief time in the mid- 
1820s production rose steadily and the venture looked like 
it might succeed. But falling prices and the thin soils of 
the region combined to make eastern Virginia's experiment 
with King Cotton a short one.33
The unsuccessful efforts of eastern planters to reverse 
their economic decline served to harden their commitment to 
the political doctrines of the state rights school. As they 
examined the sources of their impoverished condition, it 
became increasingly clear that factors beyond their control 
were partly to blame. Since they could not hope to control 
crop prices on the international market, eastern Virginians 
sought out ways to lower costs, such as reducing high tariff 
duties, and to expand their markets, such as ending trade 
restriction with the West Indies.34 Such goals put them at 
odds with the nationalists in Congress. By 1820, eastern 
Virginians had come to view most of the policies associated 
with Henry Clay's "American System" as inimical to their 
interests. A federally funded program of internal 
improvements, a national bank, and a protective tariff, they
Historical Association. Vol. 1 (1918), 263-349.
“Virginia produced 25,000,000 pounds of cotton in 1826, 
but only 10,000,000 pounds in 1834, two million pounds less 
than had been produced in 1821. Ambler, Sectionalism. 115,
n. 53 =
“William H. Roane to John C. Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824, 
Harrison Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society; RE, Jan. 
8, 1822.
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argued, were all part of a plan to weaken the economic and 
political power of the agricultural South at the hands of 
the capitalists and manufacturers of the North.
Even before the Panic of 1819 hit, the planters of 
eastern Virginia had attributed the region's economic woes 
to the corruption and mismanagement of the Bank of the 
United States. Although they had no problem with state 
chartered banks, strict constructionists considered a 
national bank unconstitutional, and Ritchie had heaped abuse 
upon it since its rechartering in 1816. The "bank question" - 
not just the debate over the constitutionality of its 
charter, but discussions of its policies and impact on 
regional economies - was among the most talked about 
subjects of the day, far outstripping in volume and in 
intensity the debates on the Supreme Court's decisions.35
Coupled with distrust of the Bank of United States was 
a strong aversion to protective tariffs. Eastern Virginians 
sensed that tariff duties ostensibly designed to encourage 
American manufacturing were in fact nothing more than 
government approved taxes imposed on the agricultural South 
to nourish the commercial and manufacturing interests of the 
North. In petitions, memorials, private correspondence, and
35For typical examples of anti-Bank sentiment, see 
Ritchie's editorial of Sept. 18, 1818 and Sept. 3, 1819, as 
well as the essays of "Lycurgus," Oct. 16, 1818, and
"Americanus," Oct. 20, 1818, all in RE. Junto members held 
positions of power in all of Virginia's banks, both state and 
national.
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newspaper columns, Virginians explained how artificially 
high duties hurt the South both economically and 
politically. The tariff, as John C. Calhoun made clear in 
his Exposition (1828), forced farmers to buy high and sell 
low. Protective duties were also of dubious 
constitutionality, and the Old Dominion's congressmen 
spearheaded opposition to the tariff in Washington by 
cultivating a steady habit of voting against any rate 
increases.36
Another burden imposed upon the South by the national 
government, eastern Virginians argued, was a bloated and 
useless system of internal improvements. Ritchie, like many 
eastern Virginians, agreed that a state-funded program of 
improvements was desirable, in fact necessary, to revive the 
commerce of the state. But a federally-funded program was 
both unconstitutional and clearly designed to benefit the 
western portions of the country at the expense of 
easterners. What use did a Tidewater or Piedmont farmer have 
for costly projects that offered them no relief from their
36While the South split over the tariff of 1816, 
Virginia's delegation opposed it 13 to 6. By 1824, the rest of 
the South had joined Virginia in condemning the protective 
tariff. Lowery, James Barbour. 92-93, 141. For examples of 
eastern Virginia's opposition to the tariff, see RE, Sept. 24, 
1819, Feb. 19, April 28, May 2, Aug. 11, 1820 (Proceedings of 
a meeting called in Richmond to protest the tariff), and "The 
Farmers and Merchants of Fredericksburg, A Memorial on the 
Policy of Protective Tariffs," which appeared on the front 
page of the Enquirer of Aug. 25, 1820. The memorial, written 
by John Taylor, noted that the "mercantile, naval, and 
agricultural occupations, are all discouraged by restrictions 
upon commerce."
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economic misfortunes?37
From this brief examination of the response of eastern 
Virginia to the economic and political questions of the day, 
it can be seen that provincialism and sectionalism had 
assumed new importance in the state by 1820. In an 1821 
editorial Ritchie summarized the region's growing hostility 
to the American System and to all things northern. As the 
editor saw it, the North was the "place where the people 
were losing interest in the preservation of the 
Constitution; where the public expenditures were being made; 
where the United States Bank sat in majesty; where the 
spirit of mercantile cupidity was enveloping itself in the 
mantle of monopoly and privilege; and where the people 
wished to enthrone the federal government and debase that of 
the states."38 Among the more important consequences of the 
depressed economic condition of much of the state during the 
postwar years was the considerable aid it gave to the 
Junto's efforts to reassert the primacy of the "Virginia 
principles."
37RE, March 20, Nov. 16, March 16, 1819. Mutersbaugh, 
"Jeffersonian Journalist," 129, explains Ritchie's support of 
state-supported internal improvements: "There were no
constitutional difficulties here, and no fear of 
centralization sliding toward tyranny." Philip N. Nicholas 
informed Andrew Stevenson that their opinions on internal 
improvements "suit the meridian of Richmond and the Old 
Dominion better than that of Washington." Nicholas to 
Stevenson, April 8, 1824, Papers of Andrew and John White 
Stevenson, LC.
38The words are Ambler's analysis of Ritchie's editorial 
of Aug. 8, 1821, in Sectionalism. 119.
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A more significant development that pushed Virginians 
toward adopting a strong state rights ideology was the 
Missouri Crisis. Between 1819 and 1821 debate on this 
question occupied center stage, at times reaching fever 
pitch. From start to end of the crisis the state's political 
leaders, including the Jutno, rallied their fellow citizens 
to action. They argued that "Virginia at the head of the 
Southern States, ought now to speak as she did in '98. She 
ought to put forth her whole strength + save the 
Constitution from this unhallowed assault." The General 
Assembly agreed and adopted resolutions pledging to resist, 
"with manly fortitude, any attempt which Congress may make 
to impose restraints, or restrictions, as the price of 
admission [of Missouri to statehood], not authorized by the 
great principles of the constitution."39
In discussions on the Missouri question that followed, 
two main issues impressed Virginians as vital to the welfare 
of their state and the Union. First and foremost, efforts to 
restrict Missouri's entrance into the Union must be resisted 
at all costs. Attempts by northern congressmen to impose 
conditions upon the territory's admission to statehood were 
unconstitutional and set an ominous precedent that 
threatened all of the states. The Tallmadge Amendment, which
39Thomas McLeland to Joseph C. Cabell, Jan. 12, 1820,
Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Journal of the House of Delegates 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia .. . 1820 (Richmond: Thomas 
Ritchie, 1820), 166-178.
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sought to end slavery in Missouri, amounted to "a vital blow 
... aimed at the constitution of the United States.... A 
government limited in its powers is to be endued with an 
authority to which there is no assignable limit." To 
acquiesce in this bold move on the part of northern 
politicians would be equivalent to forfeiting state 
sovereignty. Ritchie made this clear when he noted that "it 
is in the interest of all the states to support the rights 
of Missouri: her rights are those of Virginia."40
Leaders in the commonwealth also expressed concern that 
proposals to exclude slavery from Missouri would provoke a 
divisive and unproductive debate on the merits of that 
institution. Undoubtedly, such a discussion would only 
heighten sectional animosities. "The East and the South 
stand on very different grounds" when it came to the topic 
of extending slavery, Ritchie noted. "The former says, 'We 
believe it to be expedient to restrict slavery;' the latter, 
'We believe a restriction to be a breach of the constitution 
which we have sworn to support." Northern critics of 
slavery, "fiery enthusiasts" quick to charge the "southern 
people with inhumanity" for owning slaves, failed to 
"conceive how difficult it is for us to be rid of it, in a
40RE, Jan. 22, 1820, May 27, 1819; see also Ritchie's 
editorials on July 9, Oct. 22, 1819.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 0
manner consistent with our future peace and tranquillity."41 
By throwing the debate on slavery into the political arena, 
northern zealots had presented the young nation with a 
problem that it simply was not capable of resolving without 
causing irreparable damage.
Virginians also believed that they detected ulterior 
motives in northern efforts to halt the extension of 
slavery. "Some sinister design, something inimical to the 
interests of the southern states" lurked "behind the 
specious mask of humanity." The real purpose for northern 
maneuvering on the Missouri question was to "exclude a very 
great majority of the citizens of the Southern States from a 
participation of the benefits and advantages ever to be 
derived from the fertile western regions, and confine them 
and their prosperity, to the narrow limits which they now 
possess." Spencer Roane echoed this sentiment when he wrote 
Madison that the state would never consent to be "damned up 
in a land of Slaves" as a consequence of northern "lust for 
dominion and power." Far removed from Virginia, John Quincy 
Adams speculated that the political dealings surrounding the 
Missouri Compromise were calculated to produce a new 
political alliance "terrible to the whole Union, but 
portentously terrible to the South - threatening in its
41RE, Jan. 11, Feb. 10, 1820. Even at this early stage of 
the debate over slavery, Ritchie had no stomach for extended 
discussion of this divisive question. "Where will the vortex 
of this slave question terminate?" he wondered aloud in the 
Feb. 3, 1821 edition of the Enquirer.
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progress the emancipation of all their slaves ..., and 
threatening that political ascendancy of Virginia ..." which 
had guided the country since Jefferson's election in 1800.42
When news reached Richmond in early 1820 of a proposed 
compromise that would admit Maine as a free state, Missouri 
as a slave state, and fix a line at 36 degrees and 3 0 
minutes, above which slavery would be forbidden, Virginians 
were stunned. Ritchie could barely contain himself. "A 
compromise! who will compromise with the constitution of the 
country? and barter away its essential principle?" In the 
capital "indignation at the idea of such a compromise is the 
ruling sentiment." People say, "If we yield now, beware.
They will ride us forever." George Hay wrote to his uncle, 
James Monroe, that Richmonders considered the Compromise "a 
base + hypocritical scheme to get power under the mask of 
humanity + it excites the most unqualified indignation + 
resentment.1,43
In a series of letters to Virginia senator James 
Barbour, Junto members and intimates explained their reasons 
for condemning the compromise. Henry St. George Tucker, a
42RE, Dec. 16, 1819; Roane to Madison, Feb. 16, 1820, in 
Ammon, "Richmond Junto," 412; Charles Francis Adams, ed., 
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), 4:529. 
The best treatment of the Missouri Crisis remains Glover 
Moore, The Missouri Controversy. 1819-1821 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1953).
43RE, Feb. 8, 10, 1820; George Hay to James Monroe, Feb. 
18, 1820, James Monroe Papers, LC.
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western Virginian in the capital for the legislative caucus 
to determine the state's presidential nominee in 1820, 
confided to Barbour that "I am unable to describe the 
sensation in Richmond at the intelligence conveyed by your 
letter. A compromise which gives up the fairest and largest 
part of the Western Territory and leaves us to a narrow slip 
intersected with mountains in one direction, destroyed by 
Earthquakes in another, and interspersed in a third with 
swamps and bayous, and infested with mosquitoes, and bilious 
diseases, never can be grateful to us." William Gordon 
discounted such practical considerations and went straight 
to what he believed was the heart of the matter. The South 
must resist the compromise not because of the "value of the 
territory or the disadvantage of the bargain so much," but 
rather because it "manifests what we consider a spirit of 
injustice and want of faith in the Northern politician, 
which if yielded to would lead only to farther and more 
daring and vital usurpations." Linn Banks, Speaker of the 
House of Delegates, used blunter language. "If a compromise 
of this kind be constitutional and expedient," he predicted, 
"it would lead directly to a dissolution of the Union, by 
giving an unjust influence in the National Councils, by 
which the Southern people would become the 'hewers of wood 
and drawers of water' for those of the North." In one fell 
swoop, northern politicians had announced their plan to
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smash the Union and enslave the South.44
Excitement over the proposed compromise reached such 
heights in Richmond that the legislative caucus was 
temporarily adjourned. By mid-February, however, tempers 
cooled and "reason ... resumed her empire." The caucus 
reconvened and endorsed Monroe, despite his alleged support 
of the Compromise. "We prefer him as president to any 
other," Roane informed Barbour, "but would not sacrifice our 
Constitution or risque [sic] our safety to insure his 
election. I expect this is a general sentiment in 
Virginia."45 Monroe's nomination amounted to a "tacit 
acceptance" of the Missouri Compromise on the part of 
Virginia's political leaders, albeit in a tone of 
resignation and not acquiescence. "We submit ..., we bow to 
it," Ritchie seethed, "though on no occasion with so poor a 
grace and so bitter a spirit.1,46
Ritchie could find something positive to say about the 
Missouri Compromise. Along with the controversy surrounding
^These and similar letters to Barbour appear in WMO. 
series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 5-24. Tucker's letter, dated 
Feb. 11, 1820, appears on pages 10 and 11; Gordon's, Feb. 18, 
1820, 18-19; Banks's, Feb. 20, 1820, 20-22. Barbour had broken 
the news of the proposed compromise and Monroe's support of it 
in a letter to Charles Yancey, who leaked it to the state 
legislators. Ibid., 6.
45Charles Yancey to Barbour, Feb. 16, 17, 1820; Roane to 
Barbour, Feb. 19, 1820, both in WMO. series 1, Vol. 10 (1901- 
1902), 13-18. For Barbour's role in getting Virginians to
accept the Missouri Compromise, see Lowery, James Barbour. 
110-141.
46Ammon, "The Richmond Junto," 413; RE, March 7, 1820.
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the American System and the Supreme Court's decisions, the 
compromise had provoked a much-needed return to the sound 
doctrines of the past. "A short time ago," the editor noted, 
"and the very sound of state rights was scarcely heard out 
of Virginia. But now the people begin to awake."47 Ritchie's 
assessment proved an accurate one. The questions of the day 
had reinvigorated the American political process by blowing 
life into the smoldering sectional animosities that lay just 
beneath the surface of the political landscape in the mis­
named Era of Good Feelings. Virginia's response between 1816 
and 1822 had been to restore to primacy the fundamental 
doctrines of the republican faith, including state rights 
and a strict interpretation of the Constitution. Now the Old 
Dominion's leaders turned their efforts to bringing about 
similar developments on a national scale. That could best be 
accomplished by putting a man who shared their beliefs in 
the White House.
The presidential election of 1824 began soon after 
James Monroe's second inauguration in March of 1821. Because 
no one stood out as the obvious successor to the Virginia 
dynasty, the field of candidates grew significantly. John 
Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, John Calhoun, William Crawford, 
and Andrew Jackson all had designs on the office. While no 
one matched Jefferson or Madison in stature, Adams and
47RE, Aug. 31, 1821.
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Crawford had served the country ably for decades, and 
Calhoun and Clay were rising stars in Congress. Jackson's 
popularity stemmed chiefly from his military successes in 
the War of 1812 and in Florida. Although all five candidates 
claimed membership in the Republican party, they differed 
significantly in their political beliefs and in their 
interpretations of the Constitution.48
The lack of ideological unity in the national 
Republican party had in fact been a point of contention with 
the Junto throughout Monroe's two terms as chief executive. 
The clique's tepid support for Monroe had stemmed in part 
from his qualified endorsements of nationalistic policies 
and his efforts to extinguish party differences, a policy 
referred to as amalgamation. A few Virginians agreed with 
the fifth president that political parties represented "the 
curse of the country." Daniel Norton, a young planter 
writing to a friend in Europe, expressed this displeasure 
when he complained of the damaging effects of party spirit 
on men. "So blinded are men to their own interests and to 
the good of the community, that when once they have joined 
and act[ed] under the influence of party spirit, rather than 
break that charm that holds them together, they will dance
48George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American 
Nationalism. 1815-1828 (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 218- 
230.
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hand in hand into Hell."49
A more common sentiment in Virginia was the belief 
that party distinctions needed to be preserved because they 
were both natural and beneficial to a democracy. Party 
spirit must exist, "Fabricus" told his fellow Virginians,
"in every free country.... Nothing but the rod of despotism 
can keep it down. To a certain extent, it may even be 
salutary; it creates and keeps alive a degree of vigilance 
on men in power which may often produce the happiest 
effects." William H. Roane, who had replaced his father in 
the Junto, notified John C. Calhoun that Monroe's efforts to 
abolish parties had cost him in Virginia because people 
realized that "there must ever be parties in the country." 
Jefferson explained to his good friend the Marquis de 
Lafayette that "the parties of Whig and Tory, are those of 
nature. They exist in all countries.... The sickly, weakly, 
timid man, fears the people, and is a tory by nature. The 
healthy, strong, and bold cherish them, and is formed a Whig 
by nature." To many politically-minded Virginians, attempts 
to eliminate competing parties could never succeed because
49Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Stanislaus Murray 
Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1902-1903), 6:284-290; Daniel N. Norton to J.J. 
Ambler, July 2, 1824, Papers of the Ambler and Barbour
Families, UVA.
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they went against human nature.50
Virginia's desire to preserve party distinctions struck 
a responsive chord with Martin Van Buren, who by 1822 was 
busy reviving the political alliance between New York and 
the Old Dominion, this time based upon a union of the Albany 
Regency and the Richmond Junto. The New Yorker had convinced 
himself that the "settled purpose of Mr Monroe[']s 
administration ... [was] ... to destroy the Republican Party 
by amalgamating it with its opponents." There was still time 
to reverse Monroe's folly and salvage the party of Jefferson 
if Virginia, spokesman for the South, lended its support to 
Van Buren's plan. "All hopes of the restoration of the 
party," Van Buren explained, "now rests on the fidelity of 
Virginia & New York.... Without the two pillars I have named 
the edifice cannot be sustained."51
To bring about the reorganization of the Republican 
party, Van Buren opened correspondence with prominent 
Virginians and travelled to the commonwealth to cultivate 
friendships with the Junto. The Little Magician's manners 
and devotion to the "Virginia principles" impressed 
political leaders in the state. Writing from Washington, 
Virginia congressman John Floyd told Junto associate
50"Fabricus," RE, Jan. 3, 1822; William H. Roane to John 
C. Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824, Harrison Family Papers, VHS; 
Jefferson to Lafayette, Nov. 3. 1823. Ford. ed., Writings of 
Jefferson. 10:279-283.
51Martin Van Buren to David Evans, June 9, 1824, Martin 
Van Buren Papers, LC.
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Claiborne W. Gooch that Van Buren represented "our hope to 
the north.... He will serve the purposes better than any, as 
his notions of State Rights are correct, and he is now 
almost the only distinguished man out of our own state who 
entertains opinions ... approximating our own." Ritchie 
struck up an immediate relationship with the New Yorker that 
lasted until 1844, when the two split on the Texas question. 
In 1822 and 1823 Van Buren's plans found enthusiastic 
support among the political leaders of Virginia.52
By the summer of 1823, Van Buren's Albany Regency and 
the Junto had settled on William Crawford as their choice to 
succeed Monroe. Ritchie had held back discussions on the 
campaign in the Enquirer until late 1822, claiming that the 
country had more pressing problems to address. In fact, 
Ritchie and the Junto still had not selected their 
candidate. Calhoun and Clay could be dismissed quickly 
because of their support for various nationalistic measures 
after the War of 1812. The South Carolinian, Ritchie 
explained simply in late 1822, "is not the candidate we 
should select as the President of the U.S. - the why and 
wherefore it is unnecessary to explain." The Kentuckian's 
candidacy in the state stalled because many Virginians "look 
on Mr. Clay as a deserter from the good old Virginia
52John Floyd to C.W. Gooch, June 9, 1824, Gooch Family 
Papers, VHS. In 1838 Ritchie wrote to Van Buren that from the 
"first moment of my acquaintance with you, I have been your 
personal & political friend." Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2, 
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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politicks. "53
The Junto expressed strong reservations about Jackson, 
suggesting that his fiery temper and meager experience made 
him peculiarly unqualified for high civil office. Virginians 
had castigated Jackson for his actions in Florida in 1818 
and 1819 by claiming that he had exceeded the constitutional 
limits of his power as territorial governor. One voter was 
so disgruntled at Jackson that he confessed to being 
"entirely at a loss to decide which is the most alarming, 
the conduct of Genl. Jackson, or the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in the case of the United State Bank.1,54 
Ritchie had condemned Jackson in 1819 as well, and saw 
nothing in the General's conduct since that warranted a 
reappraisal. The editor summed up the feelings of the Junto 
toward Jackson when he wrote that "we think he has been 
betrayed into errors by the enthusiasm of his feelings, and
53RE, Jan. 5, Aug. 13, Nov. 29, 1822. In an editorial on 
April 4, 1823, Ritchie bluntly stated that "Mr. Calhoun has 
less chance in Virginia than any other candidate who has been 
named." See also M. Sheppard to Andrew Stevenson, April 28, 
1824, Stevenson Papers, LC. Littleton Waller Tazewell 
dismissed Clay as a "mere politician" completely lacking in 
principles. Tazewell to John Randolph, March 4, 1824, Tazewell 
Family Papers, VSL. Waller Taylor, however, insisted that Clay 
was popular in Virginia in 1822, and that he had heard that 
"even Judge Roan [sic], the great stickler for State Rights, 
is supposed to be favorable to him." Taylor to Archibald 
Austin, March 11, 1822, Austin-Twyman Papers, William and
Mary.
^"Virginia," RE, March 30, 1819. Attacks on Jackson
filled the Enquirer from July 1818 to March 1819. For a 
scathing indictment of Old Hickory's career, see "Algernon 
Sidney," RE, Dec. 22, 1818, Jan. 7, 12, 14, 1819.
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the warmth of his temper."55 Despite warnings from his 
supporters that his enemies in Virginia had successfully 
created "an impression that you were a man governed alone by 
Passion and impulse," Jackson continued to believe that the 
Old Dominion would cast its vote for him on election day.56
Having eliminated Jackson, Calhoun, and Clay, only two 
candidates remained from which the Junto could select.
Adams, though respected for his intellect and services to 
the country, was a recent convert to the Republican party, 
and a Yankee to boot. Ritchie and others had strong 
reservations about Adams's reliance on the doctrine of 
implied powers. The New Englander did, however, maintain a 
significant following across the state and was the second 
choice of many Virginians.57
The Junto selected Crawford, then, partly by a process 
of elimination. But the Georgian's services to the country 
and his devotion to state rights principles were more
55RE, May 6, 1823. See also RE, July 30, 1822, Feb. 28, 
March 2, 6, 19, 26, May 14, 1824; J.A. Coles to Andrew
Stevenson, April 11, 1824, Stevenson Papers, LC.
56Col. Charles P. Tutt to Andrew Jackson, June 24, 1823, 
John Spencer Bassett, ed. Correspondence of Andrew Jackson 
(Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935), 
3:199; Jackson to George Martin, Jan. 2, 1824; to Andrew J. 
Donelson, Feb. 12, 1824; to John Coffee, March 14, 1824,
Ibid., 3:221-233.
57RE, Jan. 23, May 20, June 15, July 4, Aug. 5, 8, 1823; 
J.A. Coles to Stevenson, April 11, 1824, Stevenson Papers, LC. 
John Taylor of Caroline, while not thrilled by any of the 
candidates, found Adams the least objectionable. Taylor to 
Monroe, April 29, 1823, Monroe Papers, LC.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 1
important in leading the Junto to select him as their 
candidate. After a distinguished public career, Crawford had 
narrowly missed capturing the Republican party's 
presidential nomination in 1816, and had been impatiently 
waiting for his turn ever since. Ritchie and his group had 
long admired Crawford, although they fretted over his 
flirtation with nationalism immediately after the War of 
1812 and preferred Spencer Roane for president until his 
death in 1822. Still, Crawford's flaws were smaller and 
fewer than the other candidates, as one commentator 
explained. "The election of Mr. Crawford will restore our 
institutions to their primitive purity and simplicity. The 
elevation of Mr. Adams or of Mr. Jackson will perpetuate the 
extravagance and false splendor of the government, and 
perhaps by sanctioning usurpations of power, make it too 
strong for the rights and the liberties of the people."58 
Moreover, Crawford was the choice of Van Buren and his New 
York party; the Georgian could serve as the instrument by 
which a Virginia-New York alliance could regain power. 
Ritchie announced the party's support for Crawford in early 
April 1823, thereby shifting the contest for the presidency
58RE, April 8, Aug. 5, 1823, Feb. 19, 28, 1824;
"Bolinbroke," RE, Aug. 27, 1824. Articles attacking Crawford 
slowly disappeared from the columns of the Enquirer after 
September of 1823, and were replaced by statements supporting 
and defending the Georgian.
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into high gear.59
The closeness and bitterness of the presidential race 
led to dubious campaign tactics and violent personal 
attacks. To Virginians accustomed to the genteel politics of 
the past, the tone of the election seemed proof positive of 
degeneracy. John Taylor complained that politicians now won 
office "by crafty influence and pecuniary influence" rather 
than by devotion to republican principles. David Campbell, 
prominent landowner in western Virginia, wrote his wife in 
disgust over the personal attacks on the candidates that 
typified modern electioneering. "Such are the republicans of 
the present day," he sighed. Old Republicans expressed 
revulsion at the way the campaign unfolded. James M. Garnett 
wrote John Randolph of Roanoke that newspaper editors, the 
"Regulators-General of all the affairs of the Nation, will 
condescend to make a President for the Profanum Vulgus, who 
must necessarily be incompetent." William Branch Giles 
insisted that "visionary, fanatical, excessive democracy" 
threatened to force down fundamental principles. A new era 
of politics was dawning, and tradition-minded Virginians 
found little it it to commend.60
59RE, Feb. 13, Oct. 7, 1823; Remini, Making of the
Democratic Party. 49-51, 63-66.
60John Taylor of Caroline to Monroe, April 29, 1823,
Monroe Papers, LC; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, Feb. 16, 
1823, Campbell Family Papers, Duke University; James Mercer 
Garnett to John Randolph of Roanoke, Oct. 21, 1823, John
Randolph Papers, LC (typescript); William B. Giles, RE, April 
9, 1824. Not surprisingly, Randolph confessed that he opposed
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A second development that worried the faithful in the 
commonwealth was the steady stream of charges of 'Virginia 
influence' that issued from politicians and editors across 
the country. The Junto took particular care to downplay such 
claims, and Jefferson seemed particularly adamant about 
coaxing other states into assuming leadership roles in the 
struggle against the dangers of nationalism. In the columns 
of the Enquirer Ritchie repeatedly urged the same policy, 
all the while insisting that "there is no spirit in 
Virginia, which aspires to a sway or dictation over the 
other states.1,61
On top of accusations of 'Virginia influence' came more 
specific charges that a club or Junto ruled the state from 
Richmond. Although attacks on the Junto stretched back to 
1816, they increased in number and intensity as the election 
neared. Newspapers from across the state and the nation 
described the sinister machinations of the "Central 
Influence" in Richmond, with the Lynchburg Virginian and
"this age of reformation + spectacle, - where presents + 
speeches + entertainments are 'got up' + all erectness of 
spirit + manly sincerity [are] exploded for fulsome 
adulation"; Randolph to Garnett, Sept. 26, 1825, Randolph
Papers, LC (transcript).
61Jefferson to Spencer Roane, June 25, 1821, Branch
Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 138-139;
Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon, Oct. 20, 1821, Ford, ed.,
Writings of Jefferson. 10:193-194; RE, July 2, 1822; see also 
issues of Feb. 21, Aug. 13, 1822, Sept. 19, 1823, William H. 
Roane told Calhoun that Virginia "should fold her arms + 
remain completely passive" regarding the outcome of the 
election. Roane to Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824, Harrison Papers, 
VHS.
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Niles7 Register leading the way.62 Soon mention of the group 
and their modus operandi began appearing in personal 
correspondence as well, including those of Crawford's rival 
candidates.63
The most thorough and infamous attack on the Junto came 
from an anonymous writer who published a series of letters 
that first appeared in the Washington Republican in November 
of 1823. Reprinted in pamphlet form as Letters on the 
Richmond Party and signed simply "A Virginian," the epistles 
generated considerable interest across the state. Unlike 
earlier jabs at the Junto, the author of the Letters named 
clique members and described in great detail their deeds in
6211A Virginian.1 Albany Advertiser. Aug. 26, 27, Sept. 17, 
1816. By my count, at least eleven different newspapers, six 
from outside Virginia, contained articles on the Junto in 
1822, 1823, and 1824. The sharpest attacks came from the
editor of the Virginian. John Hampden Pleasants, who moved to 
Richmond in late 1823 to found the Richmond Constitutional 
Whig in support of Adams's candidacy; Lynchburg Virginian. 
April 15, 29, 1823, Aug. 17, Nov. 20, 1824. Pleasants's zeal 
got him into plenty of trouble and an occasional duel. 
Ironically, a son of his lifelong rival Thomas Ritchie killed 
Pleasants in a duel in 1846. For Pleasants's belligerency, see 
John Campbell to James Campbell, Nov. 29, 1823, Campbell
Family Papers, Duke.
63Dr. Thomas G. Watkins to Andrew Jackson, March 13, 1822, 
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:153-155; Francis W. 
Gilmer to Peachy R. Gilmer, Jan. 13, 1824, MS, VHS, in which 
F.W. Gilmer refers to the Junto as a "club of inveterate 
tories bound together by fraudulent collusion + family compact 
... [who] ... put up + put down whom they please"; E.H. Lundy 
to William Brodnax, Feb. 10, 1824, William H. Brodnax Letters, 
VHS; John Quincy Adams to Louisa C. Adams, Sept. 6, 1822,
Worthington Chauncy Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917), 7:301-302; Henry Clay to 
Peter Porter, Feb., 1823, cited in Remini, Making of the 
Democratic Party. 38.
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the past and their goals for the future. "A Virginian" 
dwelled at length on the family connections in the group and 
their controlling interest in Virginia's court system and 
banks. The current Junto had been formed in 1816, when the 
"old party" of Wilson Cary Nicholas joined forces with the 
nascent Richmond Party to oppose Monroe's election. Since 
then the Junto had controlled affairs in the state behind a 
veil of secrecy. Its decision to join with the Republicans 
of New York to elect Crawford in 1824 held ominous 
implications for the commonwealth. Now that the group's 
leadership and tactics stood exposed, the author trusted 
that the people of Virginia must disable the Junto before it 
ruined what remained of the state's power and prestige.64
In Richmond the Letters produced much excitement and 
speculation. Most readers agreed that the author's purpose 
was to affect the outcome of the presidential election. 
Others viewed it as a personal attack upon the men mentioned 
as Junto leaders. Whatever its purpose, the pamphlet 
certainly got Ritchie's attention. The editor had carefully
^Letters on the Richmond Party. By a Virginian. 
Originally published in the Washington Republican (Washington 
City, 1823), microfiche copy from original in LC. Speculation 
as to the author of the pamphlet consumed a great deal of 
time, both then and now. Leading candidates include Alexander 
McRae and John H. Pleasants. I would add Henry Lee to the 
list. Lee was a political hack living in Washington at the 
time who knew Virginia politics intimately. On Nov. 29, 1824, 
Benjamin Watkins Leigh wrote to him that "you were mistaken, 
when you supposed there was a 'Richmond party' - if, indeed, 
what you published last summer on that subject, were not (as 
I more than half suspected) a mere banter." Leigh to Lee, Nov. 
29, 1824, Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers, VHS.
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refuted every charge of a Junto in his paper, claiming time 
and again that such an organization never existed. The idea 
of a Richmond Party was a "phantom" conjured up by political 
zealots for partisan purposes. They combined it with the 
"cry of Virginia candidate-Virginia influence ... for the 
purpose of bringing one of the candidates into odium and 
contempt." Ritchie expressed surprise that any man with 
common sense would believe "that this proud and independent 
state is ruled by a Junto at the City of Richmond; that her 
citizens are in fact the puppets of a political and 
intriguing oligarchy at the metropolis."65
While Ritchie could brush aside insinuations of a 
autocratic Junto operating from the state capital, he found 
it harder to ignore accusations that the Virginia Republican 
party had compromised the state's integrity by forming a 
"combination" with the politicians of New York to elect 
Crawford. In September of 1824, Hezekiah Niles began a six 
part expose on the union between the Junto and the Albany 
Regency, ending it in mid-October by claiming that the 
"combination" sought to push Crawford on the nation through 
political "management and, I believe, I may say political 
fraud." Calhoun noted this development as well. "Between the
65RE, March 7, May 6, 1823; for other instances of 
Ritchie's denials, see issues of Sept. 7, 1816, April 22, May 
2, Aug 5, 1823, Sept. 14, 24, Oct. 5, 1824. David Campbell 
offered a lengthy description of the pamphlet and the uproar 
it caused in Richmond to his brother James. David Campbell to 
James Campbell, Dec. 5, 10, 1823, Campbell Family Papers, 
Duke.
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Regency at Albany and the junto at Richmond there is a vital 
connection," he informed Samuel Gouverneur. "They give and 
receive hope from each other, and confidently expect to 
govern this nation." Ritchie explicitly denied that any 
"combination with the leading politicians of New York" 
existed, and thought that Niles "labors under some delirium 
of the brain" for suggesting such a thing.66
Ritchie's denial of a union between New York and 
Virginia to elect Crawford strengthened the Georgian's 
standing in the Old Dominion. Crawford's prospects remained 
bright in the state, thanks in part to the Junto's efforts 
to explain his past support for the tariff and internal 
improvements and their savage attacks on the other 
candidates. Ritchie confidently predicted victory on both 
the state and national level for his candidate. Then 
disaster struck. Crawford suffered a paralytic stroke at the 
home of James Barbour in September 1823. The stroke left 
Crawford personally incapacitated and politically 
handicapped.67
Perhaps even more damaging was Crawford's nomination at
“Hezekiah Niles, "The Sovereignty of the People," Niles' 
Weekly Register. Sept. 4, 11, 16, 28, Oct. 2, 16, 1824, quote 
from Oct. 16; Calhoun to Samuel Gouverneur, Nov. 9, 1823, 
cited in Remini, Making of the Democratic Party. 41; RE, Sept. 
14, 24, Oct. 5, 1824, quote from Sept. 24.
67RE, April 22, May 20, June 15, July 4, Aug. 8, 1823; 
Lowery, James Barbour. 147. Ritchie often downplayed 
Crawford's illness and insisted he was capable of serving as 
president if elected; see, for example, RE, June 1, 8, Aug. 
10, 1824.
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the hands of a discredited and despised congressional 
caucus. Hostility toward this form of nomination had been 
growing for years, and as late as 1820 Ritchie himself had 
condemned it, claiming it was "no longer needed." But the 
bitter contest of 1824 led him to change his mind. Crawford 
must receive the official sanction of the national 
Republican party to insure his election, and that seal of 
approval had always been issued by the congressional caucus. 
Besides, no reasonable alternatives existed. "Why rail 
against it," Ritchie asked his readers, "unless some better 
substitute is to be devised?"68
Crawford's campaign leaders severely underestimated 
popular resentment of the caucus and paid the consequences. 
Only 68 of 220 Republican congressmen showed up at the 
Washington caucus to cast their vote, many of them from 
Virginia and New York. Opponents heaped abuse on the 
undemocratic mode of election and agreed with Niles that it 
represented a "deliberate attempt ... to overthrow the 
constitution of my country." Citizens in Winchester urged an 
end to the caucus system, claiming it encouraged abuses of 
power and led to tyranny. "Power usurped, and usurpation 
long acquiesced in, are often mistaken for right."69
68RE, April 14, 1820, March 28, 1823; Ritchie rallied the 
faithful to support the caucus system; see "Publius," RE, Dec. 
23, 1823, Jan. 1, 3, 1824 for a particularly able defense.
69For the results of the Washington caucus, see RE, Feb. 
19, 1824. Niles' Weekly Register. Oct. 13, 1823; "Resolutions 
of Town Hall Meeting in Winchester, Virginia," April 5, 1824,
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Ritchie developed an ingenious answer to such claims. 
Without the guidance and unity provided by the congressional 
caucus, he claimed, the election would undoubtedly be thrown 
into the House of Representatives to be decided. A small 
group of politicians would then select an executive, rather 
than the people. John Wickham saw through this argument when 
he wrote sarcastically to Littleton Waller Tazewell that in 
Richmond the "opinion is very general that a caucus is 
necessary and the Doctrine that the Liberties of the people 
are best supported by passive obedience is thought a very 
sound one.1,70
The final blow to Crawford's presidential hopes came 
from Pennsylvania, where Jackson won the nomination of the 
state Republican convention in March 1824. Pennsylvania's 
actions changed the complexion of the campaign nationwide. 
Jackson gained considerably from it, while Crawford appeared 
almost totally discredited. Van Buren and the Junto knew 
this, but refused to give up on their nominee. Plans were 
made to replace Albert Gallatin, Crawford's vice- 
presidential nominee, with Henry Clay, in the hopes of 
strengthening the ticket in the West.71 These last minute
Broadside, VHS.
70RE, Feb. 12, 1824; Wickham to Tazewell, Jan. 11, 1824, 
Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
71C.W. Gooch to Van Buren, Sept. 14, 1824, P.N. Nicholas 
to Van Buren, Oct. 19, 31, 1824, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; 
Gales and Seaton to Ritchie, Oct. 17, 1824, Gooch Family
Papers, UVA.
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changes proved to be too little, too late. While Virginia 
cast its 24 electoral votes for Crawford, he finished a 
distant third behind Jackson and Adams nationally, just high 
enough to have his name submitted to the House of 
Representatives, where the deadlocked election would be 
decided. Amid charges of intrigue and of a "corrupt bargain" 
with Clay, John Quincy Adams won the election on the first 
ballot early in 1825.72
The rumor that Clay and Adams had struck a bargain to 
effect the latter's election in the House outraged 
Virginians, and turned many of them against both men. From 
Richmond, Andrew Stevenson's young niece wrote him that the 
"good people are run mad here about the Presidential 
election - I was with some of your great men at Dr. 
Brockenbrough's the other night, and found them all 
universally denouncing Clay and Adams. They ([Philip] N. 
Nicholas, Dr. and Judge B[rockenbrough], [William H.] Roane, 
[John] Campbell, etc) said they would take Jackson or any 
body now in preference to Adams."73 That the Junto was 
contemplating supporting Jackson, even for a moment, showed 
the degree of their disenchantment with Adams. By bargaining 
with Clay, he had shown his lack of devotion to the
72RE, N o v . 1824-Feb. 1825, passim; Dangerfield, American 
Nationalism. 218-230; Remini, Making of the Democratic Party. 
72-84.
73B. Coles to Andrew Stevenson, Feb. 3, 1825, Stevenson 
Papers, LC; John Campbell to David Campbell, Jan. 28, 1825, 
Campbell Family Papers, Duke.
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preservation of republican principles. His subsequent 
actions only hardened those feelings among the Junto.
Between 1816 and 1824, the Richmond Junto oversaw the 
revival of state rights thought in Virginia. By decrying the 
dangers of the centralizing policies of Congress and the 
Supreme Court in the years that followed, the group had 
succeeded to a large extent in renewing attachments to what 
it considered the cardinal principles of republicanism. As 
far as its second goal, that of revitalizing the Old 
Dominion's role in national politics, was concerned, the 
Junto met with mixed results. The union with Van Buren and 
New York held promise, despite Crawford's defeat. It was 
clear that a new style of politics had emerged during the 
campaign, one that differed significantly from the methods 
of the past, and one that could not be ignored. To many it 
seemed that "Virginia men, and Va. principles and Va. 
conduct ... are getting quite out of fashion."74 In order to 
continue its struggle, the members of the Junto realized 
that they needed to adapt to the changing times without 
abandoning their commitment to the "Virginia principles," 
which they continued to see as vital to their continued 
well-being. The Junto also realized that it needed to ally 
itself with someone capable of inspiring enthusiasm and
74David Watson, Dec. 1824, Miscellaneous Memoranda, 1822- 
1829, David Watson Papers, LC.
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unifying the state and the country behind its goals. In 1825 
the Junto began scanning the political horizon for the man 
who could carry its dreams to fruition.
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Chapter II 
"Jackson and Reform": 1825-1828
Among the more intriguing and perplexing tasks 
confronting the historian of antebellum Virginia is 
explaining why the state strongly supported Andrew Jackson 
in 1828 after opposing and even condemning him just four 
years earlier. What happened in those years to make Jackson 
a more attractive candidate to the Richmond Junto and their 
fellow Virginians? Had the issues involved changed 
dramatically? Did Old Hickory confess the errors of his way 
and hew closer to the strict construction line after 1824?
In their zeal to gain political power, did Virginians 
abandon the political principles they claimed to hold 
sacred? The answer to these questions can be found by 
examining the changing perceptions of Jackson that the Junto 
and others articulated during the campaign of 1828. In 1824, 
the Junto had branded Jackson as a dangerous and high-handed 
military chieftain unfit to rule the nation. But the 
nationalistic measures of the Adams administration, coupled 
with Jackson's emergence as the leader of a new political 
coalition ostensibly based on the doctrines of state rights, 
led the clique to reevaluate the General. While Ritchie
73
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still had reservations about Jackson's qualifications for 
the office of president, other members of the group came to 
support his candidacy with varying degrees of enthusiasm. As 
the election neared, however, the Junto dropped all 
criticism of Jackson and embraced him openly. It now 
described the Hero of New Orleans as the the herald of a new 
age of liberty and reform. The Junto, and Virginia, 
supported Jackson in the election of 1828 because it 
believed that he would restore virtue to the American 
government. Henry Lee summed up the sentiment of many voters 
in the state when he told Jackson that the "honorable men in 
this great republic hope by electing you to preserve our 
liberty."1
Some commentators, both contemporary and modern, have 
argued that Virginians supported Jackson in 1828 only 
reluctantly, viewing him as the lesser of two evils. There 
is a certain validity to this claim, and it does explain why 
some in the state voted for Jackson. William Pollard's 
comment that "I am affraid [sic] whilst I am endeavoring to 
get rid of Charybdis I shall fall in with Scylla," 
accurately describes the sentiment of a segment of Virginia 
voters.2 Even some of those who convinced themselves to vote
^enry Lee to Andrew Jackson, Sept. 17, 1828, quoted in 
Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American 
Freedom. 1822-1832 (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 101.
2William Pollard to A.G. Ruffin, March 7, 1827, Wilson 
Cary Nicholas Papers, Library of Congress; John Wickham to 
Littleton Waller Tazewell, Dec. 17, 1826, Tazewell Family
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 5
for Jackson did so with reservations or stipulations. 
Virginia will "do everything she can" to elect Jackson, John 
Campbell wrote in November 1827, "but the moment he gets 
into any of his tantrums and gets afoul of the Constitution 
again, she will most assuredly get afoul of him with all the 
force she can muster."3 Despite such ambivalence, the notion 
that Virginia voted for Jackson merely because he was the 
least objectionable candidate must be discarded as too 
simplistic. It fails to take proper measure of the 
importance that Virginians attached to their political 
philosophy.
The Richmond Junto's role in bringing Jacksonianism to 
Virginia has never been fully explored. The group 
established itself as the leader of the opposition movement 
in the state by late 1825 and was later enormously
Papers, Virginia State Library; Richmond Enquirer (hereafter 
cited as RE), Oct. 17, 1826, May 22, 1827; For examples of 
scholars who accept this thesis, see Charles H. Ambler, Thomas 
Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics (Richmond: Bell Book & 
Stationary Co., 1913), 106; Katherine Ruth Malone, "The
Virginia Doctrines, The Commonwealth, and the Republic: The 
Role of Fundamental Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798- 
1833" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981), 285- 
295. Malone wrote that Virginians accepted Jackson "with 
regret rather than enthusiasm" (295).
3John Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 16, 1827, Campbell 
Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke University. 
Ritchie expressed a similar sentiment in a September, 11, 
1827, editorial in the Enquirer. when he wrote that Virginia's 
support for Jackson did not "necessarily involve the 
obligation to support measures which she cannot approve." It 
could be argued that these warnings to Jackson were actually 
part of a strategy on the part of Jackson's supporters to 
placate those who still distrusted him.
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influential in organizing the Jackson campaign in Virginia. 
For much of the campaign, however, the members of the Junto 
remained uncertain about Jackson's candidacy. They wanted to 
insure that he was pledged to positions compatible with 
their own on such matters as the protective tariff and 
federally-funded internal improvements. The Junto insisted 
that Old Hickory measure up to their state rights standards. 
The Junto and its followers were too dedicated to the tenets 
of republicanism to cast their votes for a man who had not 
earned their respect and admiration, or who did not share 
their concerns about the future of the Union. Virginia's 
decision to support Crawford in 1824, despite his poor 
health and fading hopes of victory, made clear the 
importance that Old Dominion voters placed on a candidate's 
principles. Expediency was no reason to vote for any man for 
any office. What mattered was his commitment to preserving 
liberty and his devotion to the Constitution. Had Jackson 
failed to measure up to these standards, he would have been 
rejected out of hand by the Junto and by Virginia. To earn 
the state's vote, Jackson, like any other office-seeker, 
would have to pass a test of political orthodoxy.4
Jackson gained the Junto's support in 1828 because he
4John Tyler spoke for many Virginians when he warned 
that, "Should he [Jackson] abuse Virginia, by setting at 
naught her political sentiments, he will find her at the head 
of the opposition, and he will probably experience the fate of 
J.Q.A." Tyler to John Rutherfoord, Dec. 8, 1827, Lyon G.
Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers (3 vols., Richmond: 
Whittet and Shepperson, 1884-1896), 1:376-378.
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seemed capable of defeating Adams and returning the federal 
government to its original purity. The Junto viewed the 
threat to state rights posed by the Adams administration as 
so grave that it focused all of its efforts on turning Adams 
out of power. Moreover, the group insisted that his 
successor be devoted to preserving the liberties of the 
people and the rights of the states. Like Jefferson in 1800, 
the new president must be dedicated to the fundamental 
principles of republicanism. The logic of this argument 
drove the Junto to emphasize Jackson's soundness on all of 
the issues facing the country: the tariff, internal 
improvements, and corruption in the federal government. In 
short, the Junto came to portray Jackson as the living 
embodiment of the southern state rights philosophy. This 
strategy worked marvelously and helped Jackson to capture 
69% of the vote in Virginia in 1828.5 But the unrealistic 
image of Jackson as the savior of the South inevitably 
cracked once he was in office. There was no way that Jackson 
could satisfy completely the expectations placed upon him by 
the Junto and by other southerners in 1828. Much of the 
bitter factionalism of Virginia politics in the 1830s can be 
traced to the disillusionment of those who supported Jackson 
in 1828, only to see him betray their trust. When, during 
the course of his administration, Jackson deviated from the
P
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections 
Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), 
93.
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true state rights course, many Virginians felt not just 
disappointment, but betrayal.
The Junto's march toward Jacksonianism between 1825 and 
1828 followed three distinct stages. First, the group warned 
Virginia voters that the Adams administration presented 
dangers to the rights of the states every bit as real and 
threatening as those of 1798. Strong action was needed now, 
as it had been then, to prevent the overthrow of republican 
government. Next, the Junto concluded that Jackson was the 
only candidate capable of defeating Adams and reforming the 
federal government. It acknowledged Jackson's faults, but 
insisted that he was the best hope for success. Having gone 
this far, the group then spent the last months of the 
campaign reshaping Jackson's image in Virginia. By election 
day, the General was not only the defender of liberty and 
the agent of reform, but the "new apostle of the South, the 
new Jefferson, the new sentinel of southern power and 
prerogative in the nation."6 In a time filled with political 
corruption and dangerous doctrines, the Junto argued,
Jackson stood ready to defend the rights of the states. Only 
he was "capable of seeing the interest of the Southern & 
Western people" clearly; only he was free from the 
corrupting influence of faction, for "no party
William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of 
Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1978), 7.
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considerations would induce him to support a wrong 
measure."7 The Junto succeeded in equating Adams with power, 
corruption, and a federal government unbound by the 
strictures of the Constitution, and Jackson with liberty, 
virtue, and the rights of the states.8 That made the choice 
in 1828 obvious.
The bitter and divisive presidential election of 1824 
carried within it the seeds of political change at both the 
state and national level. The death of the congressional 
caucus, the rampant factionalism, and the generally low tone 
of the campaign were just three indications that the 
political status quo had been shaken, if not toppled. Quite 
frankly, the future appeared bleak to many. Unprincipled 
faction threatened to destroy the republican experiment. 
Elections centered on personalities instead of principles. 
Long standing party distinctions had been broken down and 
beneficial political alliances torn asunder. John Quincy 
Adams, the new president, had won office in a dubious 
manner, and he could expect strong opposition from Jackson's 
disappointed supporters. The nation found itself facing 
another crisis, the Junto argued, and something must be done
7David Campbell to James Campbell, March 29, 1827, CFP,
Duke.
8RE, Oct. 26, Nov. 27, 1827, Sept. 5, 1828; John Campbell 
to James Campbell, Dec. 13, 1827, CFP, Duke; John Tyler to 
Henry Curtis, Mar. 18, 1828, Tyler, Letters and Times of the 
Tylers. 1:383-386.
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to awaken the people to the dangers they faced. "Doctrines 
are afloat," Ritchie wrote in early 1825, "which in times 
past would have roused up the jealous principles of the 
Republican Party."9 But that party now stood in disarray, 
unable to guide the country as it had in the past. What was 
needed to remedy the situation was a return to the political 
distinctions of the past and a reassertion of the primacy of 
the "Virginia principles" in political affairs. This was the 
strategy Ritchie and the Junto mapped out in 1825 as they 
began to evaluate the administration of John Quincy Adams.
The Junto had succeeded in reviving state rights 
sentiment in Virginia, and this was the block upon which the 
Adams administration stumbled in the state. Adams's and 
Clay's perceived deviance from the true principles of 
republicanism sparked and sustained opposition to them in 
the Old Dominion. Virginians believed that the tenets of 
their political faith, best expressed by Jefferson and 
Madison in 1798 and 1799, had withstood the test of time and 
had served admirably as an unerring compass for the freest 
and most perfect nation in the world for half a century. 
Since their creed derived from firmly held beliefs about 
human nature, it was highly static and slow to accept 
change. Virginians could find no reason to alter or abandon 
their principles simply because the country had grown or
9RE, Jan. 6, 1825.
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times had changed.10 "Grant, that Virginia differs from most 
of her sister states, as to the interpretation of the 
constitution," Ritchie wrote in 1825. "Does this difference 
prove that Virginia is in the wrong? Is the constitution a 
nose of wax? Its words are the same as in 1789."n Human 
nature had not evolved, nor had the forces of good triumphed 
over the forces of evil. Power and liberty still existed in 
inverse proportion to each other, power still corrupted, 
patriotic opposition was still necessary and noble, and the 
surest way to maintain political purity was still through a 
"frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." Devotion to 
liberty, to virtue, to the faith of their fathers, dictated 
the course that true patriots must follow. "Obsta 
principiis," Ritchie proclaimed from the pages of the 
Enquirer. and a great number of his fellow Virginians agreed 
heartily.12
When Ritchie and the Junto applied their standards to 
the Adams administration, they found it severely wanting, 
and the new government came under immediate attack in 
Virginia. The notion that Henry Clay had plotted with Adams 
to elevate him to power proved impossible to shake in the
10Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 278-295.
nRE, Jan. 20, 1825.
12Ritchie used the phrase repeatedly in the Enquirer. 
Junto member Andrew Stevenson told James Barbour that 
"Principles and not men, has heretofore and will continue to 
be my motto." Stevenson to Barbour, March 28, 1825, Barbour 
Family Papers, University of Virginia.
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state, handicapping the administration from the start.13 
The Junto viewed Clay and Adams's machinations as a clear 
sign that the liberties of the people were being subverted 
by politicians bent on personal gain. Such an 
administration, founded in corruption, would surely continue 
to ignore constitutional restraints and could never be 
trusted. "I care not what principles regulate Mr. Adams's 
and Mr. Clay's administration,” one disgusted observer 
pronounced. ”1 care not how they conduct themselves in 
future. It is enough for me to know, that it is an ill- 
gotten administration, 'begotten in sin, and brought forth 
in iniquity'."14 Charges of a "corrupt bargain" marked the 
beginning of an assault on Adams and Clay that intensified 
in the years ahead.
Adams's Inaugural Address in March of 1825 increased 
Virginia's displeasure with the new administration.15 
Ritchie dissected the oration carefully before announcing
13Richmond Constitutional Whig (also known simply as the 
Richmond Whig). Feb. 1, March 29, April 1, 8, 1825; RE, March 
11, 22, April 12, 1825. In July and August of 1827, at the 
height of the campaign, Ritchie dragged out the "corrupt 
bargain" question again. The Junto's hatred of Clay outmatched 
their dislike of Adams.
14"0ne From the East," RE, May 10, 1825. In a similar 
vein, David Campbell told his brother that Adams's association 
with Clay "injured him greatly in this State. Indeed we view 
it as a corrupt one tho it may not be." David Campbell to 
James Campbell, Oct. 22, 1826, CFP, Duke,
15James D. Richardson, ed. and comp., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896-1899), 2:292-299.
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that the Chief Executive's loose construction of the 
Constitution represented "no very agreeable prognostic of 
the course which we, Virginians, are to anticipate from the 
present administration.1 Adams hoped to "build up a 
magnificent and splendid national government, upon the ruins 
of the Constitution." The Old Dominion must continue its 
struggle against the pernicious "doctrine of the general 
welfare," Ritchie concluded. "The crisis is a serious one, 
and calls for all our vigilance and all our energy."16 From 
the state capital, John Campbell wrote to James Barbour in 
Washington about the address. Federalist Richmond applauded 
Adams's remarks, but "his views relative to the powers of 
Congress in making internal improvement are altogether at 
war with the doctrines of V[irgini]a." A short time later, 
Andrew Stevenson wrote Barbour suggesting he decline a 
cabinet position in the new administration. Ritchie and 
other party leaders objected to him accepting, the 
congressman implied, because they hoped to evaluate the 
administration impartially. Barbour's presence in the 
cabinet would hinder that. In fact, Stevenson's letter made 
clear the Junto's disapproval of Adams.17
William Branch Giles and John Randolph, two Old 
Republicans with ties to the Junto, attacked the president
16RE, March 8, 11, 1825.
17John Campbell to James Barbour, March 8, 1825, CFP,
Duke; Andrew Stevenson to Barbour, March 28, 1825, Barbour 
Family Papers, UVA.
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more forcefully. Giles insisted that Adams's "entire 
destitution of republican principles" and "blind sublimated 
ungovernable ambition" made him especially dangerous. His 
administration must be stopped before it did irreparable 
damage to the edifice of liberty. The people gave the 
government its power, Giles announced boldly, and they can 
take it away. Randolph, ever full of venom, rarely missed a 
chance to assail Adams and Clay and flatly stated his desire 
to pull down the administration. Less than a month into his 
term of office, Adams had already provoked opposition and 
earned the enmity of some of Virginia's leading 
politicians.18
The situation worsened considerably for the president 
as the year ended. Barbour ignored Stevenson's and Ritchie's 
advice and became Adams's Secretary of War, thereby vacating 
his Senate seat.19 As the Virginia General Assembly prepared 
to designate a replacement, the Enquirer was filled with 
letters and editorials urging the legislature to select a 
true republican to fight against the administration in
18William Branch Giles, "Political Disquisitions #3," 
March 25, 1825, in Political Miscellanies (Richmond, 1829). 
Randolph's "Blifel and Black George" speech, delivered in the 
Senate on March 30, 1826, was typical of the stridency of his 
attacks on the administration. Virginia's other senator at the 
time, Norfolk lawyer Littleton Waller Tazewell, was also an 
early and outspoken opponent of Adams. Norma Lois Peterson, 
Littleton Waller Tazewell (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1983), 148.
19Charles D. Lowery, James Barbour. A Jeffersonian 
Republican (University, Al: University of Alabama Press,
1984), 151-152.
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Washington. Commentators typically pointed out that the 
"general welfare" clause of Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution was being used to usurp the powers of the 
states. Under Adams, "Fabricius" warned his readers, "this 
is no longer to be a confederative republic, but a great 
consolidated empire. A reference to constitutional limits is
laughed to scorn. Expediency is the order of the day___  If
not resisted, the general government will become everything
and the state nothing." Other analysts agreed and joined in 
calling for their representatives to appoint a senator who 
would "support the old Virginia Doctrines of the
constitution.1,20 The Legislature responded by selecting John
Randolph of Roanoke, that Argus-eyed protector of liberty, 
to the post.21
Given the hostile atmosphere in Virginia toward the 
Adams administration, it is not surprising that Adams's 
nationalistic message to Congress on December 6, 1825 set
20,1 Fabricius," RE, Nov. 8, 1825; RE, Oct. 28, 1825. See 
also "Mutius," RE, Nov. 18, 1825; James Trezvant to William H. 
Brodnax, Dec. 10, 1825, William H. Brodnax Letters, Virginia 
Historical Society; Claiborne W. Gooch to Thomas Jefferson, 
Dec. 31, 1825, Gooch Family Papers, VHS.
2lRandolph outpolled Giles (who had the support of the 
Junto, but was even less popular than Randolph), John Floyd, 
and Henry St. George Tucker, a popular western lawyer and 
Randolph's step-brother. Lynchburg Virginian. Nov. 17, 1825; 
Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the 
Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830 
(Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Co., 1914), 218. Doubts 
about Tucker's orthodoxy on the internal improvement question 
kept him from receiving the office. See John Campbell to David 
Campbell, Jan. 19, 1826, CFP, Duke.
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off fireworks in the state. Ritchie condemned Adams's 
commitment to expand the powers of the federal government, 
ridiculed his plans to build "lighthouses of the skies," and 
mused rhetorically, "are we really reading a state-paper, or 
a school-boy's thesis?"22 In a similarly wry but revealing 
comment, "Common Sense" quipped that "it was observed, by 
one present, that he had heard a great deal of the 
violations of the constitution committed by 'General 
Jackson;' but from what he now heard, 'General Welfare' beat 
him, all hollow, in the number of his violations." At the 
Fourth of July celebrations in Richmond that year, Ritchie 
toasted "'Sky-light' Politicians; May those who dare to soar 
'sky-high' beyond the Constitution of their Country, be 
dashed, like Phaeton to the earth."23
Jesting aside, Virginians found much in Adams's message 
to justify their apprehensions about the course of his 
administration. The president's interpretation of the 
Constitution and some of his statements, particularly his 
comment that elected officials should not be "palsied by the 
wills of their constituents," and his remark that "Liberty 
is power," deeply troubled Virginians grounded in the
22RE, Dec. 8, 1825. Pleasants mocked Ritchie in the Dec. 
9, 1825 issue of the Richmond Constitutional Whig: "There is 
but one way in which Mr. Adams can hope to write a perfect 
message, and that is, by first consulting Thomas Ritchie, Esq. 
Let Mr. Ritchie furnish the ideas, and Mr. Adams add the last 
polish, and then we shall have a great Message."
23"Common Sense," RE, Dec. 18, 1825; Constitutional Whig. 
July 7, 1826.
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republican creed of their fathers.24 Representatives not 
responsive to the voters? A central government with 
enormously expanded powers? Nothing could alarm Virginians 
more. The president's plans smacked distinctly of despotism. 
To show the state's concern with the doctrines set forth in 
Adams's message, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
resolutions condemning a general system of internal 
improvements and protective tariffs as violations of the 
Constitution.25 "Rapid strides are making towards the 
consolidation of all powers in the hands of that [federal] 
government," Claiborne W. Gooch informed Thomas Jefferson 
shortly after Adams's Message, "and it is feared that when 
that consolidation takes place, the day will not be distant 
when the liberties of the people will be subverted." Ritchie 
was not alone in claiming that his opposition to the 
administration dated from the delivery of Adams's first 
message.26
The president's supporters responded swiftly to these
24Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 
2, 299-317. Both Pleasants and Hezekiah Niles scrambled to 
explain the president's quotes. See Constitutional Whig. Jan. 
6, 1826, and Niles' Weekly Register. Jan. 14, 1826.
“The legislators used the language of the Virginia 
Resolutions of 1798 in the preamble to the resolutions. 
Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia —  1825 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1825). Niles
thought the resolutions were passed solely for political 
effect. Niles' Weekly Register. March 18, 1826.
26Gooch to Jefferson, Dec. 31, 1825, Gooch Family Papers, 
VHS (photocopy); RE, June 1, 1827; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 
101-102.
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early attacks upon his administration. In the Richmond 
Constitutional Whig, the Lynchburg Virginian, and Niles' 
Weekly Register, editors and essayists explained Adams's 
policies, denied their unconstitutionality, and argued that 
an unnatural coalition had formed with the sole and avowed 
purpose of opposing every measure of the administration.
"The Crawford party," John Hampden Pleasants announced in 
March of 1825, "are seeking at this moment, to rally an 
opposition to Mr. Adams's administration ...," and the 
Jacksonians, "that party who have no opinions," have joined 
them. "It is an unprincipled opposition on all hands." 
Ritchie was the ringleader, Pleasants noted, and had 
secretly supported Jackson all along. Only the General's 
unpopularity in Virginia prevented the Junto leader from 
admitting this in public.27
The Virginian dragged out charges about the Junto 
again, claiming Ritchie and his cronies (Giles received 
special attention) were out to topple Adams any way they 
could. "With unlimited talents and a paper of extensive 
circulation to convey their opinions, the members of the 
Richmond Junto issue their orders with all the hauteur of a 
Roman Pontiff and the people obey with unresisting 
servility." The Junto was the true subverter of liberty, the
^Constitutional Whig. Feb. 1, March 15, March 25, 1825. 
Pleasants repeated these charges frequently throughout 1825 
and 1826.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 9
editor concluded, not the Adams administration.28 Hezekiah 
Niles, an old foe of Ritchie and the Junto, condemned its 
attacks on Adams and chastised the group for "whipping-up an 
opposition about something - any thing." The Baltimore 
editor also jabbed at Giles and Randolph for being 
doomsayers and for never suggesting solutions to the 
problems they ranted about. He then defended vigorously 
Adams and his Message.29
The composition and tactics of both the supporters and 
detractors of the administration had begun to take form by 
the end of 1825. The president's adherents denied all 
allegations of wrongdoing and claimed an unprincipled 
coalition of disgruntled politicians intended to derail the 
administration's plans for fostering national growth and 
harmony. The opposition, which the Junto and much of 
Virginia had slipped into by year's end, castigated Adams 
severely for discarding fundamental republican axioms and 
for abusing the privileges of office. The administration, 
born of corruption, was unquestionably jeopardizing the 
liberties of the nation. James Trezvant summed up the 
concerns and goals of the opposition as Adams's second year 
began. "I fear the worst - yet I hope there is a redeeming 
spirit in the virtue of the people which will ultimately 
produce a reaction in public sentiment, and bring us back to
28Lynchburg Virginian. Nov. 17, Dec. 5, 1825.
29Niles' Weekly Register. Dec. 17, 31, 1825.
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the wholesome and sound constitutional doctrines from which 
we have been certainly tho' gradually departing ever since 
the end of Jefferson's administration.1,30 The message was 
clear, but who was to be the messenger?
Ritchie and his circle judged the administration's 
actions against the yardstick of their political principles. 
Federally funded internal improvements, however beneficial, 
stretched the powers of the central government beyond their 
constitutional limitations. A protective tariff was not only 
unconstitutional, but injudicious and immoral as well. 
Executive patronage was inherently dangerous, because it 
reposed excessive power in the one branch of government most 
likely to abuse it. These conclusions flowed logically from 
the ideology of state rights and strict construction. To 
deny their validity or to forsake them for political 
expediency constituted a repudiation of everything that they 
held sacred.
Not all Virginians joined with the Junto in demanding 
adherence to the "Principles of '98." Some chafed under the 
yoke of the ideological constraints of the state rights 
school. They denounced as antiquated the doctrines of strict 
construction. Jefferson's and Madison's fears of a 
consolidated federal government may have been well founded 
in 1800, but that crisis had long passed. America had
30James Trezvant to William H. Brodnax, Feb. 8, 1826, 
Brodnax Letters, VHS; Remini, Course of American Freedom. 1 DO- 
115.
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changed, and ideas must change to suit the realities of the 
day. The country had different problems to solve in 1825 
than it did in 1800, and the old interpretations and 
solutions were no longer acceptable.31
Proponents of these conflicting ideologies clashed 
repeatedly during the campaign of 1828 over nearly every 
subject, including whom to support for the presidency. 
Nowhere was the debate sharper than on the questions of 
tariffs and internal improvements. The positions of Adams 
and Jackson on these issues shaped the response of 
Virginians to their respective candidacies. Debate in 
Virginia on the protective tariff system and federally- 
funded internal improvements centered not so much on the 
economic dimensions of these issues, but on the ideological 
aspects. Adams's opponents, including the Junto, argued that 
both of these policies were not only unconstitutional, but 
detrimental to the health of a republican government as 
well.
As Virginians assessed the Adams administration and 
began discussing the upcoming election, they came to focus 
quickly on some old concerns. Debate over the 
constitutionality of a protective tariff stretched back at 
least to 1816, and Ritchie was an early and outspoken foe of
31In his study of James Barbour, Charles D. Lowery 
describes this desire "to transcend the limits of ... rural 
Virginia culture and to respond positively to complex national 
needs." Lowery, James Barbour. 106.
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the principle of protection. Other Virginians joined the 
fight against high tariffs when rates were increased 
substantially in 1824. The tariff, however, received little 
attention in the campaign of 1828 until Daniel Webster 
introduced a bill to raise rates on imported woolens in 
1827. While the bill never passed, it did increase anxiety 
in Virginia and the South about the issue and the upcoming 
revision of the tariff schedule in 1828.32 The Virginia 
General Assembly was so concerned that they passed 
resolutions, penned by Giles, that denounced the protective 
tariff as "the most despotic and dangerous power that can be 
exercised by government in any form. It places the 
occupation and property of every man, under the control of 
the government, and thus converts the citizen into the 
slave, the natural man into a governmental machine."33 While 
Giles's bellicose views foreshadowed the position taken by 
South Carolina in the Nullification Crisis, they did not 
reflect the prevailing sentiment of Virginia or the region 
at the time.
Ritchie, attempting to keep relations with Pennsylvania 
and New York on a friendly basis, assured his northern
32Robert Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the 
Democratic Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 
134-135; Robert Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson 
(Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1963), 
143-148.
33The Virginia Resolutions of 1827, reprinted in Niles' 
Weekly Register. April 21, 1827.
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friends that Giles did not speak for Virginia.34 The Old 
Dominion did doubt the expediency, even the 
constitutionality, of a protective tariff scheme, but Giles 
had been excessive in his condemnation. Ritchie noted, 
however, that Adams's approval of high tariffs made him 
unpopular in Virginia, and he asked his northern 
correspondents if they were familiar with Jackson's views on 
this issue. Could they assure Virginia that the General was 
opposed to the principle of a protective tariff? Such a 
statement would go far toward convincing Virginians to 
support Jackson's candidacy. While Ritchie waited for 
Jackson's supporters to explain his views on the tariff 
question, other Virginians were reporting that Jackson 
opposed "prohibitory duties" and favored only "fair + 
moderate protection" that would allow American manufacturers 
to compete in the world market.35 Ritchie and the Junto 
remained unconvinced. They realized that Jackson was 
especially vulnerable on this question. If he came out 
strongly in favor of protection, he would be lauded in 
Pennsylvania but scolded in the South. If he spoke out 
against the tariff, his northern supporters might abandon 
him. Littleton Waller Tazewell and others who supported 
Jackson understood the delicacy of the situation and warned
^Ambler, Ritchie. 113.
35William Cabell Rives to Thomas W. Gilmer, July 22, 1827, 
William Cabell Rives Papers, LC.
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that Jackson's election in Virginia would be endangered if 
he took a strong stance in favor of the tariff.36
Ritchie attempted to contain discussion on the tariff 
question throughout most of the campaign. He continued to 
placate his northern friends on the matter throughout 1827 
and early 1828, even admitting at one point the 
constitutionality of the tariff system. To Van Buren he 
confided his concerns about the impact of the debate on 
Jackson's candidacy in the South. Ritchie assured the New 
Yorker that he was endeavoring to divert attention away from 
the topic in his paper.37 But the debate on the "Tariff of 
Abominations" in the summer of 1828 changed Ritchie's 
response to the subject. He now joined the chorus of 
Southerners who spoke out against "this vexatious measure, 
which is at war with the spirit of the Constitution, as well 
as the spirit of the age ...; this oppressive measure, which 
operates so unequally and partially upon the different parts 
of our country." The emerging Jacksonian coalition must work 
to end this injustice, Ritchie argued, and on this matter 
Virginia's devotion to the strict construction philosophy 
and to the South would take precedence over party harmony
36Tazewell to Giles, June 26, 1828, M.S., UVA; John Floyd 
to Sam Houston, March 15, 1828, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; 
Richard E. Parker to Tazewell, May 4, 1828, Tazewell Family 
Papers, VSL.
37RE, N o v . 16, 1827; Ritchie to Van Buren, March 11, 1828, 
Martin Van Buren Papers, LC.
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and unity.38
A second major battle in the campaign of 1828 involved 
the question of internal improvements. In his first annual 
address, Adams had outlined an ambitious blueprint for a 
national system of canals, roads, turnpikes, and bridges 
that would facilitate commerce and communication between the 
various regions of the country, thereby drawing them closer 
together. Regional prejudices and tensions would be set 
aside as the farmer of the west joined hands with the 
merchants and manufacturers of the east and north in 
economic union. The federal government's function, Adams 
reckoned, was to provide the resources needed to bring about 
such a marriage. Like other loose constructionists, the 
president hinged his scheme on the "general welfare" clause 
of the Constitution, which gave Congress powers to provide 
for the well-being of the nation. Besides, the president 
argued, these improvements were badly needed, and the people 
overwhelmingly favored them.39
Strict constructionists, however, argued forcefully 
that the Founding Fathers never intended their words to have 
such elasticity. After all, virtually any project could fall 
under the rubric of providing for the general welfare. The 
Constitution clearly placed limitations upon the federal
38RE, June 6, Aug. 5, 1828; Remini, Election of Jackson. 
171-180.
39Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of Presidents. 
2:299-317.
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government's powers and reserved others to the states. The 
"power to make internal improvements" was an "original 
substantive" power that could not be "assumed by the general 
government." Granting Congress such power "would not only 
destroy all the demarkations of power between the state and 
general governments grounded upon principles of locality, 
and generality; but would be consolidation in its 
essence."40 Further, a program of federally funded 
improvements would undoubtedly lead to corruption and the 
abuse of power. Projects would always favor one section at 
the expense of others. Taxes would be collected from honest 
citizens to pay for improvements that might never benefit 
them, or worse yet, might injure them economically. Such 
unjust and unconstitutional measures must not be allowed to 
come to fruition, regardless of how popular they were.41
Troubled by this issue, Ritchie wrote to Madison and 
asked if Adams's plans for internal improvement did not 
represent an assumption of powers by the federal government 
similar to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 
1798. Ritchie knew that "old Virginia herself is divided
40The Virginia Resolutions of 1827, reprinted in Niles' 
Weekly Register. April 21, 1827.
41RE, N o v . 8, Dec. 8, 1825, Feb. 18, 1826. Once again, it 
should be pointed out that even the most doctrinaire 
Virginians had no problem with state financed improvements. 
The Enquirer was filled with proposals and calls for actions 
on such projects. See April 12, 15, 19, 26, 1825; Jan. 12, 
Feb. 23, March 7, June 6, 1826, etc. In July of 1828, a
convention met in Charlottesville to discuss internal 
improvements.
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upon this subject," but suggested that a constitutional 
amendment denying Congress power to fund internal 
improvements would resolve the dispute once and for all. 
Ritchie clearly hoped to link the younger Adams's actions 
with those of his father in the hopes of discrediting his 
administration. If he could get the father of the 
Constitution to acknowledge the similarities between 1798 
and 1825, Adams's fate in Virginia would be sealed.42
Madison's carefully worded reply failed to provide the 
ammunition the editor had hoped for. While Madison admitted 
concerns about the recent "license of construction which has 
been applied to the Constitution," he refused to compare the 
Alien and Sedition Acts with John Quincy Adams's message to 
Congress. Madison lectured Ritchie on distinguishing between 
a government assuming power against the will of its 
constituents, which was the case in 1798, and the 
"assumption by the Constituent Body through the Government 
as the organ of its will," which the current call of the 
people for internal improvements represented. The citizens 
of the republic, he argued, possessed the absolute right to 
shape the federal government's actions. Therefore, Madison 
concluded, the best way to address the issues of the day was 
for the people to instruct their representatives in
42Ritchie to Madison, Dec. 10, 1825, Madison-Todd Papers,
UVA.
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Washington rather than to propose constitutional 
amendments.43
The exchange between Madison and Ritchie revealed more 
than their respective positions on the internal improvement 
question. Ritchie's letter underscored his devotion to a 
theoretical political philosophy that many of his generation 
accepted implicitly. Madison's response confirmed the 
evolution of his political thought and his desire to stay in 
touch with the sentiments and aspirations of his countrymen. 
Democracy was fluid, evershifting, Madison maintained, and 
ideological rigidity stunted the progress of liberty. In 
this instance, the words of the disciples no longer matched 
the ideas of the master.44
If Madison's reply disappointed Ritchie, it did not 
slow down his assault on the administration or stop him and 
his fellow Virginians from comparing the younger Adams with 
the elder. The tenacious editor warned his readers 
repeatedly that the Constitution was "again exposed to the 
most serious dangers." Heretical doctrines were espoused 
that threatened to hurl the country into the "gulf of 
consolidation," and all true republicans knew that "the next
43Madison to Ritchie, Dec. 18, 1825, James Madison Papers, 
LC. Apparently, Van Buren asked Madison the same question, and 
Madison made the same distinction and suggestions to him in a 
letter dated Sept. 20, 1826, Madison Papers, LC.
^For a first-rate treatment of Madison's maturation as a 
political theoretician, see Drew McCoy, The Last on the 
Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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step to consolidation, is Monarchy in some of its forms."45 
John Campbell, a Junto intimate, thought that Adams's 
"latitudinarian doctrines have gone far ahead of even Alex. 
Hamilton," and added his voice to those calling for an end 
to the "mad and ambitious schemes" of the administration and 
its "infatuated partizans." Others agreed with Campbell, and 
Ritchie announced with confidence in the summer of 1826 that 
"no administration ever lost strength throughout Virginia, 
so completely, as the present one since its commencement." 
Virginians were so bitter about Adams's actions, Ritchie 
insisted, that he could never expect the state to support 
his administration.46
Astute observers from across the state agreed with 
Ritchie's analysis. Adams's support continued to fall in the 
Old Dominion. The question now concerned who the state would 
support in the upcoming presidential contest. Western 
Virginia seemed committed to Jackson already, and a general 
consensus existed by late 1826 that most of Crawford's
45RE, Feb. 23, 1826; see also RE, Mar. 2, 24, April 26, 
1826. In the June 16, 1826 issue, Ritchie noted that he had 
received correspondence from across the state comparing J.Q. 
Adams's administration with that of John Adams.
46John Campbell to James Campbell, April 8, 1826, CFP, 
Duke; RE, June 13, 1826. For other examples of this sentiment, 
see James Trezvant to William H. Brodnax, Dec. 10, 1825,
Brodnax Letters, VHS; William H. Roane to Van Buren, April 23, 
1826, Harrison Family Papers, VHS.
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supporters now backed the Hero of New Orleans.47 One of 
Jackson's correspondents notified him that "Virginia is 
changing fast, the Western part of the State was always 
disposed to support you, and in the Eastern section of the 
State a change is gradually taking place."48 But other 
voters remained undecided. Richmond lawyer Benjamin Watkins 
Leigh described the growing, but still tenuous, support for 
Jackson in a letter to Henry Lee. "I begin to apprehend, 
that the vote of Virginia will be given to Gen. Jackson ..., 
tho the public feeling is not yet by any means decided. The 
most zealous men of the old Jefferson party are for him - 
and I believe would be for any body - against John 0.1,49
Leigh's comments about Jackson's supporters accurately 
reflected the state of sentiment as it existed in the summer 
of 1826. The Junto had moved much more decisively into the 
General's ranks, however, by early 1827. A key reason for 
this shift was Van Buren's efforts to add the Junto to the 
Jackson coalition. This required assurances that Jackson
47John Campbell to James Campbell, April 8, 1826; David 
Campbell to James Campbell, July 3, 1826, both in CFP, Duke; 
John Wickham to Tazewell, Dec. 17, 1826, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Sam Houston to Andrew Jackson, Jan. 5, 1827, in 
John Spencer Bassett, ed. Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (7 
vols. Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-
1935), 3:330-331.
48Arthur P. Hayne to Jackson, July 20, 1826, Bassett, ed., 
Correspondence of Jackson. 3:306-307.
49Benjamin Watkins Leigh to Henry Lee, July 30, 1826,
Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers, VHS; emphasis mine. Leigh 
despised both Adams and Jackson, and had no reason to 
misrepresent the political climate in the capital.
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accepted the "Virginia doctrines," which the Little Magician 
quickly gave. Although historians usually credit the New 
Yorker with bringing Virginia into the Jackson fold, 
evidence exists to prove that the Junto sought out Van Buren 
as a source of information and possible collaboration.50
Communication between Van Buren and the Junto had 
lapsed after Adams's election, as both parties turned to 
other matters. Van Buren, back in control of New York, 
returned to the national stage, and set about creating a 
coalition to drive Adams from office. Sometime in 1826, the 
New Yorker settled on Jackson as his candidate. He then 
talked with John Calhoun, Adams's Vice President, about 
joining forces on Jackson's behalf. Calhoun had already made 
overtures to the General, and agreed to work with Van Buren 
as well. The New Yorker promised to discuss matters with the 
Richmond Junto in the hopes of enticing it to join the 
coalition as well.51
The Junto had, in fact, already made tentative gestures 
toward Van Buren. William Roane, son of Spencer Roane, wrote 
to the Little Magician early in 1826 to praise the speech he 
had made on the Panama Mission. Adams had appointed 
commissioners to attend a conference in Panama without first
50Remini, Making of Democratic Party. 118-129; Donald B. 
Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 116-159; John 
Niven, Martin Van Buren: The Romantic Age of American Politics 
(New York: Oxford, 1983), 156-214.
5lRemini, Making of Democratic Party. 123-146.
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securing the approval of Congress, thereby leaving himself 
open to charges of abusing his presidential powers. Van 
Buren, back in Congress, joined Randolph and Tazewell in 
denouncing the president's actions.52 Roane thought that the 
New Yorker's speech made perfectly clear the dangerous 
actions of the administration. The Junto member then 
informed Van Buren of the widespread opposition to Adams in 
Virginia, and the common fear that the administration was 
"breaking down the best principles + changing the ancient + 
established usages of the govt." Roane closed by expressing 
his support of Van Buren's "efforts to retract the govmt to 
its original + true principles."53
Having thus established, or rather reestablished, 
communication with Van Buren, the Junto grew bolder. Philip 
Norborne Nicholas, brother of Wilson Cary Nicholas, penned 
the New Yorker a letter in October of 1826 detailing the 
clique's ambivalence about Jackson and hinting at its desire 
for reliable information about him. After asking Van Buren 
to explain New York politics, Nicholas informed him that 
Virginians opposed Adams strongly, but remained undecided 
about who to run against him. Jackson, who "was not the 
favorite originally of V[irgini]a," had picked up
52Peterson, Tazewell. 126-132.
53Roane to Van Buren, April 23, 1826, Harrison Family
Papers, VHS. Ritchie spoke out repeatedly against the Panama 
Mission in the Enquirer in late March and early April of 1826. 
In the April 11 issue, Ritchie praised Van Buren's speech.
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supporters, although "there are many with us who I think 
carry their hostility to him to quite an unreasonable 
length." With more information about the General's views and 
about developments in New York and Pennsylvania, perhaps 
Jackson's prospects would improve in Virginia. Nicholas then 
went to the heart of the matter. "We are so little informed 
in the views of those with whom we would cooperate in other 
states. There are surely some of us discreet enough to be 
confided in."54 The cards were on the table. Nicholas was 
suggesting to Van Buren that the Junto join his coalition to 
oust Adams.
Van Buren's reply began with a lengthy exposition on 
the "inexplicable" state of political affairs in New York.
He traced party developments in the state from the days of 
Burr and Hamilton, carefully pointing out that his party "is 
now + has been throughout the same old Republican party 
which secured the election of Mr. Jefferson." The New Yorker 
then abruptly changed the subject to a discussion of 
Jackson's prospects in 1828. "If Gen. Jackson and his 
friends will put his election on old party grounds," the 
Little Magician claimed, "preserve the old systems, avoid if 
not condemn the practices of the last campaign[,] we can by 
adding his personal popularity to the yet remaining force of 
old party feeling, not only succeed in electing him but our
^Nicholas to Van Buren, Oct. 13, 1826, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
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success when achieved will be worth something." Van Buren 
seemed to be revealing his blueprint for the upcoming 
election, but Nicholas and the Junto remained unclear about 
what role they were to have in it.55
Two developments in January of 1827 clarified matters 
and strengthened the Junto's commitment to Jackson. John 
Randolph, having served the remainder of Barbour's Senate 
term, stood for reelection. Randolph's intemperate actions 
in Washington and his role as "Van Buren's stalking horse 
for Jackson in the Old Dominion" sparked a movement in the 
legislature to have him replaced by John Tyler, a moderate 
who opposed Adams but who had not yet endorsed the Hero.56 
Ritchie and the Junto backed Randolph strongly. They knew 
that Tyler, who had defended Clay against the "corrupt 
bargain" charges, had the support of the administration men 
in Virginia. The senatorial election quickly became a hotly 
disputed topic in the state and attracted attention 
nationwide.57 Tyler's forces claimed that Randolph's only 
support came from the oligarchic Junto, the "parents of the 
factious opposition to the administration." They also
55Van Buren to Nicholas, Nov. 1, 1826, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
56John Niven, Van Buren. 181; John Y. Mason to William H. 
Brodnax, March 4, 1827, M.S., VSL; "Barre," Constitutional 
Whig, Jan. 2, 1827, Jan. 26, 1827.
57The Enquirer and Constitutional Whig were filled with 
editorials and essays about the election in late December, 
1826 and early January, 1827.
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highlighted Randolph's eccentricities to discredit further 
his candidacy. Despite these tactics and the feeling that 
Adams's friends in Virginia were attempting to divide the 
Republicans of the state by turning out Randolph, the Junto 
remained confident that its man would triumph.58
Tyler's subsequent victory, then, left the group 
stunned and "deeply mortified." The administration presses 
claimed that the opposition and the Junto had suffered a 
mortal wound.59 Randolph's defeat did represent a setback 
for the anti-administration forces in Virginia, but not a 
crippling one. Randolph himself considered the defeat more 
of a personal insult than anything else. He had confided to 
his close friend and Junto member John Brockenbrough that if 
he were not reelected, he would assume it was because the 
state considered him unfit for the office. When notified of 
his defeat, Randolph asked Brockenbrough, "Why is it that 
our system has a uniform tendency to bring forward low and 
little men, to the exclusion of the more worthy?" After 
reflecting upon the matter, Randolph grew less bitter and
58Benjamin Watkins Leigh to Littleton Waller Tazewell, 
Jan. 24, 1827, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL (Leigh was quoting 
from a speech given by Samuel Moore of Rockbridge in the 
Assembly); Con st itut i ona1 Wh iq. Jan. 1827, passim; 
"Virginius,1 RE, Jan. 4, 1827; Sam Houston wrote Jackson that 
"Times have been squally as Richmond, but his friends here say 
he [Randolph] will be elected easily." Houston to Jackson, 
Jan. 5, 1827, Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:330- 
331.
59Benjamin Estill to David Campbell, Jan. 24, 1827, CFP, 
Duke; "Timon," Constitutional Whig. Feb. 20, 1827.
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decided that "nothing then, remains but a calm and dignified 
submission to the disgrace that has been put upon me."60 
While one observer claimed that the election results threw 
Ritchie "into hystericks," the editor quickly assured his 
readers that no significant damage had been inflicted. Since 
Tyler opposed the administration and was a true friend of 
state rights, there was no need for concern.61
Just a few days after Randolph's defeat, Ritchie 
received a long letter from Van Buren that removed all 
doubts as to the role the Junto would play in the upcoming 
campaign. The professed purpose of the epistle was to gain 
the Junto's support for a scheme Van Buren had proposed to 
restructure the Republican Party's national convention, but 
the New Yorker ranged far beyond that. With uncharacteristic 
candor, Van Buren suggested to Ritchie that the "planters of 
the South and the plain Republicans of the north" unite in 
the "substantial reorganization of the Old Republican 
party." Jackson would serve as their leader and Van Buren's 
general convention scheme would be the means by which unity 
and victory would be achieved.
Van Buren explained the reasoning behind his plan in a
^E, Jan. 16, 20, 1827; John Randolph to John
Brockenbrough, Aug. 8, Oct. 13, 1826; Jan. 13, 19, 1827,
Kenneth Shorey, ed., Collected Letters of John Randolph to Dr. 
John Brockenbrough, 1812-1833 (New Brunswick: Transition
Press, 1988), 82-84.
61Benjamin Estill to David Campbell, Jan. 24, 1827, CFP, 
Duke; RE, Jan. 16, 1827.
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fashion well calculated to impress the Junto. The breakdown 
of the old party system, hastened by Monroe's "amalgamating 
policy," had revived local and regional prejudices long 
considered dormant. Factionalism and corruption ensued. To 
correct this, the "old party distinctions" must again be 
raised and maintained.. "We must always have party 
distinctions and the old ones are the best." Furthermore, 
"political combinations between the inhabitants of the 
different states are unavoidable ..., and the most natural 
and beneficial to the country is that between the planters 
of the South and the plain Republicans of the north."62
The engine driving this "political combination" would 
be the ideology of Jeffersonian Republicanism, and the 
popular Jackson would serve as engineer. Van Buren told 
Ritchie that he had "long been satisfied that we can only 
get rid of the present, + restore a better state of things, 
by combining Genl Jackson's personal popularity with the 
portion of old party feeling yet remaining." The device of a 
general convention would help bring such a goal to fruition. 
Because it was "more in unison with the spirit of the times, 
especially at the seat of the war Pennsylvania + N. York," a 
convention would lend respectability to the campaign. It 
would also bring together Republicans from all regions and, 
by drawing "anew the old Party lines," unite them behind
62Van Buren to Ritchie, Jan. 13, 1827 (copy), Van Buren 
Papers, LC.
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common principles. Next, Van Buren discussed how a 
nomination from a national convention committed to a 
specific platform would strengthen Jackson's campaign. "His 
election, as the result of his military services without 
reference to party + ... principle, would be one thing. His 
election as the result of a combined and concerted effort of 
a political party, holding in the main, to certain tenets + 
opposed to certain prevailing principles, might be another 
and a far different thing."63
The New Yorker closed his letter by shamelessly 
praising Ritchie for his indispensable services in the name 
of liberty. In case the Junto leader missed the point, Van 
Buren informed him that "there is not another man in the 
Union [who] can render as much service to the cause in which 
we are engaged as yourself." The Little Magician's words 
must have warmed the hearts of Ritchie and the Junto. A 
national party grounded in the "Virginia doctrines" was a 
longstanding goal of the group, and now it seemed on the 
verge of realization.64
Van Buren's proposition and kind words stiffened 
Ritchie's wavering commitment to Jackson. The editor had 
been more reluctant than others in the Junto to embrace Old 
Hickory, and he continued to worry about the General's 
ability to hold high public office. Ritchie began to comment
63 Ibid.
‘“ibid.
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more favorably on Jackson in the Enquirer. however, soon 
after receiving Van Buren's communication. The first reports 
of pro-Jackson meetings in Virginia appeared in his paper on 
February 20, 1827, when the citizens of Fredericksburg 
praised Jackson as the "'great republican leader under whose 
auspices the constitution may be restored to its 
supremacy.'" On March 1, 1827, Ritchie noted for the first 
time that Virginia would probably give its vote to Jackson. 
He confided to Tazewell, a leader of the Jackson forces on 
the Southside, that "I perfectly agree with you and Mr. Van 
Buren that if we are fortunate enough to shake off the 
present disastrous administration, the succession of Gen. 
Jackson will be the most important era which our country has
witnessed  Principles will then be fixed, which will cast
their shadows or their lights for years to come." After 
considerable hesitation, Ritchie finally endorsed Jackson 
publicly in the April 27, 1827, issue of the Enquirer.65
Despite his apparent conversion, Ritchie continued to 
express misgivings about Jackson's candidacy and felt 
compelled to explain the reasoning behind his decision to 
back him. Adams's first message to Congress had made clear 
his dangerous policies, and from that moment on Ritchie had 
opposed him. Repeated abuses of patronage and widespread 
corruption in the administration proved the correctness of
65RE, Feb. 20, March 1, 1827; Ritchie to Tazewell, Feb. 
28, 1827, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; RE, April 27, 1827.
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these initial suspicions. Ritchie could not support Adams, 
and that left him with no other choice than to back Jackson. 
"We are compelled to take Jackson with all our objections to 
him," the editor informed his readers, "rather than Mr.
Adams, with his own transgressions." The Junto leader 
underscored his devotion to the state rights philosophy and 
the tenuous nature of his advocacy of Jackson by adding that 
Virginia's support for Old Hickory did not bind the state 
"to support measures [passed by a Jackson administration] 
which she cannot approve."66
Followers of both candidates attacked Ritchie for his 
position on Jackson. Adams's backers accused the editor of 
making an about-face. The editor of the Virginian feigned 
confusion and asked Ritchie "whether your charges against 
General Jackson in 1824 or your eulogy of him in 1827 is to 
be regarded as your mendacious commentary." Pleasants kept 
up a steady denunciation of Ritchie for switching positions 
on Jackson.67 These ribbings were mild compared to the 
criticism that defenders of Jackson levelled at the 
influential editor. When asked for advice on starting a 
Jackson paper in Charlottesville, Rives told Thomas W.
Gilmer to "leave Mr. Ritchie to compromise as well as he can 
with former opinions, + to talk about the 'hard alternative'
“RE, June 1, 15, Sept. 11, 1827.
67Lvnchbura Virginian. July 23, 1827; Constitutional Whig. 
July 14, Aug. 29, Nov. 10, 1827.
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of supporting Gen. Jackson." He added that he was perfectly 
satisfied that the General was a "most orthodox + thorough­
faced republican of the Jefferson school." Claiborne W.
Gooch, co-editor of the Enquirer at the time, complained 
that Ritchie was too cautious in advancing Jackson's cause 
and too "courteous" in attacking Adams. James Campbell 
informed his brother that "Hickory requires defense and if 
we go on dosing [sic] as we have done in old Va. & talking 
about choice of evils & all that kind of stuff the Adams 
party may yet beat us." Jackson's forces in Virginia were 
clearly disappointed with Ritchie's leadership.68
Ritchie responded to these criticisms by praising 
Jackson more strongly and by dropping all mention of his 
reservations about supporting his candidacy. The Junto 
leader now described Jackson as "an honest, high-minded man" 
dedicated to the cause of liberty and above corruption. He 
expounded on Jackson's firmness and integrity, defended him 
against all charges of wrongdoing, and confidently predicted 
an overwhelming victory at the polls the following 
November.69
Ritchie's shift in editorial policy revealed the 
strength of Jackson's cause in Virginia. In fact, the
68Rives to Thomas W. Gilmer, July 20, 22, 1827, Rives 
Papers, LC; Gooch to John Campbell, Oct. 8, 1827, Gooch Family 
Papers, VHS; James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827, 
(typescript) ; Alexander Smyth to David Campbell, Nov. 6, 1827, 
both in CFP, Duke.
69RE, Oct. 26, Nov. 20, 27, 1827; Aug 29, Oct. 14, 1828.
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General appeared so popular by late 1827 that his supporters 
became complacent about the election.70 But Adams's forces 
refused to abandon hope and unveiled some new campaign 
tactics that they hoped would strengthen their cause. They 
now focused all their efforts on condemning Jackson rather 
than praising Adams. This allowed them to attract voters who 
remained concerned about the General's qualifications or his 
commitment to the "Virginia principles." A reinvigorated 
party, now called the Anti-Jacksonians, set about spreading 
the message that Old Hickory was a militaristic demagogue 
completely unfit for the presidency. Pleasants and others 
cranked out editorials that called into question Jackson's 
actions as governor of Florida, his conduct at the Battle of 
New Orleans, even his marital status, all for the sake of 
revealing to Virginia that Jackson lacked integrity, 
honesty, and a commitment to liberty.71 The Anti-Jacksonians 
held meetings to express popular dissatisfaction with the 
General and to prove that he had repudiated all of the 
principles sacred to the state. They claimed, with some
70The Enquirer turned to other matters in the summer of 
1827, only occasionally touching on the election. See RE, May- 
September, 1827, passim.
^Constitutional Whig. Nov. 17, 1826; March 2, May 15, 
June 15, 1827; James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827, 
CFP, Duke; "Preamble and Resolutions of A Meeting ... 
Disapproving the Election of Gen. Andrew Jackson to the 
Presidency of the United States," (Richmond: T.W. White,
1827); Richard E. Parker to Tazewell, May 4, 1828, Tazewell 
Family Papers, VSL; Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia 
Democratic Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State 
University, 1974), 69-71.
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authority, that Jackson looked favorably upon a system of 
protective tariffs and federally-funded national 
improvements. "General Jackson is as friendly to a broad 
construction of the Constitution— is more inimical to State 
Rights," John Pleasants of the Constitutional Whig insisted, 
"than the present administration." Given this, the editor 
asked his fellow Virginians what they stood to gain by 
electing Jackson: "Where is the probability that this event 
will make her [Virginia] principles triumphant?"72
The Anti-Jacksonians extended their attacks to Old 
Hickory's supporters, demanding to know why Jackson was now 
thought to be the best candidate for the office, when just 
four years earlier Virginians had denounced him as a 
military chieftain. "If he was not worthy of the Presidency 
in 1825," one commentator noted, "neither will he be in 
1829." Why was it that Virginians supported Jackson now, 
Adams's followers asked. Was it due to his principles or to 
the notion that only he could preserve the endangered rights 
of the states? Hardly. As the Anti-Jacksonians saw it, there 
was "no serious apprehension felt about state rights" among 
opponents of the administration. That was merely a "bug bear 
got up for electioneering purposes, to inflame the minds of 
the people against the present administration. Virginia did 
not get her President [Crawford]; there is the rub! It is 
that disappointment which rankles in the bosom of her
^Constitutional Whig. March 14, 2, 1827.
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politicians and has made them so extremely lynk eyed in 
discerning constitutional infractions.1,73
The Anti-Jacksonians reserved their most bitter 
invective for Ritchie and the Junto. Attacks on the group 
escalated as the campaign reached fever pitch in 1827, and 
Ritchie worked tirelessly to assure Virginians that such a 
clique did not exist. Since the editor felt compelled to 
refute nearly every claim about the Junto and its powers, it 
must be assumed that Ritchie considered these charges a 
serious threat to Jackson's hopes in Virginia. He also 
viewed them as personal assaults on himself and his paper. 
His honor required vindication.74
Supporters of the administration had denounced the 
Junto regularly since early 1825, but their tactics grew 
bolder and their language more biting as the campaign 
proceeded.75 Ritchie's foes condemned the clique's grip on 
political matters in the state and accused the Junto of 
subordinating Virginia's interests by joining with Van Buren 
and other northern politicians in an unnatural alliance to 
put Jackson in the White House. One columnist claimed that
73"No Turncoat," March 6, 1827 and "Americanus," Feb. 13, 
1827, both in Constitutional Whig.
74RE, 1825 to 1828, passim; for evidence that Ritchie took 
these attacks personally, see Ritchie to Col. A. Ritchie, n.d. 
(probably late 1825), John P. Branch Historical Papers of 
Randolph-Macon College. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 205-206.
75RE, March 1, 1825, March 31, 1826; Lynchburg Virginian. 
Nov. 17, Dec. 5, 1825, Oct. 9, 1826; Niles' Weekly Register. 
Dec. 17, 1825.
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the Junto was using its vast power to "plunge the People 
into political excess." The Lynchburg Virginian referred to 
the group as the "Metropolitan demagogues" and claimed that 
its opposition to the tariff and internal improvements 
stemmed from economic concerns, not political principles.
The Virginian asserted that the decision to support Jackson 
had broken the unity of the Junto, although the group 
remained a formidable force working behind the scenes. When 
pressed by Ritchie to substantiate claims about the Junto, 
"that idle chimera, which has no existence," the paper's 
editor admitted that the Richmond Party was an "intangible 
body," but added defiantly that it was "not the less 
powerful because of its intangible character."76
The National Intelligencer went farther in denouncing 
the Richmond Party. William Seaton and Joseph Gales, who ran 
the paper, published a series of editorials in April of 1827 
that described the union between the Albany Regency and the 
Junto. A few months later, they referred to the Junto as the 
"Political Vatican of Virginia," and insisted that its 
members were plotting to take the Old Dominion out of the 
Union in order to strengthen their political position.77
76RE, May 8, 1827 (describing editorial in Winchester
Republican); Lynchburg Virginian. Oct. 8, Nov. 12, 1827; RE, 
Nov. 6, 1827.
^National Intelligencer. April 7, 19, 1827; RE, April 13, 
24, 27, June 15, 1827. Just before the election, Gales and 
Seaton published more essays on the "combinations" that had 
formed to elect Jackson. Intelligencer. Sept. 11, 13, 23, 25, 
Oct. 4, 1828.
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While these claims about disunionism were completely 
groundless, others agreed that the Richmond Party held too 
much power in the state. Its dominance must be broken and 
the people's power restored to them. Ritchie's group had 
deluded Virginians into believing that Jackson was fit to be 
president, when in fact he would lead the country to ruin. 
Furthermore, the Junto's decision to support Old Hickory was 
based on personal and party considerations, without any 
concern for what was best for Virginia. Clique members were 
hypocrites, intriguers, and base scoundrels. Only through a 
concerted effort to prevent Jackson's election could the 
Junto be cut down and removed from power. "I trust in God," 
Joseph C. Cabell wrote in the Autumn of 1827, "that the 
reign of a Central Junto is nearly over, and that the people 
will now take the matter into their own hands." From 
Washington, Henry Clay suggested to his friends in Richmond 
that they use animosity toward the "party of the metropolis" 
as a tool "to induce men to discard their preference for 
General Jackson." Ritchie's claim that attacks on the Junto 
were revived "to answer party purposes" seemed verified by 
the actions of the group's opponents.78
The ferocious attacks of the Anti-Jacksonians seemed to 
slow down the Jackson machine in Virginia, at least
78Joseph C. Cabell to John H. Cocke of Bremo, Oct. 17, 
1827, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Henry Clay to Francis Brooke, 
Sept. 24, 1827, Calvin Colton, ed., The Private Correspondence 
of Henry Clay (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971 
[reprint of 1855 edition]), 178-180; RE, Jan. 16, 1827.
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temporarily. While the administration men spoke of growing 
support for Adams, Jackson supporters worried about efforts 
"to turn the tide against Old Hickory."79 Pleasants, seizing 
the moment, called for a statewide convention to unify the 
Anti-Jacksonians.80 An Anti-Jackson Convention was held in 
Richmond on January 8, 1828, the thirteenth anniversary of 
the Battle of New Orleans. Delegates adopted an address that 
cataloged Jackson's faults and warned of the consequences of 
his election. The "dearest interest" of the country were at
stake, and "even the permanence of her free institutions __
were in peril," should the military chieftain win in 
November. The address closed by naming both Madison and 
Monroe to its electoral ticket and by calling on Virginians 
to go forth at the next election and "save the Temple of 
Liberty from pollution."81
Jackson's followers in Virginia responded vigorously to 
the barrage of accusations, condemnations, and arguments
79James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827;
Alexander Smyth to David Campbell, Nov. 6, 1827, both in CFP, 
Duke; Judge Stuart to James Barbour, Oct. 28, 1827, Barbour 
Family Papers, UVA; John Taliaferro to James Monroe, Dec. 15, 
1827; Samuel Southard to Monroe, Dec. 16, 1827, both in James 
Monroe Papers, LC.
^Constitutional Whig. Sept. 1, 15, 19, 26, Oct. 6, 13,
1827.
81 "The Virginia Address of the National Republican Party 
(Va.) Convention (1828)," VSL. Madison and Monroe had 
previously and explicitly declined to serve in any capacity 
for either candidate. They immediately refused to become 
electors for Adams. The audacious move of the Anti-Jacksonians 
outraged Ritchie. Ambler, Ritchie. 116.
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laid down by the Anti-Jacksonians. The "noise they are 
making has roused the lion from his den and will cause the 
friends of Genl Jackson to offer some strong views," one 
western Virginian commented. Already the "old patriots" were 
holding meetings and declaring for Jackson. "Virginia + 
Pennsylvania can do much and will do it," he concluded, "if 
too much rubbish is not thrown their way." John Tyler, now 
in Congress and fighting for Jackson, agreed. Old Hickory 
"will come in on the shoulders of the South - aided and 
assisted by New York and Pennsylvania." In Richmond, John 
Campbell, a Junto associate, wrote home predicting that "We 
shall sweep every thing before us."82
The Jacksonians in Virginia had every right to be 
confident. Despite the efforts of the Anti-Jacksonians, all 
signs pointed to a landslide for the General.83 The party 
was well organized and solidly behind Jackson. Questions 
about his orthodoxy had been replaced by a new found zeal 
for his character and achievements. "Support of Gen. Jackson 
is now of a character widely different from that which it 
bore a year ago," Benjamin Watkins Leigh informed his 
brother in early 1828. "Then, it was with most men, only a
82David Campbell to James Campbell, Nov. 11, 1827, CFP, 
Duke; Tyler to John Rutherfoord, Dec. 8, 1827, Tyler, Life and 
Letters of Tvlers. 1:376-378; John Campbell to David Campbell, 
Dec. 7, 1827, CFP, Duke; Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 
72-75.
83John Y. Mason to James H. Rochelle, Dec. 13, 1827, James 
Henry Rochelle Papers, Duke; William C. Rives to Thomas W. 
Gilmer, Sept. 25, 1828, Rives Papers, LC.
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hearty determined opposition to the present 
administration...; now, it has become a positive preference 
for Gen. Jackson; all his acts are justified; and he is as 
much the idol of his party ... as ever Mr. Jefferson was of 
his." Homilies about Jackson's efforts "on the blood-stained 
fields of Orleans, covering himself with evergreen laurels, 
and crowning his country with immortal glory," replaced 
questions about his views on internal improvements and the 
tariff. Jackson the military chieftain was now Jackson the 
defender of liberty and savior of the country.84
In October 1828 the Jackson Central Committee, 
controlled by the Junto, addressed the people of Virginia on 
the significance of the upcoming election. The "important 
principles" involved rendered this election "momentous in 
the extreme." The Adams administration had pursued policies 
"not only inconsistent with the constitution, but 
incompatible with freedom." Now it was up to the people to 
decide "whether they will put down this most violent effort 
to destroy our free constitution." The president's 
supporters had made every effort to defend his course, but
^Benjamin Watkins Leigh to William Leigh, Feb. 3, 1828, 
Francis Otway Byrd Papers, VHS; "A Freeholder of Buckingham," 
RE, April 8, 1828. Leigh had published a popular pamphlet in 
1827 under the pseudonym of Christopher Quandary that poked 
fun at the Jacksonians for describing their candidate as 
"another WASHINGTON" and for attributing to him "the sum total 
of all that is great and good." Christopher Quandary [B.W. 
Leigh] Some Serious Considerations on the Present State of 
Parties. With Regard to the Presidential Election (Richmond: 
Thomas White, 1827).
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to no avail. They had then attacked Jackson "with an 
intemperance and an acrimony which are the surest badges of 
incorrect opinions and a bad cause." These efforts to 
discredit Jackson had failed, and the people stood ready "to 
assert and maintain the supremacy of the public will; to 
vindicate the elective franchise; to preserve the 
constitution in its purity; and to hand down to posterity 
the liberty acquired by the virtues and valor of our 
ancestors." The preservation of liberty and the expansion of 
freedom flowed downward through the Founding Fathers to 
Andrew Jackson. He must be elected in an "illustrious and 
decisive" manner to show the people's commitment to the 
basic principles which had founded the nation.85
On election day Virginians went to the polls in record 
numbers. Some voters listened to last minute speeches on 
"Objections to Mr. Adams." Others marched to town in groups 
of fifty or sixty under signs emblazoned with the words 
"Jackson and Reform." Virginians cast nearly 27,000 votes 
for Old Hickory, as opposed to 12,000 for the hapless Adams. 
The people had spoken. The Constitution stood vindicated. 
Liberty had been preserved.86
85"Address of the Jackson Central Committee," RE, Oct. 7,
1828. Ritchie, Daniel, Nicholas, and Roane all sat on the 
committee.
86"Notes - Heads of a Speech intended to be delivered at 
Nelson Court House - 3 Nov 1828," Cabell Family Papers, UVA; 
Jacob Lynch to William B. Campbell, Nov. 5, 1828, CFP, Duke. 
Lynch told Campbell that Jackson received 564 of 580 votes 
cast in Abingdon in western Virginia. He then named every man
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Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond Junto played a key role 
in Jackson's victory in Virginia. The clique headed the 
opposition movement in the state and later organized 
Jackson's forces for the electoral contest. It kept up a 
steady attack on Adams and refashioned an image of Andrew 
Jackson that Virginians found more acceptable. The Junto 
also represented Virginia in Van Buren's new union of the 
"planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the 
north." In short, the group was an integral part of 
Jackson's emerging political machine.
Despite its strong endorsement of Jackson during the 
last days of the 1828 campaign, some members of the Junto 
continued to have nagging doubts about the Tennessean. The 
group understood Jackson's views on two matters crucial to 
Virginia, the tariff and internal improvements, imperfectly. 
His fiery temper and military background remained a source 
of concern. Ritchie and the Junto wondered if Jackson would 
remember the role Virginia played in his election when he 
selected his cabinet. Most of all, they worried about 
Jackson's devotion to the "Virginia Principles" of state 
rights and strict construction. Ritchie wasted no time in 
notifying Jackson of Virginia's expectations of his 
administration. The people of the Old Dominion presumed the 
government would be guided by the "high minded enlightened
who voted for Adams. For vote totals, see Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc., Presidential Elections. 93.
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principle[s]" of republicanism. Should Jackson deviate from 
this course, he could expect Virginia to oppose him as 
strongly as it had Adams.87 The price of liberty was eternal 
vigilance, and that was a price Virginia had always been 
willing to pay.
87Andrew Stevenson to Jackson, Dec. 8, 1828, Jackson
Papers, LC; [Thomas Ritchie], "Memorandum of Points to be 
considered in the administration of the government," [Dec. 9,
1828], Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:451-452.
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Chapter III 
Rumblings in the Atmosphere: 1829-1833
"When I had the pleasure of seeing you in Richmond," 
Thomas Ritchie wrote Martin Van Buren early in 1829, "I was 
struck by your views of the benefits which we might promise 
ourselves from Gen. J[ackson]'s election." Ritchie and the 
Junto had fought hard to get Andrew Jackson into the White 
House, and now they hoped that their efforts would pay 
dividends. The Junto had supported Jackson not only because 
of its distaste for John Quincy Adams and his policies, but 
also because it believed that Jackson would restore virtue 
to government and zealously protect the rights of the 
states. The Junto also hoped to reexert Virginia's influence 
in national affairs. "Now is the epoch," Ritchie announced 
upon hearing of Jackson's victory, "for Virginia to re­
assert her old doctrines - to fix, if possible, the true 
interpretation of the Constitution." Naturally, the Junto 
would be in charge of carrying out such an important task.1
•Thomas Ritchie to Martin Van Buren, Jan. 31, 1829,
Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress; Richmond 
Enquirer (herafter cited as RE), Dec. 6, 1828. Ritchie
apparently made overtures to Jackson even before he took 
office. Jackson responded, through Andrew Stevenson, that it 
would give him "much pleasure to receive at all times Mr. 
R[itchie]'s frank & full opinion on any & all subjects."
123
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During his first term, Jackson lived up to the Junto's 
expectations in many ways, but by no means completely. His 
efforts to ferret out corruption in the federal government, 
to reduce the national debt, and his attack on the Bank of 
the United States won applause from the Junto, as did his 
veto of the Maysville Road Bill. These encouraging signs 
allowed the Junto to remain loyal to Jackson during his 
struggle with John C. Calhoun. The group also played an 
important part in reelecting Jackson and in securing the 
vice-presidential nomination for Martin Van Buren in 1832. 
But the Junto's commitment to Old Hickory was never 
absolute. While Jackson's appointment of editors to public 
positions and his failure to veto certain internal 
improvement bills disturbed the clique, his stance toward 
South Carolina during the nullification crisis, culminating 
in the Proclamation and Force Bill, severely tested its 
faith in the President and its control of the Jacksonian 
forces in Virginia.
The Junto's hesitancy to endorse all of Jackson's 
actions during his first administration was significant for 
two reason. First, Ritchie and his group insisted on 
retaining their commitment to the doctrines of the state 
rights school of thought. They had genuinely hoped that
Jackson to Stevenson, undated [probably early 1829], Harold D. 
Moser, et. al., eds., The Papers of Andrew Jackson: A
Microfilm Supplement (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1986), reel 12, frame 0391.
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Jackson would follow a state rights course, and were 
disappointed when he failed to measure up to the standards 
of the "Virginia doctrines." In 1830, Ritchie confided to a 
friend that "You must not be surprized to find us pressing 
at this time our old State Rights Doctrines ..., believing 
that they alone will save the country from the gulf of 
consolidation - and that if we give up now, we are gone 
forever."2 The Junto continued to view Jackson as an 
instrument by which its larger goals could be achieved; he 
was the means to an end, not the end itself.
Second, the Junto's actions between 1829 and 1833 
revealed its reluctance to embrace completely Martin Van 
Buren's idea of the primacy of party loyalty in the new 
Jacksonian coalition. To traditionally minded Virginians, 
slavish devotion to a political party threatened the 
independence of the individual voter, and many remained 
suspicious of the idea of following blindly the dictates of 
party leaders. William Roane assured his voters in 1831 that 
he was a "Jackson-man," but not "in the servile partisan 
sense" of the term. He supported the President because of 
his policies, not his party.3 When Jackson continued to 
alienate Virginians during the course of his administration, 
and as defections from the party continued, however, the
2Ritchie to William Cabell Rives, April 15, 1830, William 
Cabell Rives Papers, LC.
3William H. Roane, "To the Voters of Hanover," [1831], 
Broadside, Virginia Historical Society.
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Junto gradually accommodated itself to the need for 
effective party discipline and loyalty. Without a cohesive 
base of support, they reasoned, none of their programs could 
be implemented.
In addition to national developments that required 
their constant attention, Ritchie and the Junto also had 
their hands filled at the state level. The constitutional 
convention of 1829-30 pushed all other matters into the 
background for several months and brought sectional tensions 
in Virginia to a boil. That was followed by Nat Turner's 
Rebellion in Southampton County and a painful and drawn-out 
debate on the future of slavery in the Commonwealth. Then 
came another revolt, this time a movement within the ranks 
of the Jackson party led by supporters of Philip P. Barbour, 
who refused to accept Van Buren as Jackson's running mate in 
1832. During these troubled years, the Junto struggled 
constantly to maintain order and unity in the Jacksonian 
ranks. To a remarkable extent the group was able to keep 
Virginia hitched to the Jackson wagon. Only the damage 
caused by Jackson's handling of the Nullification Crisis 
proved too much for Ritchie and his clique to control. The 
President's actions on those matters served as a rallying 
cry for both the party's enemies and a growing number of 
disaffected Jacksonians. The Democratic Party in Virginia 
was reshaped during Jackson's first presidency by 
controversy and growing factionalism, but the Junto
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maintained and even strengthened its hold on political 
matters. In fact, Jackson even increased his vote totals in 
the election of 1832, capturing 75% of the votes in 
Virginia.4 After this decisive victory, Ritchie could 
downplay party disputes and claim that the Old Dominion had 
once again redeemed its honor by voting for the true friend 
of state rights, Andrew Jackson.
Jackson's administration did not begin auspiciously, as 
far as the Junto was concerned. His cabinet choices seemed 
completely uninspired and his decisions in removing 
officeholders seemed based more on political motives than on 
a desire to restore integrity to the government. Much worse 
was Jackson's appointment to office of several editors who 
had helped him in the recent election. Not only did this 
smack of a spoils system, the Junto argued, but it seriously 
endangered the freedom of the press, something all 
republicans understood as a central bulwark of liberty. 
Ritchie and the other Junto members wasted no time in 
informing Van Buren and Jackson of their disapproval of 
these actions. At the same time, they refrained from 
complaining too stridently, for they continued to look upon 
Jackson as the means by which Virginia and the state rights 
philosophy could regain ascendancy in Washington.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections 
Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), 
94.
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News of Jackson's cabinet selections was greeted with 
disappointment and dismay in Virginia. After all, the 
General's supporters had promised that he would gather the 
finest men around him to assist with the work of reforming 
and purifying the government.5 Now that promise seemed like 
a cruel hoax. Of the men whom Jackson chose to be his 
closest advisors, many Virginians believed that only Martin 
Van Buren, the Secretary of State, possessed the skills and 
competence needed for a cabinet position. The remainder of 
the group, they correctly perceived, was decidedly 
lackluster. John Campbell informed his brother that not a 
single man in Richmond was satisfied with the cabinet 
selections. There was "general disappointment here" and many 
of their friends were "in a state of great despondency" over 
the matter. Andrew Stevenson bluntly informed Van Buren that 
dissatisfaction with the appointments had caused a "state of 
astonishment and excitement" in Virginia that "required all 
our skills and prudence to quiet." Ritchie was more 
diplomatic. "We do not hesitate to say," he told his 
readers, "that this is not throughout the Cabinet which we 
could have wished or expected."6
A second source of early concern centered on Jackson's
sRichmond Constitutional Whig. March 13, 20, April 1,
1829.
6John Campbell to David Campbell, March 26, 1829,
Campbell Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke 
University; Stevenson to Van Buren, April 19, 1829, Van Buren 
Papers, LC; RE, Feb 28, 1829.
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removal policy. Jackson had vowed to "cleanse the Augean 
Stables" once in power, and he quickly bounced several 
officeholders out of the government. Some were genuinely 
corrupt or incompetent, but other removals seemed 
politically motivated. That bothered Jackson's supporters in 
Virginia. They backed Jackson in his efforts at reform, but 
believed that public officials should not be discharged 
solely because of their political beliefs. As long as they 
carried out their duties effectively, they should be allowed 
to remain in office. "I go for reform," Ritchie told Van 
Buren, "but what is reform?" It is not punishing supporters 
of Adams and rewarding cronies; rather, it should be the 
removal of incompetents and abusers of offices, and the 
abolishment of all unnecessary positions.7 This is not to 
say that Ritchie and others considered themselves above 
rewarding party supporters; they simply clung to more 
traditional notions of disinterested service. Ritchie's 
comment that some of the removals had cut "doubly deep into 
the popularity of our party" revealed the problems that many 
Virginians had in coming to terms with the new style of 
politics set in motion by Van Buren and Jackson.8
A more serious problem concerned Jackson's unfortunate
7Ritchie to Van Buren, March 27, 1829; Stevenson to Van 
Buren, April 19, 1829; Ritchie to Van Buren, April 19, 1829, 
all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
8Ritchie to John [?] Campbell, October 26, 1829, CFP,
Duke.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 0
decision to appoint editors to positions in the government. 
Virginians spoke out against this policy with near 
unanimity. They considered the "seeming intimacy between the 
Press and the Government" a blatant abuse of executive 
patronage and a dangerous erosion of the freedom of the 
press. "The administration will be ruined if any further 
appointments are made of editors," one concerned observer 
warned Van Buren. John Rutherfoord, a Richmond merchant and 
Junto associate, agreed. Jackson's appointments have been a 
"source of exultation to the enemies, and of the deepest 
regret and mortification to the friends of Genl. Jackson in 
this quarter." John H. Pleasants, editor of the anti-Jackson 
Richmond Constitutional Whig, announced in May that, because 
of his intemperate actions, "Jackson fanaticism has already 
died a violent death, and his popularity is declining more 
rapidly than it ever advanced."9
Concerned about Jackson's sliding popularity in 
Virginia, Ritchie wrote Van Buren to express his 
apprehension and to recommend a course of action. Van Buren, 
impressed by Ritchie's arguments, showed the letter to 
Jackson, who promptly defended his actions in a reply to Van
9"A Lowlander and a Jacksonian,1 RE, Aug. 14, 1829;
William S. Archer to Van Buren, May 6, 1829, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; John Rutherfoord to Rives, May 22, 1829, Rives Papers, LC; 
Richmond Constitutional Whig. May 15, 1829. Pleasants never 
tired of discussing Jackson's controversial appointments and 
removals. Between May and August of 1829, discussion of these 
issues dominated the Whig, even pushing aside debate over the 
upcoming constitutional convention. For examples, see May 5, 
19, June 23, 1829.
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Buren. The President asked Van Buren to assure Ritchie of 
his commitment to the principles of reform. This 
correspondence revealed very clearly the nature of the 
relationship between the Junto and the national Jackson 
party as it stood in 1829, and is worth further 
investigation.
In his letter to Van Buren on March 27, 1829, Ritchie 
spelled out the concerns he had about Jackson's early course 
as president. The editor considered the election of Jackson 
a "new epoch in the history of our country, - as opening a 
bright prospect of wise and constitutional principles." But 
already Jackson had dampened hopes by selecting an 
incompetent cabinet and removing officeholders for 
exclusively political reasons. Worse still was Jackson's 
penchant for appointing friends, especially newspaper 
editors, to government positions. "It really looks as if 
there were a systematic effort to reward several Editorial 
Partizans," Ritchie told Van Buren, "which will have the 
effect of bringing the vaunted Liberty of the Press into a 
sort of Contempt." Ritchie understood that patronage was a 
"delicate" matter, but he believed that Jackson should act 
more prudently in the future. Ritchie closed by informing 
Van Buren that the "course of appointments at Washington is 
calculated to cool and alienate some of our friends ...[;]
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you can scarcely conceive the uneasiness which prevails."10
The tone of Ritchie's letter, and his position as 
leader of the Jackson forces in Virginia, convinced Van 
Buren to show the epistle to Jackson. The New Yorker told 
the President that he had known Ritchie for a long while and 
had complete faith in his devotion to the cause of reform.
In fact, there was "not a man of purer public spirit in the 
country." Jackson, unmoved by such praise, wasted no time in 
countering the charges made by Ritchie. The General informed 
his Secretary of State that Ritchie's concerns about 
removals were unfounded, for only those who lacked "moral 
honesty" had been dismissed. Perhaps the touchy editor had 
been misled by "some disappointed office hunter" on this 
matter. Clearly, Jackson continued testily, he had "not 
reflected upon the subject, or he would not have suffered 
himself to be so easily alarmed." As to appointments,
Jackson seemed perplexed as to why he should not appoint his 
friends to office. "If my personal friends are qualified and 
patriotic, why should I not be permitted to bestow a few 
offices on them?" Write to Ritchie, Jackson closed, and 
assuage his fears. The country is in no danger from my 
policies."
10Ritchie to Van Buren, March 27, 1829, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
"Van Buren to Jackson, March 31, 1829, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; Jackson to Van Buren, March 31, 1829, John Spencer
Bassett, ed. , Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (7 vols. 
Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935),
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The following day Van Buren penned a note to Ritchie 
explaining the President's response. While Jackson believed 
that the editor's fears were unfounded on this issue, he 
hoped that Ritchie would continue to offer his input in the 
future. In diplomatic language, Van Buren assured Ritchie 
that Jackson's motives remained pure and that he valued the 
Virginian's friendship. If Ritchie would travel to 
Washington, Van Buren suggested, the two could discuss these 
matters in greater detail.12
Jackson's and Van Buren's replies must have stung 
Ritchie. They were clearly brushing aside his concerns about 
issues that threatened to weaken the Jackson party in 
Virginia. That hardly seemed an appropriate response, 
especially given the role that Ritchie and the Junto had 
played in electing Jackson. Van Buren, astute politician 
that he was, realized that Ritchie was dissatisfied with 
Jackson's response. To placate him, the New Yorker wrote 
again, this time seeking advice on some presidential 
appointments. The editor responded pointedly that he was not 
capable of advising the President on such matters; he was 
far too busy with other work. In a sharply worded note 
accompanying a letter from Andrew Stevenson to Van Buren,
4:18-19.
12Van Buren to Ritchie, April 1, 1829, in John C. 
Fitzpatrick, ed. Autobiography of Martin Van Buren. Vol II, 
American Historical Association Annual Report. 1918 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 249-250.
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Ritchie again expressed his dissatisfaction with Jackson's 
appointments. By placing editors in high office, the 
president has "excited a flame in Virginia which it will be 
difficult if not impossible, to extinguish." Following this 
outburst, Ritchie, soured by his first encounter with the 
new administration, ceased corresponding with Van Buren for 
several months.13
The anger and disappointment of Ritchie and the Junto 
over Jackson's early course in no way shook their devotion 
to his cause. Protestations against his policies were, in 
fact, usually accompanied by claims of loyalty to Old 
Hickory and his administration. Thus, while John Campbell 
noted that the "ruling passion and governing principle with 
which he[Jackson] seems to have set out in his 
administration are to reward those most who have bawl'd 
loudest in his favour without any regard to their characters 
or fitness for Office," he quickly added that he had "not 
lost all confidence in the old man[']s honesty of purpose 
and ardent love of country."14 When opponents of the 
administration began claiming that Virginia's anger with the 
President stemmed from the lack of political spoils given to 
the state, Jacksonians responded vigorously. Criticism of
13Ritchie to Van Buren, April 13, 19, 1829, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
14John Campbell to David Campbell, March 26, 1829, CFP, 
Duke. See also John Rutherfoord to Rives, May 22, 1829, Rives 
Papers, LC.
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Jackson was motivated by principle and patriotism, they 
claimed, not by disappointment over the lack of spoils. As 
usual, Ritchie led the way in making this claim. "We are 
content to be without ... any hand in the administration," 
he told fellow editor M.M. Noah. "Office or not: whether we 
get the loaves & fishes, or are forgotten, it can have no 
influence on the principles of Virginia." The only guide to 
judging the administration has been, and will remain, "the 
course which it may pursue."15 By the summer of 1829, with 
Henry Clay's unannounced campaign for the presidency already 
well underway, dissatisfaction with Jackson in Virginia was 
beginning to be replaced by a defense of his actions. "The 
nation is not to be changed by any clamour about Removals 
and appointments," Ritchie predicted confidently in October; 
"they wait for higher game."16
The "higher game" that Ritchie spoke of undoubtedly 
involved the great constitutional and economic questions of 
internal improvements, banking, and the tariff. These issues 
had dominated state and national debate since the War of 
1812. As firm advocates of state rights, the Junto had very
lsRitchie to M.M. Noah, March 14, 1829, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; RE, May 15, 1829; William Archer to Van Buren, May 6, 
1829, Van Buren Papers, LC.
16RE, Oct. 13, 1829. See also "One of the People," RE, 
June 23, 1829; "Mordaunt," RE, Sept. 22, 1829; Claiborne W. 
Gooch to Van Buren, Oct. 27, 1829, Gooch Family Papers, VHS. 
Pleasants noted this change in sentiment in the June 19, 1829 
issue of the Constitutional Whig. When it came to criticizing 
Jackson, he noted, "All is hushed into breathless silence! 
Hypocrites! Shallow, tortuous hypocrites."
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clear beliefs on these matters, beliefs that allowed little 
room for compromise. A significant part of its commitment to 
Jackson in 1828 stemmed from the notion that he was a state 
rights man and would work to implement proper policies on 
these matters. If the Junto was not exactly sure what the 
General's ideas on internal improvements were or what he 
meant when he claimed that he supported a "judicious 
tariff," its members had faith that Jackson would not turn 
his back on the South and its principles. Although this 
faith was shaken occasionally by Jackson during his first 
term of office, the Junto continued to believe that Jackson 
was working with the best interests of the South in mind.
Early indications of Jackson's course toward banking, 
internal improvements, and the protective tariff system 
seemed favorable to the Junto. In his inaugural address and 
in his first message to Congress, Jackson spoke of the 
rights of the states and of the need to reduce unnecessary 
expenses in the government. He also issued a call to weaken 
the power of the Bank of the United States, claiming that it 
exerted excessive influence over the economy and politics of 
the nation. These remarks pleased the Junto, but proof of 
Jackson's sincerity was needed.
The Junto had nothing but praise for Jackson's call for 
a reduction in the power of the Bank of the United States. 
Many Virginians viewed banks, whether at the state or 
national level, as "artificial" aristocratic institutions
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that preyed upon the hard working, honest people of the 
land. One widely read editorial printed in the Enquirer in 
1829 earnestly looked forward to the day when "Banks will 
cease to exist, and thus leave the judgement of men, free 
and unfettered."17 The Junto's strong ties to both state and 
national banks in Virginia - Andrew Stevenson, Wilson Cary 
Nicholas and Philip Norborne Nicholas had served as 
directors of the Richmond branch of the Second Bank of the 
United States in the 1810s and early 1820s, and John 
Brockenbrough was President of the Bank of Virginia from 
1811 to 1843 - prohibited it from going that far, but it did 
fall solidly behind Jackson in his early skirmishes with the 
Second Bank of the United States. Ritchie and his clique, 
like the President, considered a national bank 
unconstitutional and worried about the undue influence it 
exerted on national affairs. The Panic of 1819 had turned 
many against the Bank, and a decade later it still had few 
defenders in eastern Virginia.18
17"George Clinton" [William Robertson?], RE, Feb 21, 1829. 
In an editorial in the Constitutional Whig. Oct. 2, 1829, 
"Anti-Jackson and Anti-Bank" claimed that Robertson's attack 
on the nature of banking had provoked the fury of the 
"arrogant ... and vindictive" Junto, who had him removed from 
the Executive Council.
18The Junto broke off its association with the Bank of the 
United States in the early 1820s. After leaving the BUS, 
Philip N. Nicholas also served as President of the Farmer's 
Bank of Virginia from 1818 to 1837. For the Junto's bank 
connection, see Joseph Harrison, "Oligarchs and Aristocrats - 
The Richmond Junto," Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography. Vol. 78 (1970), 195.
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As Jackson moved to crush the Bank in Congress, Ritchie 
kept up a steady barrage of editorials in Richmond 
denouncing the "monster of corruption" and calling for its 
extinction.19 He assured his readers that Old Hickory would 
slay the Bank dragon by vetoing the Bank Bill that had 
worked its way through Congress. When word arrived that 
Jackson had indeed vetoed the bill, Ritchie praised him 
warmly and described the veto as the "most important and 
glorious act of his civil administration.1,20 The Junto 
considered Jackson's early struggle against the Bank of the 
United States a signal success and an important step in 
reforming the national government and preserving the 
independence of the individual.
Jackson's record on internal improvements was less 
spectacular. Between 1829 and 1833, Ritchie and his group 
continued to call for state funded internal improvements in 
Virginia. They understood the value of improved waterways, 
roads, canals, and turnpikes in the developing market 
economy of nineteenth century America, and realized only too 
painfully the consequences of continuing to neglect these
19RE, July 10, 1832. See also RE, May 18, June 8, July 13,
1832.
20RE, July 13, 1832. See also, RE, May 18, June 8, July
10, 1832; P.V. Daniel to Van Buren, July 12, 1832, Van Buren
Papers, LC. Early in Jackson's first term, Pleasants claimed 
that Van Buren had travelled to Richmond to consult with the 
Junto about banking policy, implying that Van Buren held sway 
over the group. Ritchie dismissed this allegation as absurd. 
Richmond Constitutional Whig. Dec. 15, 1829; RE, Dec. 25,
1829.
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matters. "We cannot delay it longer." Ritchie told his 
readers, referring to a system of state funded internal 
improvements. "Virginia is too proud to be longer kept in 
the rear of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York."21 At the same 
time, the group refused to countenance federally funded 
improvements, claiming that the Constitution failed to give 
the federal government jurisdiction over this issue.
Congress could create roads and transportation networks 
under certain conditions, but their powers were very limited 
in this realm. The Junto hoped that Jackson would move 
decisively to restrict the federal government's funding of 
public works.22
The President's veto of the Maysville Road Bill in June 
of 1830, which had authorized funding for construction and 
repairs on a section of the National Road that ran 
exclusively through Kentucky, represented a tremendous 
victory for state rights proponents, but not a completely 
satisfying one. Ritchie, back in regular contact with Van 
Buren, told the New Yorker that the Junto had hoped that 
Jackson would reject the bill "on constitutional grounds." 
Such a course would represent "an achievement more glorious 
that the victory of New Orleans." In his message 
accompanying the veto, Jackson shied away from explicitly
21RE, Feb. 10, 1829. See also Ritchie's editorials in the 
Enquirer of Feb. 3, 5, 7, March 3, and Aug. 7, 1829.
22Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; RE, 
Aug. 7, 11, 1829; April 6, 13, May 14, 1830.
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declaring the bill unconstitutional, claiming instead that 
it was simply a bad piece of legislation. After reading the 
message, Ritchie noted privately that "it does not exactly 
come up to our Virginia doctrine." Nevertheless, he praised 
Jackson's "moral courage" and claimed that he had vindicated 
the "principles of '98." By vetoing the bill, the General 
had "arrested that little, local, grasping, debasing, log­
rolling system of appropriations" that plagued the country 
and threatened to "prostitute the vital principles of the 
Constitution to the lust of self-interest.1,23 A writer in 
the Enquirer was more enthusiastic about the veto. Jackson's 
actions, he claimed, had reversed "twelve years" of 
"despondency" in the South. The Old Hero "has made a 
generous effort for the redemption and salvation of his 
country. Despotism is arrested in its lawless march, and 
anarchy confounded in its tumultuous route."24
Late in his first administration, Jackson disappointed 
his Virginia supporters by refusing to veto another bill 
authorizing federal funds for internal improvement projects. 
An obviously exasperated Ritchie notified Van Buren that 
Jackson's decision had "shaken his friends in the constantcy
23Ritchie to Van Buren, June 1830, Van Buren Papers, LC; 
Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, June 8, 1830, Branch Historical 
Papers of Randolph-Macon College. Vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1902), 
147-149; RE, June 1, 1830. P.V. Daniel expressed much the same 
sentiment in a letter to William Brent, Jr., June 18, 1830, 
Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
24"Mecklenburg," RE, July 13, 1830.
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[sic] of his principles." Daniel chimed in, citing the 
damage the passage of the bill had inflicted upon the 
General's supporters in Virginia. In the Enquirer. Ritchie 
wondered how Jackson could reconcile the Maysville veto with 
his recent decision. As he understood it, under the bill 
passed "We extend the powers of the federal government to 
our local concerns," and that would lead to consolidation.25 
Jackson's record on internal improvements, then, was spotty 
as far as the Junto was concerned.
Closely related to the internal improvement question 
was the tariff controversy, the most discussed and divisive 
issue in Jackson's first administration. The Junto, along 
with many southerners, resented the protective tariff 
system, believing it punished farmers and planters at the 
expense of manufacturing interests in the North. Needless to 
add, the policy also lacked a constitutional foundation. The 
"God-like" Founding Fathers would have never sanctioned such 
an unfair and unwise policy. Where, Virginians wondered, "is 
the Republicanism in a measure which exalts the capitalist, 
the monied aristocracy, above the sturdy yeomanry of the 
country, the worthy, industrious and patriotic farmer"?25 
Ritchie and other Virginians also believed that the tariff
“Ritchie to Van Buren, July 10, 1832; Daniel to Van
Buren, July 12, 1832, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, July 
10, 1832.
26"Mathews," RE, Aug. 20, 1830. See also the petition of 
the citizens of Nottoway County, reprinted in RE, Dec. 6, 
1828, and Ritchie's editorial of Sept. 3, 1830.
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served as the unifying link in a series of policies designed 
to destroy the power of the states in general, and the 
southern states in particular. They realized that revenue 
raised from the import taxes could be used to fund internal 
improvement projects once the national debt was eliminated. 
This "union ... between the friends of the Tariff and of 
Internal Improvements" would be especially dangerous. If 
such an alliance should come to pass, Ritchie warned, the 
"rights of the States, and the liberties of the people would 
be threatened with a fearful eclipse." Experience had taught 
Americans that "one assumed power leads to another."
Decisive action must be taken to end the protective tariff 
system. More than just economic gain or loss was at stake; 
the fate of liberty and the republican experiment hung in 
the balance.27
The importance of the tariff question led the Junto to 
keep in constant touch with Washington. Even before 
Jackson's inauguration, Ritchie wrote Senator Littleton 
Waller Tazewell of Virginia to tell him of the course the 
House of Delegates had adopted concerning the Tariff of
1828. The House had passed resolutions condemning the so- 
called "Tariff of Abominations" and declaring it
27Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; RE, 
May 14, 1830. Ritchie frequently attacked the "American
System" of Clay, claiming that "it alters the very character 
of our Federal Government - causing it to break down the 
barriers which separate its powers from the Rights of the 
States ..., threatening us with consolidation. with disunion. " 
RE, Sept. 3, 1830. See also RE, Jan. 30, April 6, 1830.
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unconstitutional. Would Tazewell explain to Jackson how 
deeply the state felt on this issue, and try to secure his 
support in removing or modifying the tariff? Ritchie himself 
was ready to fight to the end on this issue, and he hoped he 
could count on the president's backing.28
Actions in South Carolina, where hostility to the 
tariff produced talk of nullification and disunion, changed 
the nature of the debate over the tariff. Virginians now 
found themselves in the delicate situation of condemning 
both the tariff and South Carolina's response to it. Worse, 
South Carolinians claimed that the doctrine of nullification 
derived naturally from the principles enunciated in the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Nullification and 
secession were merely the logical conclusions of the state 
rights philosophy cherished by Virginians and the Junto.29
Ritchie and others acted quickly to refute the
28Ritchie to Littleton Waller Tazewell, Feb. 21, 1829, 
Tazewell Family Papers, Virginia State Library. For a 
revealing examination of the tariff debate within Virginia, 
see the series of essays on "Mr. Madison's Letters" that 
appeared in the Enquirer between Jan. 17 and Feb. 26, 1829.
In a few places, opposition to the tariff took the form 
of non-importation agreements reminiscent of the Revolutionary 
era. A writer from Prince Edward county forwarded 213 samples 
of home-spun clothing to Ritchie and described the atmosphere 
in his home community. "Instead of seeing us dressed up, and 
appearing in public with a tawdry suit of clothes manufactured 
to the North, and many of us playing the 'shabby genteel,' you 
would now see us clad in the substantial home-spun, with the 
good old domestic way, and worn with an easy lofty pride, 
becoming a people resolutely bent on stern resistance to 
usurpation and oppression" ("Earnest," RE, Feb. 10, 1829).
29William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), 207-209.
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assertions of the Nullifiers. While some denied that the 
Resolutions of 1798 condoned nullification, Ritchie was 
forced to admit that Jefferson had in fact originated the 
notion of a state nullifying a national law. He pointed out, 
however, that the tariff controversy was not, in and of 
itself, sufficient cause for such an extreme measure to be 
taken.30 Plenty of room for compromise still existed.
Congress may choose to lower rates sufficiently in 1832. 
Failing that, an "Anti-Tariff Convention" could be called to 
express the region's displeasure. This was, he declared, the 
only "peaceful and constitutional means of stating the 
grievances of the people."31
Ritchie and the Junto hoped to distance Virginia from
30Thomas Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, June 8, 1830,
Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2 (June 1902), 147-149. Ritchie 
made it clear that Virginia would not abide nullification. 
"Agricola's" eight part essay on "The Virginia Doctrines, Not 
Nullification," was the fullest refutation of the connection 
between the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the doctrine 
of nullification. It ran in the Enquirer from Aug. 17 to Sept. 
14, 1832. Madison denied the connection as well. See Madison 
to Nicholas Trist, Feb. 15, 1830, Gaillard Hunt, ed., The 
Writings of James Madison (9 vols. New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1900-1910), 4:61-66; Madison to Joseph Cabell, Aug. 16, 
1829, Ibid., 4:42-44; Madison to Edward Everett, Aug., 1830, 
Ibid.. 4:95-106. Ritchie's comments on Jefferson and
nullification are in RE, March 13, 1832.
31RE, Aug. 5, 1832. Ritchie's writings on the tariff can 
be sampled in the following issues of the Enquirer: Jan. 6, 
1829; Feb. 8, July 12, 19, Aug. 5, 12, Sept. 23, Nov. 1, 1831; 
March 13, April 24, July 17, Sept. 14, 1832. Philip P.
Barbour, John Brockenbrough, and William H. Roane represented 
Virginia at the Anti-Tariff Convention that met in 
Philadelphia in October of 1831. RE, Oct. 11, 1831; Charles 
Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics
(Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913), 142-143.
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the course of the Nullifiers in South Carolina because they 
understood clearly the politically explosive nature of the 
tariff debate. Should the state rights men of the Old 
Dominion be grouped together with the Ultra-Tariffites from 
the Palmetto State, the Jackson party would be torn apart in 
Virginia, and the Junto's power would be dashed to pieces. 
Concerned that a "New Coalition, the friends of the firm of 
Clay, Webster & Co.," were "attempting to brand the whole 
Jackson party with the name of nullifiers." the Junto 
scrambled to set the record straight.32 Philip N. Nicholas 
informed John Campbell, now Treasurer of the United States, 
that the "So. Carolina doctrines, are not those of 
V[irgini]a as I, & I have no doubt, you, have always 
understood them. They lead to disunion & to the destruction 
of the Republican Party." David Campbell spoke for many when 
he claimed that the Nullifiers "have press'd the principles 
advanced by Mr. Madison much farther, than either he or 
Virginia intended to carry it." Ritchie stated bluntly that 
nullification was not "conformable to the Virginia School of 
Politics." To make sure everyone understood where the 
leading Jacksonians of Virginia stood on this matter, he 
added that "We deny that nullification is a legitimate 
conclusion from our State Rights Doctrines." The editor 
hoped that these strong words would keep people from 
associating the Jacksonians of Virginia with the Nullifiers
32RE, July 27, 1830.
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of South Carolina.33
While taking great pains to distance themselves from 
the political arguments of the Nullifiers, the Junto 
continued to condemn the protective tariff system on 
economic grounds. Here the rhetoric employed by the group 
was similar to that of South Carolinians. Ritchie stated 
emphatically that Virginia and the South would never accept 
as a "settled policy" a tariff that made the region the 
"hewers of wood and the drawers of water, for the Northern 
manufactures." An anonymous writer in the Enquirer added 
that "Whilst Virginia loves the Union, & is willing to make 
new sacrifices for its preservation, there is a point of 
forbearance in the endurance of wrongs, beyond which she 
will not go. She must look out for her own safety."34 
Ritchie, in fact, hinted strongly that Virginia might join 
with its southern neighbor if the federal government used 
force to subdue South Carolina. In letters to Washington, 
members of the Junto urged Jackson to adopt a conciliatory 
stance toward the Palmetto State and warned of the 
consequences if he did not. Jackson must be "forbearing" 
toward the Nullifiers, John Brockenbrough argued, because
33Nicholas to John Campbell, July 23, 1830; David Campbell 
to Arthur P. Hayne, May 16, 1831, both in CFP, Duke; RE, Sept. 
14, 1832. William H. Roane told his constituents that he
opposed the "restive, wincing movements" of the South Carolina 
Nullifiers. Roane, "To the Voters of Hanover," [1831], 
Broadside, VHS.
^RE, Sept. 14, 1832; Feb. 8, 1831; "Henry," RE, Feb. 1,
1831.
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"any precipitation on his part would unite Virginia to S. 
Carolina. There is a rumbling in our Atmosphere about the 
Sovereignty of the States." Ritchie agreed with this 
assessment in a letter to William Cabell Rives. "Impress 
upon our friends in the Administration," the Junto leader 
wrote, "the necessity of pursuing a forbearing as well as 
decided course towards S. Carolina. This must be done, he 
insinuated, "lest the flame of discontent should spread.1,35
The tariff and nullification questions placed Virginia 
Jacksonians in a decidedly uncomfortable position. To 
maintain loyalty to their party and to the Union, they were 
called upon to denounce the Nullifiers and their actions. 
Yet, at the same time, their state rights ideology demanded 
that they condemn the protective tariff system and work for 
its eradication. One observer's comment that the "State 
Rights party —  appears to be completely distracted between 
the principles of the state and devotion to General 
Jackson," captured the essence of the dilemma exactly. "We 
are now laboring between two extremes," Ritchie lamented,
35John Brockenbrough to John Randolph, Nov. 8, 1832,
Kenneth Shorey, ed., Collected Letters of John Randolph of 
Roanoke to Dr. John Brockenbrough. 1812-1833 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1988), 140-141; Ritchie to Rives, Dec. 1, 
1832, Rives Papers, LC; Richard E. Parker to Littleton Waller 
Tazewell, Feb. 6, 1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. In the 
April 24, 1832, issue of the Enguirer. Ritchie told his
readers that "If South Carolina should resort to 
nullification, Virginia will be loth [sic] to send a man or a 
musket for her subjection." Still, he continued to work for a 
peaceful solution, constantly calling on all parties to be 
deliberative and calm. See RE, April through October, 1832, 
passim.
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"the wrong and the remedy - the Tariff and Nullification."3S 
The Junto hoped that the way out of this sticky situation 
would be a compromise acceptable to both sides. The group 
looked anxiously to Jackson for relief from the perplexing 
problem that threatened to tear apart all that it had worked 
for.37
Initial signs from Washington were encouraging. In his 
fourth annual message to Congress, delivered on December 4, 
1832, Jackson acknowledged the validity of South Carolina's 
claims and promised to work for a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis, including a downward revision of tariff rates.38 
Ritchie was elated by Jackson's temperate words. "The 
President's Message has given the highest satisfaction," he 
told William Cabell Rives. "His tone about S.C. is precisely 
what it should be." Perhaps the crisis could be resolved 
without destroying the Democratic party or the Union. The 
people's hero, Andrew Jackson, would once again preserve the 
Union and the rights of the states.39
36John Murdaugh to John Tazewell, Dec. 13, 1832, Tazewell 
Family Papers, VSL; RE, Dec. 8, 1832.
37For a complete account of the Nullification Crisis, see 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, and Richard Ellis, The Union 
at Risk; Jacksonian Democracy. States' Rights, and the 
Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987) .
38Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American 
Democracy. 1833-1845 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 10-11.
39Ritchie to Rives, Dec. 6, 1832, Rives Papers, LC; RE, 
Dec. 6, 8, 11, 1832.
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The hopes of Ritchie and others for a peaceful solution 
received a heavy blow just one week later, when Jackson's 
"Proclamation to the People of South Carolina" was 
published. In one bold sweep, Jackson attacked South 
Carolina, nullification, and the compact theory of 
government. "I consider," he stated flatly, "the power to 
annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, 
incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted 
expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized in 
its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it 
was founded, and destructive of the great object for which 
it was formed." Further, the Union had been formed by the 
people, not the states, and the Constitution had created a 
government, not a league. The states had surrendered 
"essential parts of sovereignty" in joining this government. 
As President and the direct representative of the American 
people, Jackson explained that he would act to stop anyone 
who attempted to deny the sovereignty of the people or the 
perpetuity of the Union.40
Virginians were stunned by Jackson's Proclamation, 
especially his remarks about the origins and nature of the 
Union. "Many of the doctrines of the President's grand 
manifesto," one writer noted, "are as obnoxious as 
Nullification itself." Another suggested that "its
40"Proclamation to the People of South Carolina," as cited 
in Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American 
Democracy. 20-23.
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principles ... are at war with all our opinions of state 
power & the character of our confederacy." John Randolph, on 
his deathbed, roused himself to curse the "ferocious and 
blood-thirsty proclamation of our Djezza Pacha."41 The 
Virginia General Assembly responded to the Proclamation by 
electing John Tyler, a known enemy of the admininstration, 
to the United States Senate.42
The Junto was much more restrained in its comments.
John Brockenbrough admitted that the Proclamation contained 
some dangerous ideas, but remained sanguine about the safety 
of the Union. Ritchie told his readers that he agreed with 
Jackson on the unconstitutionality of the doctrine of 
nullification, but felt compelled to add that "there are 
some doctrinal points ...to which we think it our duty to 
state that we cannot subscribe." Despite these differences, 
there was no reason to abandon the President or to stop 
working for a peaceful settlement to the dispute. The 
editor's conciliatory attitude roused one Virginian to 
condemn the "Ritchie and Co. party" for their devotion to 
the administration. They consider it "high treason," he
41 "Hampden," Richmond Constitutional Whig. Dec. 18, 1832; 
William F. Gordon to Thomas W. Gilmer, Dec. 11, 1832, John 
Tyler Scrapbook, Tyler Papers, College of William and Mary; 
Randolph to John Brockenbrough, Dec. 16, 1832, Shorey, ed., 
Collected Letters of John Randolph. 144. Pleasants, editor of 
the Constitutional Whig, praised the Proclamation for its 
"fervent devotion to the Union, prosperity and glory of our 
country," but admitted that it boded ill for friends of the 
state rights persuasion. Constitutional Whig. Dec. 14, 1832.
42Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 152.
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added, "to utter aught in opposition to the sovereign will 
of his most august majesty, our good master the autocrat of 
all the Americas.1143
John Marshall effectively summarized the impact of the 
Proclamation on Jackson's supporters in Virginia when he 
told Joseph Story that "that paper astonished, confounded, 
and for a moment silenced them." Van Buren was also aware of 
this, and begged Jackson to pursue "toleration and 
magnaminity" toward the state until they regained their 
political bearings. The Junto's course should, in fact, be 
seen as an effort to limit defections within the party and 
to control the damage done by the Proclamation.44
After the initial shock of the Proclamation, the Junto 
worked hard to convince Virginians that the President's 
message was only mildly offensive and that the crisis would 
soon be resolved. Instead of chastising Jackson, the state 
should pour all of its resources into mediating a compromise 
between South Carolina and the federal government. Ritchie 
even published a lengthy defense of the Proclamation penned
43Brockenbrough to Rives, Jan. 11, 1833, Rives Papers, LC; 
RE, Dec. 13, 15, 25, 1832; John Murdaugh to John Tazewell, 
Jan. 12, 1833, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. Pleasants attacked 
Ritchie for standing by Jackson and protecting his own narrow 
party interests, instead of working to save Virginia and the 
doctrine of state rights. See the Constitutional Whig. Dec. 
28, 1832.
^Marshall to Story, Dec. 25, 1832, Marshall Papers,
William and Mary (typescript copy of original in Massachusetts 
Historical Society); Van Buren to Jackson, Dec. 27, 1832, Van 
Buren Papers, LC.
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by his former partner, Claiborne W. Gooch.45 But the damage 
had already been done. The Jackson party in Virginia was 
weakened by the Proclamation, Ritchie admitted, and if 
Jackson took further action, it would be "shivered to 
pieces." Despite these developments, Ritchie continued to 
insist that his main concern was to avoid the use of force 
in settling the dispute between South Carolina and the 
federal government.46
Jackson's Force Bill and Clay's Compromise, signed into 
law by Jackson on March 2, 1833, provided one more test of 
the Junto, its devotion to Jackson, and its control of the 
Democratic party in Virginia. The intent of the Force Bill 
was to insure that federal law could be enforced in South 
Carolina. It provided for the extension of federal 
protection to tariff collection centers, the creation of 
federal courts to hear tariff cases, and the establishment 
of jails to house offenders. The Bill also gave Jackson full 
power to use military force if these actions did not prove 
sufficient to enforce the law.47 Ritchie and other 
Virginians focused on the military provisions of the bill 
and on the powers that it conferred upon the President. "All
45RE, Jan. 1, 3, 8, 10, 12, 17, 29, 1833; "Cato," [C.W.
Gooch], Jan. 31, Feb. 2, 9, 14, 21, 1833.
46Ritchie to Rives, Jan. 6, 1833, Rives Papers, LC.
Ritchie also told Rives that "We are in an embarrassing
situation - But prudence & firmness will yet save us." Ritchie 
to Rives, Feb. 2, 1833, Rives Papers, LC.
47Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. 284-286.
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the provisions about using force ought to be stricken out," 
the editor told his readers. There was no need for such a 
measure at this time. "We stand upon the brink of a 
precipice," he noted, and the Force Bill threatened to push 
the South over the edge.48
Ritchie had kinder words for Clay's Compromise Bill, 
which gradually lowered tariff rates over a nine year period 
in exchange for a revocation of South Carolina's Ordinance 
of Nullification. The editor made clear that his support for 
the compromise did not mean that he was now in favor of a 
protective tariff system. But the country had come close to 
disunion over this question, and Ritchie favored any measure 
that would end the crisis peacefully.49 When word arrived in 
Richmond of the passage of the so-called Compromise of 1833, 
Ritchie gladly informed his readers that "the Tariff Bill 
has passed - and Nullification is dead.... The friends of 
Liberty may no longer tremble for the preservation of the 
only Republic on Earth."50
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 and 1833 severely 
tested the ability of the Junto to hold together the 
coalition that had elected Jackson in Virginia in 1828. 
Despite their own disappointment with the President's
48RE, Feb. 9, 1833; Jan. 22, 1833. See also issues of Jan. 
19 and 26, 1833.
49RE, Feb. 16, 28, March 2, 5, 1833.
S0RE, March 5, 1833.
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course, the members of the group continued to profess their 
devotion to him and to the Democratic party.51 Ritchie had 
done everything in his power to minimize the damage caused 
by the Proclamation and the Force Bill. For the most part, 
the Junto managed to weather the storm and to maintain its 
hold over political affairs in the state. But many 
Virginians left the party during the crisis, frightened by 
the specter of Jackson assuming unprecedented powers as 
chief executive of the land. A prominent Williamsburg 
citizen insisted that Jackson held "consolidating & despotic 
principles which we had supposed were finally overthrow by 
the revolution of 1800." C.W. Gooch, who at the height of 
the crisis criticized Ritchie for abandoning Jackson, 
lamented that "since his [Jackson's] admirable proclamation 
I have heard him more vilely abused & denounced, by recently 
open mouthed friends, than at any other period in his 
life.”52
An anonymous writer in the Enquirer summed up the
51See William H. Roane to Peachy Gilmer, Jan. 1833, 
Randolph Family Papers, UVA; Mark Alexander to Nathaniel 
Beverley Tucker, Feb. 6, 1833, William and Mary Quarterly, 
series 1, Vol. 12 (1903), 85-86 (on Stevenson's loyalty to 
Jackson); Richard E. Parker to Van Buren, March 21, 1833, Van 
Buren Papers, LC.
52J.A.G. Davis to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Feb. 17, 
1833, Thomas Jefferson Randolph Papers, UVA; Gooch to Rives, 
Feb. 16, 1833, Rives Papers, LC. Lynwood Dent overemphasizes 
the fallout over the Proclamation and the Force Bill when he 
wrote that Jackson's actions "severly damaged his party in 
Virginia.1 Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic 
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D, diss., Louisiana State University, 
1974), 139. .
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experiences of many Virginians during the Nullification 
Crisis. He had supported Jackson in 1828 and 1832, "because 
I thought he could and would do more to sustain the sinking 
cause of State Rights and Virginia principles, than any 
other man.... His course did not disappoint me ... [and] my 
voice was given for his re-election: and again his opening 
message, calm, wise, conciliatory and statesman-like, 
satisfied me that I had voted rightly. Five or six days 
later, (what a revolution!) the proclamation came.... It 
contains matter at variance with all the President's former 
measures." Despite his differences of opinions, the writer 
insisted that he would continue to support the President.53 
The main reason for this continuing loyalty was undoubtedly 
Jackson's personal popularity in Virginia during this 
period. The Junto's role in keeping the Jacksonian party 
together, however, should not be underestimated. The group 
provided the leadership and guidance needed to weather the 
storm of the Nullification Crisis.
National problems were not the only ones facing the 
Junto in the years between 1829 and 1833. In Virginia, a 
protracted and divisive constitutional convention attracted 
everyone's attention for much of 1829 and early 1830. Then 
Nat Turner's Rebellion led some state leaders to question 
the state's need for the peculiar institution. All the
53"No Nullifier," RE, Jan. 8, 1833.
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while, opponents of the administration harangued the public 
and harassed the Junto about Jackson's policies and actions. 
When it appeared that the northerner Van Buren would capture 
the vice-presidential nomination in 1832, some Virginians 
balked and pledged themselves to support Virginian Philip P. 
Barbour instead. Each of these developments challenged the 
Junto's leadership and forced it to take actions to shore up 
the Jackson party in Virginia. While it was able to contain 
much of the discontent within the state, the clique was 
unable to prevent further defections from the Jacksonian 
cause.
The undemocratic features of the 1776 Virginia 
Constitution had never set well with many in the state, and 
since its adoption reformers, including Jefferson, had tried 
unsuccessfully to call a convention and make the state's 
constitution more democratic. Advocates of reform had grown 
more insistent as the years passed without any favorable 
response from the General Assembly. The main points of 
contention centered on suffrage requirements and the 
distribution of representatives in the state legislature. 
Virginia was among the last of the states to maintain a 
freehold requirement for voting, and reformers argued that 
the democratic spirit of the era demanded that it be 
dropped. The western portions of Virginia had been 
underrepresented in the General Assembly for decades, and as 
the population continued to shift westward, these
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disparities became even more glaring. Since the biggest 
complaint of reformers was that slaves continued to count 
toward representation, the debate in 1829 and 1830 revolved 
ultimately around the institution of slavery. The "struggle 
for political power" in Jacksonian Virginia, one historian 
noted, "centered on slavery."54
The Junto, which held considerable political power 
itself, was split over the desirability of a convention. 
Ritchie had supported constitutional reform for years, and 
continued to do so. Those members of the clique more closely 
associated with the old planting class of eastern Virginia, 
Andrew Stevenson, Philip N. Nicholas, and William H. Roane, 
resisted efforts to tamper with the state constitution.55 
Opponents spoke ominously of the dangers of "innovation," 
and intimated that westerners would use their new political 
power to place a hefty tax on slaves, most of whom lived 
east of the Blue Ridge. The easterners' chief spokesman was
^Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: The 
Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1982), xii, 47. Along with Freehling's 
study, Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., The Rhetoric of Conservatism: 
The Virginia Convention of 1829-1830 and the Conservative 
Tradition in the South (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 
1982), offers the best overview of the debate surrounding the 
calling of a convention.
55Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1949), 82; Nicholas to Joseph C. Cabell, Sept. 20, 
1825, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; While Roane admitted that 
slavery was "an irremediable drawback to her [Virginia's] 
growth and prosperity," he opposed efforts to restructure 
fundamentally the existing Virginia constitution. RE, April 
17, 1829.
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Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a Richmond lawyer not connected with 
the Junto, who began a vigorous campaign to stop all efforts 
at calling a convention. Leigh wrote incessantly to his 
friends and to prominent leaders describing the dangers of 
meddling with the state constitution, and assuring them that 
more than redistribution of representatives was at stake. 
Once those people who lived west of the mountains received 
proportional representation, Leigh argued, they would 
immediately move to "take the government out of the hands of 
the slaveholders, and make them pay the expense of it!" To 
ensure his points were clear, Leigh denounced proponents of 
reform for kindling the "spirit of faction, incarnate and 
embodied," in the state.56
The question of calling a convention consumed 
considerable time in the years between 1825 and 1829. Each 
year the General Assembly discussed the issue before packed 
galleries while commentators debated back and forth in the 
columns of the state's newspapers. When the state 
legislature finally agreed to ask the electorate if they 
desired a constitutional convention in 1828, the issue had 
become a truly sectional one in the state. The older regions 
of the state, the Tidewater and the Piedmont, generally 
opposed reform because it threatened to reduce their 
representation in the legislature. The goal of the men who
56Leigh to Tazewell, Aug. 22, 1825, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Leigh to Peachy R. Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1825, M.S., 
VSL.
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represented these areas during the convention was to prevent 
a significant shift in power to the western sections of the 
state, the Valley and the Trans-Allegheny region. The people 
of the west resented the aristocratic features of Virginia's 
constitution, and believed that slaveholders in the east 
were largely to blame for the declining status of the state. 
If they could succeed in democratizing the state's laws by 
equalizing representation and achieving white male suffrage, 
Virginia could be revitalized and reclaim its rightful 
position in the Union.
After Virginia voters overwhelmingly supported the call 
for a convention in 1829, the state's newspapers printed 
letter after letter filled with suggestions, demands, and 
recommendations for the upcoming convention, scheduled to 
convene in Richmond in early October. Both Ritchie and 
Pleasants, the two most influential editors in the state, 
supported the convention and calls for reform. Upon hearing 
of Jackson's victory in November of 1828, Pleasants had 
suggested that "while the spirit [of reform] is abroad, let 
the broom also be used in Richmond and the State 
Government." Pleasants's connection of national and state 
issues, contrived as it may have been, was nevertheless 
significant. The editor of the Constitutional Whig wanted to 
know if the advocates of "Jackson and Reform" were serious 
when they spoke of change and of returning power to the 
people. It was a valid question, and one which the Junto
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failed to answer decisively during the Virginia 
Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830.57
Many writers urged Virginians to take the necessary 
steps to bring their constitution in line with the spirit of 
the age. "A Freeholder" found it "worse than idle, to talk 
about the necessity of having a piece of land ... in order 
to give you the privileges of freemen in the State." Owning 
land "adds nothing to the intellect, integrity, or 
patriotism, of the possesser [sic]." The provision calling 
for a freehold requirement was "an odious badge of genuine 
aristocracy, and ought to be despised and ridiculed by every 
man who has a just regard for Liberty and Equality of 
political rights." Peachy Harrison expressed shock at the 
"rank aristocracy" and "oligarchic" nature of those who 
defended the existing constitution. Several commentators 
pointed out that under the current system, slaves counted 
more toward representation than many white men. Reformers 
agreed that the times demanded change.58
Conservatives responded quickly and strongly to the 
charges of reformers. They argued that Virginia's 1776 
constitution, the first written constitution ever, imparted
57Richmond Constitutional Whig. Nov. 22, 1828. For
examples of Ritchie's support for reform, see RE, Oct. 17, 
Dec. 3, 1829.
58,1 A Freeholder," RE, Feb. 14, 1829; Peachy Harrison to 
Gessner Harrison, Nov. 4, 1829; Richmond Constitutional Whig. 
July 21, Nov. 13, 1829. The debate on the upcoming convention 
can be traced in the Enquirer. February through October, 1829.
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special dignity to the state. While it might be flawed, as 
all man-made laws must be, there was no reason to scrap it 
or to adopt rashly a new constitution. No guarantee existed 
that the new charter would be any better than the old; in 
fact, it probably would not be as good. Virginia's "freehold 
suffrage has enabled her to retain character," Thomas Ruffin 
explained to William H. Brodnax. Widening suffrage would 
necessitate giving the vote to "Yankee shopkeepers" and 
other undesirables. Besides, Ruffin asked, "Is it not our 
experience that every new Constitution ... gets worse & 
worse"? James Mason saw no reason to extend the franchise 
"to every squatter, who pays one cent of tax." William H. 
Crawford warned Leigh, who needed no reassuring, that if 
Virginia adopted a white population basis for 
representation, it would divorce itself "from the rest of 
the slave holding states."59
Once the convention opened, it quickly became apparent 
that a long and bitter struggle over the questions of 
suffrage and representation, what Ritchie called the 
"engrossing and paramount subject," lay ahead. For the 
better part of four months, delegates argued over these
59Thomas Ruffin to William H. Brodnax, Oct. 22, 1829,
Brodnax Letters, VHS; John Y. Mason to James Henry Rochelle, 
Dec. 18, 1829, James Henry Rochelle Papers, Duke; William H. 
Crawford to Leigh, Dec. 24, 1829, Benjamin Watkins Leigh
Papers, VHS.
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questions, neither willing to concede too much to the 
other.60 Clearly frustrated at the lack of consensus, James 
Madison was overheard saying "that he believed if a motion 
were made, that two & two would make four, it would produce 
a division in the house." Another delegate noted that the 
Convention was "so equally divided into geographical parties 
that every question is decided by nearly the same vote." 
While Ritchie privately fretted that the convention had 
devolved into a "struggle for power" instead of a "contest 
of principle," he kept the state's readers informed as to 
all developments and continually called on the delegates to 
reach an acceptable compromise.61 By early December, Ritchie 
was deeply concerned about the increasingly strident tones 
of the delegates' speeches and actions. He worried aloud 
that such bitterness and lack of unity might lead to a call 
for another convention or even talk of separating the state. 
"We are literally a volcano at rest," Philip P. Barbour 
wrote as debate dragged on, "but with a vast mass of 
combustible matter within." Like others, Ritchie knew that 
the most "combustible matter" was slavery, and he was 
haunted by the specter of an extended debate on the issue.
60RE, Dec. 3, 1829; Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution. 
36-81. Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State 
Convention of 1829-1830 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1833)
offers a full account of the debate.
61 John Y. Mason to John H. Rochelle, Dec. 18, 1829,
Rochelle Papers, Duke; Ritchie to John [?] Campbell, Oct. 26, 
1829, CFP, Duke.
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His conciliatory nature led him to push aggressively for 
some compromise to bring the proceedings to an end.62
When the convention finally agreed to a compromise 
constitution that granted reformers practically none of 
their demands, Ritchie's relief was obvious. Despite its 
shortcomings —  representation remained skewed in favor of 
the eastern parts of the state and a significant portion of 
the adult white males in Virginia remained ineligible to 
vote —  the editor heartily endorsed the new frame of 
government and repeatedly called upon his fellow citizens to 
adopt it. Both in public and private, Ritchie asserted that 
the new constitution was not perfect, but was rather "the 
best which could be got." He remained confident that the 
state would approve it, and his assessment proved correct. 
Virginians voted that spring to accept the new constitution, 
although bitter westerners opposed it and pledged to call 
another convention. After a protracted and divisive 
struggle, the state had "held back white-basis democracy and 
opted instead for slaveholders political ascendancy."63
Ritchie hoped that the adoption of a new state 
constitution in 1830 would bring to an end the sectional
62P.P. Barbour to John J. Ambler, Jan. 9, 1830, Papers of 
the Ambler and Barbour Families, UVA; RE, Nov. 17, 19, Dec. 1, 
25, 1829. Pleasants shared his concern: Richmond
Constitutional Whig. Nov. 12, 1829.
63RE, Jan. 16, 26, Feb. 2, 1829; Ritchie to Rives, April 
15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; Freehling, Drift toward
Dissolution. 80.
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tensions that threatened to divide the state and lessen his 
power as party leader. In truth, the convention had been a 
traumatic experience for him. Unburdening himself to William 
Cabell Rives on the subject, Ritchie noted the "painful" 
activities that went on behind the scenes. "Much harsh 
language was employed. Many threats of disunion thrown out. 
Many friends alienated from each other - and a nasty and 
intemperate spirit of proscription began to show itself." 
Once a compromise had been effected, Ritchie's mood changed: 
"My own spirits are high - and my confidence in the 
principles of the Republican Party & the sound sense of the 
people remain unshaken." Perhaps now, Ritchie hoped, 
Virginians could turn their energies to the larger national 
problems facing them.64
Ritchie's desire for a return to national politics 
proved elusive. Westerners remained bitter and angry over 
the questions of representation and suffrage. Easterners 
pledged to guard their rights and interests zealously. Then, 
in August of 1831, the actions of a small group of slaves in 
Southampton County stunned Virginia and the South. In the 
wake of Nat Turner's Rebellion, which cost the lives of over 
50 whites and 100 blacks, Virginians were forced to 
reevaluate their commitment to the institution of racial
“Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC. As 
secretary to the Convention, Ritchie was privy to private 
sessions and discussions.
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slavery.65 Fear of insurrection had always haunted 
southerners, but the suddenness and brutality of the 
Southampton uprising shocked everyone. Ritchie wrote 
excitedly of the actions of the "monsters" and "blood­
thirsty wolves," and of efforts to capture Turner, the 
acknowledged leader of the rebels. Editorials attempted to 
explain the uprising, demanded action from the state 
legislature, and suggested ways of preventing it from 
happening again.66
Virginians also wrote and spoke more openly about 
ending the curse of slavery in the state. Some argued that 
the only way to avoid another bloody insurrection was to 
begin gradually freeing all bondsmen so that slavery could 
be eradicated in Virginia. Ritchie's public approval of such 
plans helped pave the way for the General Assembly's 
intensive, three-week public discussion on the future of the 
institution in Virginia during the 1831-32 session. With the 
scenes from Southampton still fresh in their minds, 
reformers such as Thomas Jefferson Randolph, grandson of the 
Sage of Monticello, and William Preston clashed with 
conservatives such as James Gholson over the advisability 
and constitutionality of abolishing slavery in the state.
“Stephen B. Oates, The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner's 
Fierce Rebellion (New York; Mentor Books, 1975).
“RE, Aug. 26, 30, 1831. For examples of the response to 
the rebellion, see the Richmond Constitutional Whig and 
Enquirer for the period August through December, 1831.
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Moderates like William Brodnax and Archibald Bryce proposed 
compromise measures that would appease both sides and end 
the tense debate.67 For a brief time in early 1832, Ritchie 
opened the columns of the Enquirer to discussions about the 
future of slavery in Virginia. But he also continued to 
discuss the key national problems facing the nation, and 
when the House of Delegates decided against instituting 
plans to end slavery in the state, the editor fired a final 
salvo and happily moved on to other matters. He rarely 
discussed the topic of slavery in his paper again for the 
next several years.68
Another irritating problem for Ritchie was the 
continuing attacks on the Junto by Pleasants and others.
Foes of the group delighted in describing its members as 
both haughty oligarchs of state power and fawning sycophants 
of Jackson and Van Buren. During the 1828 presidential 
campaign, attacks on the "Richmond Party" had become a 
staple of Virginia political rhetoric. After Jackson's 
election, those attacks continued and widened in scope. 
Papers from across the nation informed their readers that a 
Junto in Richmond sternly ruled the Old Dominion and kept it 
allied with the administration. Occasionally, in the heat of
67RE, Oct. 25, 1831; Jan. 7, 1832; Freehling, Drift Toward 
Dissolution. 122-169. See also Joseph Clark Robert, The Road 
From Monticello: A Study of the Virginia Slavery Debate of 
1832 (Durham: Trinity College Historical Society, 1941;
reprint New York: AMS Press, 1970).
68RE, Jan. 7, 1832.
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party battle, an opposition editor would claim that the 
President or his chief minion, Van Buren, consulted with the 
Junto before implementing a new policy or making a major 
decision. Ritchie, as usual, dismissed these claims as 
absurd.69
Attacks on the Junto, however, continued to emanate 
chiefly from Virginians upset about the supposed power of 
the group. Those opposed to "Ritchie & Co." or to Jackson 
missed few opportunities to rail against the undemocratic 
club in Richmond that ran state politics with an iron 
hand.70 Alfred Powell confessed that one of the reasons he 
supported the calling of a constitutional convention was 
because he believed that it would "annihilate the Richmond 
Junto with all its power and influence." Even though the 
"party has dwindled and declined in talent" since its 
founding by Spencer Roane, under Ritchie's guidance it still 
exerted an undue influence in state matters. Patrick Cabell 
was hardly less vehement in denouncing "that miserable 
Junto, who claim an exclusion of republicanism," and who are
69Ritchie would often reprint these charges before 
refuting them. See, for example, RE, Dec. 25, 1829, Nov. 19, 
1830, June 28, 1831. For a typical example of accusations
about Van Buren and the Junto, see the Richmond Constitutional 
Whig. Dec. 15, 1829, and Ritchie's response in the Enquirer of 
Dec. 25, 1829.
70John Pleasants to John Tyler, Jan. 1, 1833, Lyon G-
Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers (3 vols. Richmond 
and Williamsburg, 1884-1896; reprint New York: De Capo Press, 
1970), 1:451-452; "Extracts of a letter to W.M. Rives," Jan. 
8, 1829, Rives Papers, LC.
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attempting to enforce a "new political Faith" that is 
"reprobated by the venerable standards of 98-9." Cabell 
confessed that he was filled with "feelings of utter scorn 
and contempt" when he dwelled on the "arrogant and insulting 
dictation of some half a score of barely third rate men, 
residing in, and about, the Metropolis."71
Cabell's description of the group was as precise as 
anyone cared to get in their assaults on the Junto. Everyone 
assumed that Ritchie headed the clique, and that Peter V. 
Daniel and Andrew Stevenson were among his closest advisors. 
But other names were rarely mentioned. These three men, and 
in particular, Ritchie, came in for the lion's share of 
abuse and condemnation. Apparently Stevenson was not well 
liked, even by his some of his political allies. While it 
might be expected that Pleasants would devote much attention 
to blasting Stevenson and his actions as Speaker of the 
House, it was somewhat surprising to hear David Campbell and 
his brother John, friendly to the Junto at the time, 
criticize him. Stevenson's "vanity is beyond all 
calculation," David told his wife. "To hear him talk, you 
would suppose he was decidedly the greatest man in this 
nation." The Speaker's disappointment at not receiving the 
French ministry, David added, has made him a pouting "mal­
content .1 When brother John heard of Stevenson's appointment
71Notes of Alfred Harrison Powell, n.d. [probably mid- 
1829], Byrd Family Papers, VHS; Patrick H. Cabell to James C. 
Cabell, March 21, 1829, Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
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as minister to Great Britain, he told David that "a more 
selfish vain windy & vapouring blockhead I have never known 
to get as high as he has gotten already." He was sure the 
appointment would be laughed at throughout Virginia. Only 
"his clan at Richmond" supported him.72 Daniel, longtime 
member of the Executive Council and Lieutenant Governor, 
also received sharp criticism as a member of the Junto. 
Opponents denounced him as "that chief of hypocrites" and 
worked to get him removed, or "scratched," from the Council. 
Daniel seemed proud that opponents of the administration 
found him "odious," and Richard Parker would later note that 
the Whigs "cordially hate[d]" Daniel. Despite Ritchie's 
support, Daniel failed to win the gubernatorial race in 
1830, due in part to his unpopularity.73
The favorite target of criticism and party venom, 
however, was Ritchie. Critics never tired of attacking him 
or of concocting stories about his influence in Richmond and 
Washington. Between 1829 and 1833, Ritchie's fiercest foes 
were John Hampden Pleasants and John Floyd. Pleasants was
72Richmond Constitutional Whig. Nov. 26, 1828, April 28, 
1829; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, May 21, 1829; John 
Campbell to David Campbell, April 6, 1832, both in CFP, Duke.
73John Floyd Diary, Feb. 1, 1832, in Charles Ambler, The 
Life and Diary of John Flovd (Richmond: Richmond Press, Inc., 
1918), 176; Jacob Lynch to William B. Campbell, Jan. 6, 1832, 
CFP, Duke; Richmond Constitutional Whig. July 18, 1831; Daniel 
to Jackson. Dec. 7_, 1834, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; Richard 
E. Parker to Van Buren, Dec. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers, LC. 
For Daniel's general unpopularity, see John P. Frank, Justice 
Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. Daniel. 1784-1860 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 76, 102.
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already well versed at tweaking Ritchie's nose, and he had 
been almost continually denouncing Ritchie and the Junto for 
years. Floyd, a Jacksonian who left the party when he did 
not receive the office he thought himself entitled to, was 
elected governor of Virginia in 1830, beating out Daniel. 
During his three year tenure, Floyd made life difficult for 
all administration men, but especially Ritchie and his 
clique. "Ritchie and Stevenson and the Junta are harnessed 
to the Van Buren car," Floyd noted disgustedly in his diary, 
and he aimed to derail them.74
By the time he was elected governor in 1830, Floyd had 
joined those Virginians who openly opposed Jackson during 
his first term. Among these defectors were Littleton Waller 
Tazewell and John Tyler, Virginia's two United States 
Senators, who objected to some of Jackson's policies, 
particularly his decision to negotiate a treaty with Turkey 
before consulting Congress. Tyler, sensing the growing 
displeasure towards Jackson in Virginia, claimed in March of 
1830 that the state supported Jackson only out of the "fear 
of greater ill under the auspices of another." A few 
observers in Richmond agreed with this assessment.75
74John Floyd Diary, April 28, 1832, Ambler, Life and Diary 
of Flovd. 184. See also entries for Mar. 8, 1831 (132) and 
Feb. 1, 1832 (176).
75John Tyler to John Rutherfoord, March 14, 183 0, Tyler, 
Letters and Times of Tvlers. 3:61-63; John Wickham to 
Tazewell, Jan. 5, 1831, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. For
Tazewell and Tyler's break with Jackson, see Andrew Jackson to 
John Coffee, April 24, 1831, Bassett, ed., Correspondence of
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Tazewell, disappointed by Jackson and disgusted by the state 
of affairs in Washington, yearned to retire from public 
life. Benjamin Watkins Leigh urged him to stay on, 
explaining that Ritchie would only "supply your place with a 
Senator from Virginia likely to be more manageable." When 
Virginia backed Van Buren as the vice-presidential nominee 
in 1832, Tazewell resigned from the Senate, claiming that he 
no longer spoke for the state and was unwilling to 
contribute to the conversion of the government "into a 
military despotism.1,76
Floyd took dissatisfaction with Jackson to another 
level. He gloated that Jackson "has disappointed friends and 
foes; all his enemies said of him before his election, has 
been realized." Pleasants admitted that Floyd was the only 
man in Virginia more hostile to Jackson than himself. "Floyd 
is up to the highest button hole of anti-Jacksonianism," he 
told one friend.77 Floyd, Pleasants, Tazewell, and Tyler 
formed the leadership on an emerging anti-Jackson party 
whose impact was felt immediately. Stevenson let slip the 
state of affairs in Virginia when he told Van Buren that the
Jackson. 4:268-269; Ritchie to John Campbell, Oct. 26, 1829; 
John Campbell to James Campbell, April 23, 1830; John Campbell 
to David Campbell, n.d. [April 1831], all in CFP, Duke.
76Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 22, 1832, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Tazewell to John Wickham, Dec. 17, 1832, John 
Wickham Papers, UVA.
^John Floyd Diary, March 8, 1831, Jan. 2, 1832, Ambler, 
Life and Diarv of John Flovd. 123, 173; Pleasants to J.C.
Cabell, Nov. 14, 1831, Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
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state would support Jackson in the upcoming election, 
"apostates to the contrary notwithstanding." The unity that 
had marked Jackson's ascendancy in Virginia in 1828 was 
already showing signs of falling apart.78
Discontent with Jackson in Virginia during this period 
can be traced to three sources. First, the President's 
actions in removing officeholders and replacing them with 
friends and newspaper editors soured some Virginians 
dedicated to reform, or, in the case of Floyd, intent on 
securing a prestigious post in the new administration. 
Second, the acrimonious and protracted dispute between 
Jackson and Calhoun cost Old Hickory support among those in 
the state who looked favorably upon the South Carolinian. 
Some argued that Jackson's petulance in this matter 
increased Calhoun's strength in Virginia enough to turn the 
state against the administration.79 Ritchie at first denied 
that Calhoun was quarreling with Jackson and Van Buren, and 
then chided the South Carolinian for airing his private 
matters in public. As always, Ritchie worried most about the 
impact the feud would have on the Jacksonian party. In the 
midst of the Jackson-Calhoun feud, he informed his readers 
that they should not commit themselves to supporting anyone
78Stevenson to Van Buren, April 4, 1831, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
79Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 22, 1831, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; "Clinton," RE, Feb. 24, 1831; William S. Archer 
to Van Buren, March 12, 1831, Van Buren Papers, LC; J. Burton 
Harrison to Rives, Aug. 30, 1831, Rives Papers, LC.
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who challenged Jackson's leadership. The "course of the 
Republicans of Virginia fortunately admits of no confusion," 
he noted. "The landmarks are laid down, as straight as a ray 
of light from Heaven." Virginia must support the President 
and refuse to "bind herself at this time to the ear of any 
man who aspires to be the successor of A. Jackson."80
The third and most significant factor in weakening the 
unity of the Jackson party in Virginia involved the 
political future of the Secretary of State, Martin Van 
Buren. Many Virginians cast suspicious eyes on the New 
Yorker, not just because of his place of birth, but also 
because of his stance on key issues like internal 
improvements and the Missouri Compromise. Given the 
developments of the past decade, William M. Rives told his 
brother, Virginians are "disposed to favour a southern 
candidate in disregard of other considerations."81
Van Buren's reputation as an ambitious political 
manipulator, a "trimmer," also cost him support in the 
state. His "personal character," one observer noted in 1831, 
"is at this date held in much aversion by all parties."82
80RE, May 21, 1830; Feb. 19, 24, March 10, 12, 1831.
Quotes in March 10 issue; Lynwood Miller Dent, "The Virginia 
Democratic Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss, Louisiana State 
University, 1974), 88.
81William M, Rives to William Cabell Rives, April 30, 
183 0, Rives Papers, LC.
82J. Burton Harrison to William Cabell Rives, Aug. 30, 
1831, Rives Papers, LC.
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More than one Virginian expressed the idea that Van Buren 
had precipitated the spat between Calhoun and Jackson in 
order to strengthen his position in the administration. When 
Van Buren decided to resign his office in April of 1831, 
with the notion that the remainder of the Cabinet, but 
especially those allied with Calhoun, would step down as 
well, Virginians marvelled at the machinations of the Little 
Magician. Ritchie hoped Van Buren's resignation would ease 
party tensions and dispel rumors that he was the power 
behind the throne, while other members of the Junto were 
less sanguine.83 For their part, Pleasants and Floyd needed 
little time to decide that the whole affair had been 
designed to punish Calhoun and to position Van Buren for the 
vice-presidential chair.84
Such a notion was apparently widespread among 
Virginians, for Ritchie told Van Buren that he would 
seriously damage the party if he chose to run as vice- 
president. The Junto leader flatly stated that neither he 
nor the state could support Van Buren in this endeavor.
83Ritchie to Van Buren, April 20 and 21, 1831, Van Buren 
Papers, LC; RE, April 22, May 3, 13, 1831; Daniel to Van
Buren, April 22, 1831; Parker to Van Buren, April 23, 1831, 
both in Van Buren Papers, LC.
Van Buren only informed three people in advance of his 
decision to resign. Ritchie was one of them. This fact 
confirms Van Buren's high opinion of Ritchie's influence in 
the party. Van Buren to Ritchie, April 17, 1831, Van Buren 
Papers, LC.
^John Floyd Diary, April 21, 1831, Ambler, Diary of John 
Flovd. 139; Richmond Constitutional Whig. April 22, May 30, 
1831.
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Ritchie repeatedly told his subscribers that the New Yorker 
had not, and would not, seek the second highest chair in the 
land. He would instead continue to serve the country as 
minister to the Court of St. James.85
The continued attacks on Van Buren in Virginia forced 
Ritchie to admit that the administration was losing 
supporters in the state. John Randolph, never one to mince 
words, bluntly informed Jackson that the "great defection on 
the part of your supporters in Virginia" stemmed from the 
influence that Van Buren and other northerners had over 
affairs. Richmonder John Rutherfoord gloomily noted the 
"schisms in the republican ranks" brought on by the 
dissolution of the cabinet and other events. Jackson's 
popularity was "wholly ruined," another added. "In Virginia 
every one is mortified & chagrined," and the "abandonment of 
the President has been very extensive."86
Despite growing criticism, Jackson remained extremely 
popular in Virginia. Few doubted in 1831 that the President 
would win reelection in the upcoming election, and even 
Floyd believed that Jackson would "still get the vote of the
85Ritchie to Van Buren, April 30, 1831, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; RE, April 8, 22, May 20, 24, Dec. 2, 30, 1831.
86RE, June 24, 1831; Randolph to Jackson, Nov. 8, 1831, 
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 4:369-370; John 
Rutherfoord to Rives, Nov. 6, 1831; J. Burton Harrison to 
Rives, Aug. 30, 1831, both in Rives Papers, LC.
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State because he is now less odious than Clay."87 Within the 
Virginia Jackson party, however, considerable 
dissatisfaction existed with the idea of Jackson choosing 
Van Buren as his running mate. The Senate's rejection of the 
New Yorker as minister to the Court of St. James, engineered 
by Calhoun and Clay, "excited ... universal indignation" in 
the state and moved many to support a Jackson-Van Buren 
ticket. Stevenson wrote from Washington and encouraged 
Ritchie to throw his weight behind Van Buren's candidacy. 
Virginia must "take a strong and bold part" in this matter. 
"If she does, all is safe." Ritchie, sensing the displeasure 
such a development would cause among certain portions of his 
party, wisely withheld acting publicly on Stevenson's 
advice. While privately he had already decided to support 
Van Buren, he continued to plead with Virginians to abide by 
the decisions of the national party convention which would 
meet in Baltimore in May of 1832.88
A significant number of Jacksonians ignored Ritchie's 
pleas and moved to place Philip Pendelton Barbour in 
nomination for the vice-presidency. Barbour, who had ties
87John Floyd Diary, Jan. 2, 1832, Ambler, Diarv of Flovd. 
173; RE, June 24, 1831; Arthur Campbell to David Campbell, 
Sept. 2, 1831, CFP, Duke.
88Parker to John Campbell, Feb. 3, 1832; Stevenson to
Ritchie, Feb. 4, 1832, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, Jan. 
31, Feb. 4, 18, 24, 28, 1832; Parker to Tazewell, Feb. 6,
1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. For the Junto's support for 
Van Buren at this time, see John Campbell to Van Buren, Feb. 
10, 1832; Daniel to Van Buren, July 12, 1832; Parker to Van 
Buren, Sept. 5, 1832, all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
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with the Junto, possessed all of the qualities that Van 
Buren lacked; that is, he was an orthodox Southerner. His 
popularity had risen since he had ably presided over the 
Constitutional Convention of 1829. Voters in Piedmont 
Virginia were especially enamored of Barbour, but he 
attracted supporters throughout the state. As the campaign 
progressed, it seemed that support for the Virginian 
outstripped that for Van Buren.89
The Barbour movement proved to be a tremendous headache 
for the Junto. There was no way that it could support 
Barbour publicly, regardless of its private regard for him. 
To abandon Van Buren at this stage would have amounted to 
political suicide. For the past decade, the Junto and the 
Regency had worked together, first with Crawford and then 
with Jackson. Van Buren had always been the prime mover 
behind the coalition. Loyalty to him dictated that the 
Barbour movement be turned back and the path laid clear for 
the Little Magician. Besides, Barbour's supporters 
threatened to split the party vote in the state, thereby 
allowing the nascent opposition party to sweep into power. 
Party unity demanded, Ritchie and the Junto claimed, that 
Virginians abide by the decision made at the upcoming 
national convention. The group was beginning to realize
89William M. Rives to William Cabell Rives, April 30, 
1830; Thomas Walker Gilmer to William Cabell Rives, Sept. 29, 
1830, both in Rives Papers, LC; Dent, "Virginia Democratic 
Party," 107-113.
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first-hand the necessity of party discipline and loyalty.90
At the Baltimore Convention, Andrew Stevenson, P.V. 
Daniel and Philip N. Nicholas all represented Virginia. 
Despite this strong Junto influence, the delegates from the 
Old Dominion were determined to cast their ballots for 
Barbour as vice-president. At a caucus of the state's 
delegates, Daniel and Nicholas proposed a compromise that 
most of the men in attendance accepted. The state would 
support Barbour initially, but should it become clear that 
he lacked sufficient votes to gain the nomination, Virginia 
would accept the convention's choice for vice-president 
without dissent. Everyone understood that that meant backing 
Van Buren. This is what eventually happened, but not before 
hard-core Barbour supporters, unwilling to accept the Little 
Magician on the party ticket, walked out of the 
proceedings.91
Barbour's forces in Virginia were exceedingly bitter 
about the action of the state's delegates, and refused to 
abide by the convention's decision to support Van Buren.92
90RE, No v. 11, 1831, Feb. 28, March 4, 1832; Roane and 
Daniel both worked to keep the Virginia legislature from 
endorsing Barbour, and Stevenson asked Ritchie to put pressure 
on Barbour to withdraw from consideration. See RE, March 1, 
1832; Stevenson to Ritchie, Feb. 4, 1832, Van Buren Papers, 
LC. See also the "Message of the Jackson Central Committee," 
RE, Oct. 16, 1832.
91RE, May 25, 29, 1832.
^Littleton W. Tazewell to John Tazewell, May 23, 1832, 
Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
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Within a month a "Jackson and Barbour Convention" convened 
to Charlottesville to plan for the upcoming election. In 
their address, delegates insisted that they did not want to 
fractionalize the Jackson party in the state or the nation. 
They desired peace and unity. But the possibility of Van 
Buren becoming vice-president prompted them to take matters 
into their own hands. The New Yorker was hostile to "every 
principle and interest which has been justly held dear by 
Virginians," they claimed. Furthermore, he had been foisted 
upon the people by the oligarchic Richmond Party. Voting for 
Van Buren, they concluded, would represent the first step in 
subjecting the state to the "control of a northern 
regency.1,93
Throughout the summer of 1832, Ritchie and the Junto 
worked to bring Barbour's supporters back into the fold. The 
group worried above all about the potentially disastrous 
implications of splitting the party vote in November. 
Defeating the unnatural coalition of Clay and Calhoun 
required strength, unity, and harmony. Ritchie stressed 
these themes repeatedly in the Enquirer and made every 
effort to assuage the fears of the Barbourites about Van 
Buren. The state would not fall under the sway of any
93"Resolution and Address of the Charlottesville Jackson 
and Barbour Convention," (Charlottesville: Cary & Watson,
1832), VHS; RE, June 8, 1832. The Alexandria Gazette (May 9, 
1832) also believed that the Junto was forcing Van Buren upon 
the South, as did Littleton Waller Tazewell. Tazewell to John 
Tazewell, May 23, 1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
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"northern regency." Nor had the "Richmond Party" forced Van 
Buren upon the state; no such organization existed. There 
was, however, a real crisis facing Virginia and the nation. 
The tariff controversy in South Carolina and the debate over 
the Bank of the United States were both far more significant 
than petty squabbles over the second place on a party 
ticket. Supporters of the Union and of the Jackson 
administration must unite to end the crisis and preserve the 
integrity of the Union.94
As the election neared and the focus of discussion 
turned increasingly to the situation in South Carolina, 
Barbour's support dwindled, leading him to withdraw from the 
race in October.95 By then it was clear that a Jackson- 
Barbour ticket had no chance of winning, even in Virginia. 
Moreover, many political commentators had crippled Barbour's 
chances by linking his supporters with the Nullifiers of 
South Carolina. Barbour's friends, John Marshall noted, were 
"secretly for Calhoun" and among the "most violent of the 
state right party." He had no doubt that they were also 
"attached to nullification in principle." But Marshall, 
already at odds with Jackson, found no cause to celebrate 
the split in the Virginia Democratic party. "There might be
^RE, June 8, 12, 19, 1832.
95Duff Green to Thomas W. Gilmer, Sept. 24, 1832, Duff 
Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Gilmer to Barbour, Oct. 2, 1832, 
Papers of the Ambler and Barbour Families, UVA.
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some difficulty in managing this tangled business were not 
the Jackson majority so overwhelming as to leave his friends 
nothing to fear from a division.1,96 The Chief Justice, 
removed as he was from the intricacies of party politics in 
Virginia, misjudged the anxiety caused by the movement to 
keep Van Buren off of the ballot. But he did not misread 
public sentiment for Old Hickory. Jackson swept to a 
commanding victory in Virginia, capturing 75% of the popular 
vote, even with the northerner Van Buren as his running 
mate.97
Marshall's connection of the Barbour movement with the 
nullification debate brought together nicely the two 
greatest problems facing the Junto in the years between 1829 
and 1833. After successfully exerting its influence to elect 
Andrew Jackson to the presidency, the group found itself 
almost immediately embroiled in a number of minor and some 
not so minor disputes. If Jackson's cabinet selections, his 
patronage policies, and his uneven record on stifling 
internal improvement bills all gave cause for concern among 
his supporters in Richmond, the President's handling of the 
Nullification Crisis and Van Buren's crafty efforts to 
inherit the throne caused outright panic. On top of all
96Marshall to Joseph Story, Aug. 2, 1832, (typescript copy 
of original in Massachusetts Historical Society), Marshall 
Papers, William and Mary.
^Congressional Quarterly, Presidential Elections. 94.
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this, developments within the state produced bitter division 
and controversy. Faced with these distressing occurrences, 
the Junto responded by maintaining and even strengthening 
both its loyalty to Jackson and Van Buren and its position 
as leader of the Virginia Democratic Party.98 While 
continuing to insist upon their independence from party 
leaders in Washington —  they were only interested in 
following the principles of state rights —  the members of 
the Junto were gradually accepting the need for effective 
party discipline and loyalty, the hallmark of the second 
party system.99 Jackson's resounding victory at the polls in 
1832, coming as it did after four years of bickering, 
agitation, and compromise, gave the Junto reason to 
celebrate. Despite complaints, defections, and an attempted 
rebellion within the ranks, the group somehow managed to 
hold the Jacksonian party together. Ritchie and his group
"Ritchie to Rives, Oct. 12, 1831, Rives Papers, LC. 
Ritchie admitted that "my heart & hand are with" Jackson 
because he will "restore ... the right reading of the 
Constitution - and bring back the spirit of Union & harmony to 
our people." Lynwood Dent has argued that the Junto remained 
"Jackson's one constant source of support in Virginia" during 
this period. Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 81.
"Daniel and Stevenson were the best examples of this. I 
do not, however, agree with Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 
122, that the Junto had completely accepted "Van Buren's new 
concept of party" by 1833, or with William Cooper's assertion 
that "the Junto men were much more concerned about party in 
general and about loyalty to the Democratic party in 
particular" than republican principles. William J. Cooper, 
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) , 12. Only after 
1837 does this statement have any validity.
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realized, however, that four years of almost constant 
struggle had produced much bitterness in Virginia, and they 
hoped that Jackson's second term would be marked by peace 
and harmony.
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Chapter IV 
Party Warfare: 1834-1840
Despite the fallout caused by the Proclamation and the 
Force Bill, the Richmond Junto had managed to keep the 
Virginia Democratic party fairly unified during Jackson's 
first administration. The clique realized, however, that the 
growing opposition to Jackson presented a threat that could 
not be ignored. Jackson's second term, the Junto hoped, 
would proceed more smoothly than the first, and the 
President would not provide Virginians with any further 
reasons to abandon the Democratic party.
In this hope, the Junto was to be profoundly 
disappointed. The years between 1834 and 1840 were marked by 
some of the most ferocious party struggles ever seen in 
Virginia. The Junto found itself fighting not only an 
organized opposition party, the Whigs, but also factions 
within the Democratic party that challenged the group's 
leadership. After suffering several setbacks in 1834 and 
early 1835, the Junto regrouped and reexerted its control in 
1836, contributing to Martin Van Buren's victory that year.
Van Buren's election, however, brought no calm to 
political affairs in Virginia. The Whigs controlled the
184
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state legislature and continued their attacks on the 
administration. They were joined by a group of dissident 
Democrats, known as the Conservatives, who disagreed with 
Van Buren over his proposal for a sub-treasury banking 
scheme that would divorce the federal government from 
banking. While the Junto itself was split over the 
usefulness of the sub-treasury scheme, it remained united 
enough to insist on party unity and support for Van Buren as 
the leader of the Democrats. This call for cohesion became 
even more imperative when Calhoun Democrats in Virginia 
began challenging the Junto's control of the party.
In the bitter partisan battles that took place during 
Van Buren's administration, the Junto's power was sorely 
tested and ultimately broken. The group worked hard to see 
Van Buren capture Virginia's electoral votes in 1840, albeit 
by the slimmest of margins. But this triumph represented the 
last major achievement of the Junto. Dismayed by the 
election of William H. Harrison, weakened by attacks from 
both within and without their party, and their ranks thinned 
by death and appointment to federal offices, the remaining 
members of the Junto were losing their influence and slowly 
fading from the political scene. By late 1840, the group's 
control over the Virginia Democratic party had become 
tenuous at best, and it was clear that the end of an era was 
rapidly approaching.
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With Jackson reelected and a compromise reached on the 
Nullification Crisis, the Junto fervently hoped that a 
spirit of harmony and cooperation would take hold of 
Virginia and the nation. Commenting upon Jackson's second 
inaugural address, Ritchie thought he saw a new era dawning 
in America. "Who can despair of such a Republic," he asked 
rhetorically. "Who will not lend a hand to the 
accomplishments of the great destinies which are opening 
before us? Let us then be true to our country, and we shall 
be blessed indeed." The future held great promise if only 
the American people could unite and bend their energies 
toward constructive, rather than destructive, ends. "Every 
thing, we now hope," Ritchie concluded, "will return to its 
usua1 channel."1
Ritchie's dream of political harmony proved illusory.
By the end of 1833, debate over slavery had flared up again, 
Jackson was embroiled in another controversy, this time 
surrounding the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the 
United States, and the opposition party in Virginia was 
rapidly gaining strength as the spring elections approached. 
There was to be no respite after the tumultuous first years 
of the Jackson administration, and some Virginians believed 
that Jackson himself was partially to blame. It seemed to 
one observer that the "atmosphere in which he breaths must 
be agitated to give him life and health." Ritchie disagreed
‘Richmond Enquirer. March 7, 12, 1833.
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with this assessment, but was forced to admit in the summer 
of 1833 that instead of peace and prosperity, "this is the 
day of excess, of political fanaticism, of violent feeling, 
of ultra abuse."2 With a hint of annoyance, Ritchie informed 
his brother that "we cannot get every thing smooth in the 
political world." To another friend, he wrote simply, the 
"times are out of joint in politics."3
Throughout 1833 and 1834, the Junto found itself 
battling a familiar enemy: John C. Calhoun. The members of 
the group had repeatedly expressed their hostility toward 
the South Carolinian ever since his break with the Jackson 
administration in 1830. Calhoun's course during the election 
of 1832 and the Nullification Crisis had sealed his fate in 
the eyes of the Junto as a trouble-maker and political 
opportunist. Now they were convinced that the former vice- 
president was attempting "to rally a Southern Party around 
the Slave Question" and to present himself as the spokesman 
for the region.4 Since the Junto believed that Calhoun did 
not represent the true southern state rights position, it 
moved decisively to condemn him. The Junto offered a variety
2David Campbell to James Campbell, Sept. 15, 1833, 
Campbell Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke 
University; RE, Aug. 6, 1833.
3Thomas Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, Nov. 23, 1833, 
John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph Macon College. 
Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 214; Thomas Ritchie to William 
Cabell Rives, Jan. 6, 1834, William Cabell Rives Papers, 
Library of Congress.
4RE, July 26, 1833.
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of reasons for attacking Calhoun. By seeking to create a 
purely sectional alliance, the South Carolinian was 
undermining the strength and integrity of the Union. He was 
also attempting to weaken the state's beneficial 
relationship with the national Democratic party, and thereby 
lessen the influence of Virginia in Washington. Calhoun's 
message appealed to the fears of southern slaveholders, not 
to their reason, and was therefore dangerous. All of this 
meant that Virginians must take a stand against Calhoun and 
his plans for a southern party. Ritchie told William Cabell 
Rives that he would "battle with the Calhoun party as long 
as I can" in the hopes of minimizing the influence it would 
have in Virginia and across the South. Calhoun must be 
stopped at all costs, he informed his readers. "No one deals 
more in metaphysics and mystification, and no one is so 
utterly unsafe and unfit to be trusted."5
The Junto's goal of discrediting Calhoun proved to be a 
delicate task. Since the South Carolinian was proclaiming 
the need for southern solidarity on the slavery question, an 
attack on him might be perceived as an attack on the 
peculiar institution and on the South itself. Therefore, 
Ritchie and other opponents of Calhoun tempered their 
criticism of him with frequent defenses of the slave system 
and with menacing threats to those outsiders attempting to
sRitchie to Rives, Aug. 26, 1833, Rives Papers, LC; RE, 
April 4, 1834.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 8 9
meddle in the South's affairs. In the midst of chiding 
Calhoun for his destructive ambition, Ritchie paused 
(somewhat gratuitously) to remind his readers that "If ever 
the Federal Government pretends to control this species of 
property [slavery], the Union itself is gone. We, devoted as 
we are to the Union, would be the first to cry for its 
dissolution."6 Ritchie's words reveal the hardening 
orthodoxy on the slavery question that was coming to 
characterize the South in the 1830s. Although he insisted 
that he was dedicated to the preservation of both the Union 
and the rights of the state, it was increasingly clear where 
his ultimate loyalty lay.7
A second source of concern for the Junto was Andrew 
Jackson's decision to withdraw federal deposits from the 
Second Bank of the United States in late 1833. Even though 
the Bank's charter was set to expire in 1836, and a recent 
Congressional investigation had cleared the institution of 
any wrong-doing and declared that the public deposits were 
safe, Jackson moved aggressively to slay the Bank dragon. 
When his Secretary of the Treasury, William Duane, refused 
to issue the order calling for the withdrawal, Jackson 
demanded his resignation. He soon elevated Roger Taney, the 
Attorney General, to the position, who immediately began to
6RE, July 26, 1833. See also, Aug. 2, Oct. 8, 11, Nov. 
1, 1833.
7For an example of this sentiment, see RE, Feb. 12, 
March 12, 1833.
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make the necessary arrangements. To many observers, even 
those friendly to Jackson, the President's actions were 
perceived as unnecessary and quite possibly illegal. Those 
who had broken from the Jacksonian coalition during the 
first administration quickly raised the cry of executive 
usurpation and warned the country of the dangers of allowing 
Jackson to exercise virtually unchecked power.8
In Virginia, the removal of the deposits quickly became 
the leading topic of debate. Reaction to Jackson's attack on
the Bank was largely negative. Most argued that he had acted
precipitately and without proper reflection. The President 
had let "his zeal ... get the better of his judgment," David 
Campbell thought. More importantly, he had failed to respect 
the authority of the other branches of the federal
government. This was the "very essence of despotism."9
Others agreed with Campbell. The Virginia legislature passed 
a resolution denouncing the withdrawal of the deposits as an 
unconstitutional act, and instructed Virginia's Senators, 
William Cabell Rives and John Tyler, to support legislation 
calling for the restoration of the deposits. Rives, strongly
8Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of 
American Democracy. 1833-1845 (New York: Harper & Row,
1984), 84-131. After Taney's promotion, Jackson asked Junto 
member Peter V. Daniel to be Attorney General. Daniel 
declined. RE, Oct. 29, 1833.
9David Campbell to William B. Campbell, Oct. 29, 1833, 
CFP, Duke. See also, Littleton Waller Tazewell to John 
Wickham, Jan. 14, 1834, John Wickham Papers, University of 
Virginia.
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allied with the administration, refused to obey these 
instructions and resigned his seat. The Virginia legislature 
replaced him with Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a known enemy of 
Jackson.10 Even Ritchie criticized Jackson and doubted if he 
had acted within the realm of his executive powers. More 
importantly, Ritchie worried that Jackson's rash actions 
would revive sympathy for the nearly dead Bank of the United 
States. John Campbell, a Junto associate and Treasurer of 
the United States, echoed Ritchie's sentiment when he 
complained that the "Bank was kill'd dead & he [Jackson] has 
brought it bank to life."11
Not all Junto members disagreed with Jackson and his 
removal policy. Andrew Stevenson, who had stuck with the 
President throughout the Nullification Crisis and was now 
angling for a diplomatic mission, expressed his support for 
Jackson's plan to kill the Bank. Stevenson kept in constant 
touch with John Brockenbrough in Richmond in an effort to 
control the damage caused by the removals. Richard E.
Parker, Ritchie's cousin, insisted that the removal of the
10RE, Feb. 22, 25, March 1, 1834; Raymond C. Dingledine, 
Jr., "The Political Career of William Cabell Rives," (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Virginia, 1947), 211-213; Lynwood 
Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic Party, 1824- 
1847," (Ph.D. diss, Louisiana State University, 1974), 151- 
154. For Leigh's "viper-hatred of Gen. Jackson," see C.W. 
Gooch to John Campbell, Sept. 5, 1833, Gooch Family Papers, 
Virginia Historical Society.
nRE, Feb. 22, 1834; Sept. 27, 1833; Ritchie to Rives, 
Aug. 26, 1833, Rives Papers, LC; John Campbell to David 
Campbell, March 21, 1834, CFP, Duke.
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deposits was "prudent and necessary," and Peter V. Daniel 
defended the President and spoke out against Ritchie and 
other administration men who criticized Jackson.12
Whatever their personal feelings about Jackson's 
removal policy, the members of the Junto realized that they 
had to move quickly to deflect attention away from the 
President's controversial actions. The group understood that 
anti-administration forces, which had been slow to coalesce 
in the past, were capitalizing on Jackson's sudden 
unpopularity in Virginia and attempting to forge a coalition 
that could control the state legislature. Speaking of the 
radical state rights advocates and the nationalistic 
supporters of Henry Clay, Ritchie wrote early in 1834 that 
"It is obvious that the two fragments of the opposition in 
the Legislature are approaching each other & forming a 
Combination against the Administration." John Brockenbrough 
expressed concern that the "Nullifiers and Clayites 
combined" would carry the day at the upcoming spring 
elections, and Parker confirmed these suspicions. "A great 
effort is making now in Virginia by the party opposed to 
Genl. Jackson, to raise an outcry against him for the 
removal of the deposits," Parker wrote one friend, adding
12Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and 
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1949), 93-100; Richard E. Parker to 
Martin Van Buren, Nov. 29, 1834, Van Buren Papers, LC; John 
P. Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. 
Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1964), 119-126.
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that "it will partially succeed."13
Parker/s assessment proved to be an accurate one. As 
Harold Moser has noted, the "timing and methods of the 
removal of the deposits ... shook the Junto to its 
foundations.1,14 Split over Jackson's policy and caught off­
guard by the strong reaction against it in Virginia, the 
Junto suddenly found itself fighting for its political 
existence. In a series of letters to Andrew Stevenson, Junto 
members described the frenzied political scene in Richmond 
as they battled to hold off the opposition forces. "You have 
no idea of the excitement among parties here," one 
correspondent wrote. Ritchie told Stevenson that "I never 
was so much absorbed by politics in all my life," and 
William H. Roane kept Stevenson informed of his heated 
contest in Hanover County, just outside the city. In March 
of 1833, Roane noted, the political situation in Virginia 
was so calm that he had refused to stand for reelection the 
following spring. But the removal of the deposits had roused 
such fury across the state that he had reconsidered and
13Ritchie to Rives, Jan. 6, 1834, Rives Papers, LC; John 
Brockenbrough to Andrew Stevenson, April 5, 1834, Branch 
Historical Papers. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 253-254; 
Richard E. Parker to Edward Lucas, Jr., Jan. 12, 1834,
Edward Lucas and William Lucas Letters, Duke.
14Harold D. Moser, "Subtreasury Politics and the 
Virginia Conservative Democrats, 1835-1844," (Ph.D. diss, 
University of Wisconsin, 1977), 46.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 9 4
decided to run.15
While Roane was fighting for his political life in 
Hanover County, tempers flared in Richmond and Ritchie and 
Daniel faced physical attack. Ritchie's "temporizing course1 
on the Bank question, a former partner, C.W. Gooch, 
explained to Van Buren, had so enraged Richmonders that they 
nearly destroyed his office at the Enquirer. Fortunately, 
"cool heads" prevailed before any damage was done.16 Daniel 
was less lucky. Late in March 1834, Daniel unburdened 
himself to Stevenson, describing his hellish life in 
Richmond. The Whigs were following his every move and seemed 
bent on destroying him. "I am watched throughout the day; 
every door I enter, every person with whom I speak is a 
subject of jealous scrutiny. I am even, it is said, 
threatened with being hunted to ruin in my business, and 
with personal violence." The worst offender was John 
Pleasants, the editor of the Richmond Whig, but there were 
plenty of others as well, Daniel told Stevenson. But they 
would never stop him from doing his duty. "Damn the 
contemptable [sic] slaves of the Bank ..., I put them all at
lsJohn Rutherfoord to Andrew Stevenson, March 19, 1834; 
Ritchie to Stevenson, n.d. [probably late 1833, early 1834]; 
[William H. Roane] to Stevenson, March 27, 1834, all in 
Stevenson Papers, LC.
16C.W. Gooch to Martin Van Buren, March 24, 1834, Van 
Buren Papers, LC.
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defiance. "I7
Daniel's concern about his safety was well founded. In 
the summer of 1833, after lambasting Pleasants in the 
Enquirer. Daniel was attacked by Pleasants and Joseph Selden 
as he left the state capitol. The assailants were armed with 
pistols and a dirk, and Daniel was "hurt ... a great deal." 
Pleasants and Selden were arraigned by a grand jury for 
assault, and tension in Richmond reached new heights. "God 
knows what we are coming to," Ritchie sighed.18
Stunned by the strong and hostile attacks of the 
opposition forces, the Junto mounted an extensive 
counterattack. Its central strategy was to defend Jackson 
and his removal policy by claiming that the Bank of the 
United States continued to pose a threat to the country 
because of its undue power and influence. Attacks on Jackson 
for usurping power were uncalled for and misdirected, they 
argued. The President was merely using the constitutional 
means at his disposal to protect the country from the 
"monster" Bank. Evidence would soon be disclosed that 
revealed the "immense power of the Bank & the great abuse of 
it," Richard Parker confidently predicted. The people's eyes 
would be opened to the dangers posed by the unconstitutional
17Peter V. Daniel to Stevenson, March 29, 1834,
Stevenson Papers, LC.
18Littleton Waller Tazewell to John N. Tazewell, Aug.
19, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; Ritchie to Rives,
Aug. 23, 1834, Rives Paper, LC; Daniel to Van Buren, Aug. 8, 
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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institution. By criticizing the removal of the deposits, 
Jackson's foes were overlooking the real issue at stake.
"The constitutionality of the institution, seems to be 
entirely lost sight of," John Rutherfoord complained.19 If 
this was in fact the case, it was not the fault of Thomas 
Ritchie. He flooded the Enquirer with attacks on the Bank, 
always describing the alarming influence it continued to 
wield and highlighting the continued threat that it posed to 
the liberties of the people and the very existence of the 
Union. The real question facing the nation, he insisted, was 
whether the people would rule the Bank, or the Bank would 
rule the people. Virginians must "choose between the Rights 
of the States, and the Liberties of the People[,] or a 
tremendous Institution, which threatens and mocks at both." 
No compromise could be made on the question, Ritchie 
continued. "This ground of the unconstitutionality of the 
Bank is like adamant. No republican can surrender it. He 
cannot compromise it." To make sure the dangers of the Bank 
were clearly laid out, Ritchie offered a blunt summary to 
his readers: "Subscribe to the Bank, and we sign the death- 
warrant of the true principles of the government." The only 
question worth considering in the upcoming election, he
19Parker to Edward Lucas, Jr., Jan. 12, 1834, Lucas 
Letters, Duke; John Rutherfoord to Stevenson, March 19, 
1834, Stevenson Papers, LC.
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insisted, was "Bank or no Bank."20
Despite the efforts of the Junto to deflect attention 
away from Jackson's removal policy, the opposition forces in 
Virginia, now known as the Whigs, were able to capitalize on 
anti-Jackson sentiment in the state. The first sign of the 
growing power of the Whigs came when the General Assembly 
selected Littleton Waller Tazewell, a strong anti- 
Jacksonian, over Daniel in the 1834 gubernatorial contest. 
Tazewell, an extremely private man, agreed to run only 
because he believed that the times demanded that everyone do 
their part to end the misrule of Jackson. Ritchie 
maintained, however, that Tazewell had been elected by a 
broad coalition of delegates, including Jacksonians, because 
of his services to the state, not his political opinions.
But other observers interpreted Tazewell's election 
differently. Hugh Mercer claimed that not only had the Junto 
been "put down," but Van Buren's chances of carrying 
Virginia in 1836 had been dealt a serious blow. John Strode 
Barbour told a kinsman that "the Richmond Junto are broken 
down and thrown into the most contemptible and spiritless 
minority. Even Ritchie and Peter V. Daniel are fawning and 
begging for quarter."21
20RE, Dec. 24, 1833; March 6, 1834. For similar 
expressions of these ideas, see RE, Sept. 27, Nov. 1, 1833; 
Feb. 8, 15, 1834.
21Tazewell to John Floyd, Nov. 25, 1833, John Floyd 
Papers, LC; RE, Jan. 9, 1834; Hugh Mercer to Tazewell, Jan. 
20, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; John S. Barbour to
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Shortly after Daniel's defeat, the Junto suffered 
another setback. When Rives resigned from the Senate rather 
than vote to restore the deposits, the Junto hoped to 
replace him with Philip P. Barbour, back in good graces 
after his abortive vice-presidential bid in 1832. But the 
Whigs mustered enough support to defeat Barbour and appoint 
Benjamin Watkins Leigh to the vacant seat instead.22
These reverses in the state legislature did not bode 
well for the Jacksonians as the annual spring elections 
neared. They had controlled the General Assembly for several 
years and had not been seriously challenged since 1829. Now 
it appeared that the Whigs would not only give the 
administration party a strong fight, but might actually 
defeat them and assume power in the state. "We are in a 
state of inexpressible anxiety about the results of the 
elections," John Brockenbrough told Andrew Stevenson. In the 
columns of the Enquirer. Ritchie fretted over the 
complacency of the Jacksonians and worked frantically to 
rouse the faithful to victory.23
As the elections approached, the Junto began to speak 
more confidently of success. Ritchie predicted that the
James Barbour, Jan. 22, 1834, cited in Charles D. Lowery, 
James Barbour. A Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al: 
University of Alabama Press, 1984), 227.
22RE, Feb. 27, 1834.
23Brockenbrough to Stevenson, April 5, 1834, Branch 
Historical Papers. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 253-254; RE, 
March 28, April 1, 8, 11, 1834.
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administration party would be vindicated at the polls, and 
Brockenbrough assured Stevenson that everything was safe.
The group was also convinced that fellow member William H. 
Roane, running for office in Hanover County, would be 
"elected by a triumphant vote."24 Then disaster struck. 
Jackson, angry about the Senate's censure of his course 
during the removal controversy, issued a Protest to that 
body on April 15, 1834. Jackson defended his actions, 
insisted that the president's only responsibility was to the 
people, and condemned the unconstitutional nature of the 
Senate's censure.25 Jackson's Protest sent shock waves 
through the Senate and had an immediate impact on the 
elections in Virginia. "Richmond is all agog about the 
President's protest," Brockenbrough told Stevenson. He had 
already met with Ritchie and Philip N. Nicholas, and would 
soon meet with Roane, to discuss possible responses. All 
agreed that "something must be done at once or the party 
will be dissolved." Brockenbrough closed by notifying 
Stevenson that "news from the elections [was] bad, very 
bad."26
The news was "very bad" for the Junto and the
24RE, April 8, 11, 1834; Brockenbrough to Stevenson, 
April 11, 1834, Stevenson Papers, LC.
“Remini, Course of American Democracy. 152-160.
“Brockenbrough to Stevenson, April 20, 1834, Stevenson 
Papers, LC. Ritchie mildly criticized Jackson for the 
Protest in the April 22, 1834, edition of the Enquirer.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
200
Jacksonian party in Virginia. The Whigs won enough seats to 
gain control of the state legislature. Both parties agreed 
that Jackson's Protest had played a key role in the outcome. 
Ritchie laid part of the blame on the President, but also 
criticized his fellow party members for their apathy. 
Governor Tazewell thought that the "dose administered in the 
President's Protest, proved even too drastic for the strong 
stomach of Jacksonians."27 Even more disheartening to the 
Junto was Roane's defeat in Hanover. Ritchie confessed that 
"Roane's defeat stung me more than any other election I ever 
knew.... I don't know when I have experienced such bitter 
feelings - I could think of nothing else."28
The election had been a complete disaster for the 
Junto, but there was more bad news yet to come. In the 
summer of 1834, Andrew Stevenson, the group's representative 
in Washington, had been nominated by Jackson to be the new 
minister to Great Britain, only to be rejected by the 
Senate. Stevenson had recently been criticized in Virginia 
for supporting the removal of the deposits despite the 
objections of his constituents. Instructions sent from the 
state legislature demanding that Stevenson vote for the
^RE, April 25, 1834; Littleton W. Tazewell to John N. 
Tazewell, April 29, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
28These quotes can be found in two undated letters from 
Ritchie to Stevenson, Stevenson Papers, LC. See also William 
Pope to Stevenson, April 28, 1834, Stevenson Papers, LC, 
where Pope blamed the "Richmond and bank influence" for 
Roane's defeat.
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restoration of the deposits, coupled with his recent 
nomination, had convinced Stevenson to resign his seat in 
the House of Representatives.29 When the Senate rejected his 
nomination, Ritchie and other Jacksonians argued that 
Stevenson was being punished for his political views, and 
they sharply criticized those senators who had voted against 
him. Ritchie condemned the "slanderous persecution" of 
Stevenson by his "remorseless enemies." Richard Parker 
argued that the Senate's actions "exceeds in highhanded 
injustice the rejection of Mr. Van Buren on a former 
occasion." Stevenson felt scorned and mistreated. "I gave up 
a lucrative position, with the prospect of increased 
wealth," he wrote in a letter published in the Enquirer. "to 
devote myself to public service, and now I am to be re-paid 
with denunciation and abuse!"30
The hard times continued for the Junto when the Whig- 
controlled legislature convened in Richmond in December of 
1834. One of the first actions of that body was to strip 
Ritchie and Daniel of their official positions in the state 
government. Ritchie had served as state printer for twenty 
years, but suddenly found himself denied that lucrative 
office. The Junto leader thought it was obvious that he had 
been replaced for political reasons, and he considered
29RE, May 13, 27, 1834; Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 101-
106.
30RE, July 4, 1834; Parker to Stevenson, July 21, 1834, 
Stevenson Papers, LC; RE, May 27, 1834.
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himself the first "martyr" of Whig oppression.31 Daniel's 
removal from the Executive Council after a protracted debate 
in January convinced the Junto that the Whigs were set on 
following a vindictive and intemperent course. "The spirit 
of proscription never prevailed with more ruthlessness than 
it does here at this time," Daniel informed Jackson.32
The removal of Ritchie and Daniel marked the low point 
of the Richmond Junto's career. Between late 1833 and early 
1835, the group had suffered a series of reverses that 
severely weakened its standing in Virginia. Unprepared for 
the ferocity of the opposition attack, its members were 
derided, turned out of office, and publicly attacked. Worse, 
the Junto had been powerless to prevent the Whigs from 
assuming control of the state legislature. Something had 
gone wrong, terribly wrong, but the group was unsure what it 
was. Perhaps it had misjudged anti-Jackson sentiment in the 
state. But the President remained popular in Virginia, they 
insisted, despite his removal policy and Protest to the 
Senate. More likely, the group argued, a sense of 
complacency among the administration's supporters, combined 
with the devious tactics of the Whigs, had caused its 
downfall. But the people were now roused by the intemperance
31RE, Dec. 9, 11, 1834.
32RE, Jan. 17, 19, 1834; Daniel to Andrew Jackson, Dec. 
7, 1834, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; Daniel to Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph, Jan. 13, 1835, Thomas Jefferson Randolph 
Papers, UVA.
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of the Whigs, and the Junto had learned its mistake. Never 
again would it let down its guard or take anything for 
granted. The key to victory lay in hard work, party unity, 
and an unrelenting attack on its enemies. Politics in 
Virginia would never be the same.
Despite its miserable record in 1834, the Junto 
continued to speak optimistically about the future. Ritchie 
rejected David Campbell's claims that Jackson had "nearly 
destroyed the Republican Party in Virginia by his political 
sermons" and ruined any chance of Van Buren winning the 
presidency in 1836. Instead, the editor believed that both 
Jackson and Van Buren remained strong throughout the state. 
Once the people realized that the Whigs were the party of 
the aristocracy and the Bank, they would oust them from 
power. As for himself and the other members of the Junto, "I 
am doing all I can for the cause ... [and] nearly all my 
ancient friends are warmer than ever." Parker was sanguine 
as well. "I think I see indications that the tide is turning 
in Virginia," he noted in July of 1834.33
One reason for the Junto's confidence was its belief 
that the Whig coalition would soon fall apart. Ritchie 
explained to his readers that the lack of shared principles 
and the consuming ambition of the party ensured its failure.
33David Campbell to James Campbell, May 6, 1834, CFP, 
Duke; Ritchie to Stevenson, May 15, 1834; Parker to 
Stevenson, July 21, 1834, both in Stevenson Papers, LC.
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"The combination must eventually dissolve in its own 
weakness," he argued. Daniel agreed with Ritchie, while 
Parker maintained that the Whig movement would be short­
lived because of the antipathy party members had toward the 
common man. Without this support, the party would soon fade 
into insignificance. Ritchie picked up on this theme when he 
described the Whigs as the party of aristocrats and 
Federalists. The people would never allow such men to rule 
over them for long. A writer in the Enquirer expressed this 
idea in melodramatic fashion when he claimed that "returning 
spring will dissipate those lowering clouds of Whiggery, 
which threaten the destruction of our dearest rights ..., 
[and] the Republicans, the virtuous yeomanry of Virginia, 
will stand forth before the world, redeemed by the strong 
power of their own invincible will."34
The first issue that the Junto seized upon in its 
battle to defeat the Whigs involved the senatorial election 
of Benjamin Watkins Leigh. The Junto-led Jacksonian forces 
supported William Cabell Rives, who they claimed had been 
unfairly forced to resign from the Senate in 1833. They 
flooded the legislature with petitions praising Rives and 
instructing their delegates to vote for him. During the 
selection process, huge crowds packed the state capitol.
^RE, Aug. 5, 1834; Daniel to Andrew Jackson, Dec. 7, 
1834, Jackson Papers, LC; Parker to Van Buren, Nov. 29, 
1834, Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, Nov. 25, 1834; "Publius 
Curtius Junius," RE, Feb. 3, 1835.
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Ritchie solemnly announced that the people's will must be 
obeyed and Rives elected. When Leigh won a narrow victory, 
the administration party accused the Whigs of ignoring the 
instructions of their constituents and using their power for 
purely partisan reasons. "The guestion at issue, in April 
next," Ritchie informed his readers, "will be Leigh, or no 
Leigh? Instruction, or no Instruction? Are we freemen, or 
are we slaves?"35
The Junto also moved to shore up support for Jackson.
At a public meeting held in Richmond in late February,
Daniel was elected Chairman and Ritchie introduced 
resolutions praising Jackson for his struggle against the 
Bank. The meeting also condemned the Whigs for electing 
Leigh and called on all friends of the Constitution to rally 
behind the administration. Before adjourning, the members 
selected John Brockenbrough and Philip N. Nicholas as 
delegates to the upcoming Democratic Congressional 
Convention.36 When the convention met the following week, 
the Junto was once again in control. Nicholas was elected 
president and Daniel, through a pre-arranged agreement, 
nominated William H. Roane as the party's candidate for a 
seat in the House of Representatives in the upcoming 
election.37
35Richmond Whig. Jan. 28, 30, 1835; RE, Jan. 31, 1835.
36RE, Feb. 28, 1835.
37RE, March 5, 1835.
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After this show of power, the Junto began preparing for 
the spring elections. The strategy of the Whigs in the 
election of 1835 was to portray Van Buren, the likely 
Democratic nominee for president in 1836, as unsafe on the 
slavery question. Should the Democrats gain control of the 
Virginia legislature in 1835, the Whigs argued, they would 
force Van Buren upon the state the following year. A vote 
for the Whigs, thus, was a vote against the northerner Van 
Buren. A Whig victory "will reunite the South. It will 
secure the election of a Southern President. It will restore 
to the ascendant, Southern principles." But defeat would 
bring northern rule, corruption, "the rebellion of the 
South, and the overthrow of the Union." The real issue at 
the polls, John Pleasants of the Richmond Whig wrote, was 
not Leigh, the right of instruction, or the Bank of the 
United States; it was whether the people wanted "Van Buren 
or no Van Buren. Submission or opposition, to New York 
ambition!"38
The Junto moved decisively to challenge Whig charges 
against Van Buren. Ritchie and others asked for assurances 
from the New Yorker that he would not interfere with the 
institution of slavery, and Ritchie repeatedly told his 
readers that Van Buren was "safe" on the slavery question.39
38Richmond Whig. March 31, Feb. 13, 1835. See also the 
issues of Feb. 5, March 3, 24, and April 3, 1835.
39Ritchie to Silas Wright, March 2, 1835; Parker to Van 
Buren, Feb. 22, 1835, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, 
March 20, 31, 1835.
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Rives apologized to Van Buren for the "pertinacious cross- 
examination to which you have been subjected from Virginia." 
If Van Buren could "bear with this (as we are a famous 
people for principles, you knowt. & indulge the humour of 
your querists," Rives guaranteed him that the Democrats of 
Virginia would triumph in 1835 and that the Old Dominion 
would support him in 1836.40
As the 1835 elections neared, the Junto continued to 
defend Van Buren and denigrate the Whigs. Ritchie compared 
the composition of the party to the Tower of Babel, claiming 
it was made up of "the Nationals and the Nullifiers, the 
Bank, and the Anti-Bank, the Tariff and the anti-Tariff, the 
Internal Improvement and the anti-internal Improvement, the 
friends of Clay, Calhoun, Webster —  the Spinning Jennies of 
the North and the Cotton Planters of the South." Such a 
"piebald coalition" was necessarily held together by only 
one thing: a desire for office. Van Buren and the Democrats, 
on the other hand, were dedicated to restoring the 
"Jeffersonian Era of State Rights." David Campbell made a 
more clear-cut distinction. "The struggle in Virginia," he 
wrote, "is between aristocracy and popular rights." Even the 
Richmond Whig was forced to admit that the Jacksonians were
40Rives to Van Buren, April 10, 1835, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
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better organized and more zealous than the Whigs.41
The hard work of the Jacksonians paid off when they 
recaptured control of the state legislature in the spring 
elections. Ritchie estimated that the new body would be 
composed of 78 Republicans and 56 Whigs, a marked contrast 
with 1834, when there were 57 Republicans and 77 Whigs. The 
huge Republican victory, he claimed, was due to the haughty 
actions of the Whigs and their disregard for the common man. 
The people had "redeemed1 Virginia by rejecting spurious 
claims against Van Buren and by reasserting their control 
over the government.42
Back in power in Virginia, the Junto moved to 
strengthen its hand in national affairs. Daniel, William 
Brockenbrough, Parker, and Stevenson all attended the 
Democratic party's national convention which met in 
Baltimore in May of 1835. They would, of course, support Van 
Buren for the presidency, but they hoped to get Rives the 
vice-presidential nomination. The leading candidate for the 
position was Richard Johnson of Kentucky, who was completely 
unacceptable to the Junto. Its members argued that Johnson 
"does not carry out or maintain the political principles 
Virginia ever held dear," especially its opposition to the
41RE, April 17, 1835; David Campbell to William B. 
Campbell. April 8, 1835, CFP, Duke; Richmond Whig. March 3, 
May 12, 1835.
42RE, May 12, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, May 19, 1835, 
Rives Papers, LC.
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Bank of the United States. Johnson was also reported to have 
fathered several children with a mulatto slave who lived 
with him. The clique was convinced that Johnson's nomination 
would severely weaken the Van Buren ticket in the state, and 
it decided to prevent that from taking place at all costs. 
"Ritchie writes me [that] the State will not vote for 
Johnston [sic]," John Campbell told Rives. "He is much 
concerned about the matter."43
When the convention met, it seemed clear that Johnson 
would be selected over Rives. Determined to prevent this, 
the Virginia delegation assembled to discuss their strategy. 
Daniel was appointed head of the delegation and Stevenson 
introduced resolutions affirming Virginia's commitment to 
Rives and calling for the state to protest if Johnson won. 
When the convention chose Johnson, Daniel announced that 
Virginia would not support the decision. Other delegates 
defended Johnson and pleaded with the men from the Old 
Dominion to make the nomination unanimous, but to no avail. 
The Virginia delegation cast the only dissenting vote 
against Johnson's nomination, marring an otherwise unified 
and amicable convention.44
Despite the convention's nomination, the Junto refused 
to accept Johnson. It was convinced that Van Buren could not
43RE, May 26, 29, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, May 19, 1835;
John Campbell to Rives, May 22, 1835; William Brockenbrough
to Rives, May 13, 17, 1835, all in Rives Papers, LC.
^RE, May 26, 29, June 2, 1835.
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win in Virginia with Johnson on the ticket, and the club's 
members quickly decided that his name would not appear on 
the ballot in Virginia. But the Junto would not break with 
the party. "We have been beaten at Baltimore," Ritchie 
acknowledged, "but we must not divide our party."45
Rebuffed in Baltimore, the Junto found itself in 
trouble back in Virginia. After the spring elections, 
discussion in the state had turned increasingly to the 
dangers posed by the rise of abolitionism in the North. 
Virginia Whigs went to great lengths to connect Van Buren 
with northern radicals who wanted to end slavery. They 
pointed out that Johnson had fathered several children with 
a mulatto woman, and they condemned Ritchie for not 
defending the rights of the South in his newspaper.46 These 
attacks almost immediately yielded results for the Whigs. 
Ardor for Van Buren cooled as condemnations of the 
abolitionists became more heated. Van Buren was a "Missouri 
Restrictionist, and the advocate of free negro equality," 
the Richmond Whig claimed. Virginia could never support him 
for the presidency.47
The Junto moved quickly to defend itself and Van Buren
45Ritchie to Rives, June 5, 1835; Parker to Rives, June 
1, 1835, both in Rives Papers, LC; Parker to Van Buren, June 
18, 1835, Van Buren Papers, LC.
46Richmond Whig. June 9, 12, 16, 26, July 31, Aug. 4, 7, 
Sept. 8, 1835.
47Richmond Whig. April 21, 1835.
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from the charges levelled by "that combination of all kinds 
of violent ingredients, called the Whig party."48 Ritchie 
again assured Virginians that they had nothing to fear from 
Van Buren regarding slavery. He was not one of those 
northern "fanatics" endangering the Union by interfering in 
the private affairs of the South. The Junto leader spoke out 
strongly against the abolitionists and rejected claims that 
he was more concerned about party loyalty than defending the 
interests of the South. His first priority, he insisted, was 
to protect the rights of southerners from abolitionists.49
At the same time that he was professing his devotion to 
the South, Ritchie also criticized those "Political 
Partizans" in the region who seized upon every occurrence to 
"prepare the way for dissolution." If the country was going 
to endure, if the South was to continue enjoying the 
benefits of the Union, then moderation and compromises would 
nave to be made. In two editorials entitled "A Calm Appeal 
from the South to the North," the editor announced that all 
southerners really wanted was to be left alone on the 
slavery question.50 When a Committee of Vigilance proposed 
harshly worded resolutions condemning the abolitionists, 
Ritchie, Daniel, and Nicholas countered with more moderate
48Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
49RE, July 21, 24, 28, Sept. 1, 1835.
50RE, July 21, Aug. 4, Aug. 14, Sept. 8, 1835.
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resolutions, only to be voted down. Patience was needed, the 
Junto men explained; the storm of abolitionism would surely 
pass.51
The Junto was not willing to wait, however, to oust 
Benjamin Watkins Leigh and John Tyler, Virginia's two Whig 
Senators, from their seats. Soon after Leigh's reelection in 
early 1835, Ritchie and others had hit upon the idea of 
using instructions to force his resignation. The people, 
they claimed, had not supported Leigh for the position, and 
he should therefore give up his office. Leigh, despite 
having authored a resolution defending the right of 
instruction in 1812, told his fellow senator, John Tyler, "I 
will not be instructed out of my seat. I will not obey 
Instructions which shall require me to vote for a gross 
violation of the Constitution."52
The move to unseat Leigh and Tyler accelerated once the 
Democrat-controlled Virginia legislature convened in 
December. After promptly restoring Ritchie to his post as 
public printer and returning Daniel to the Executive 
Council, the legislators proceeded to prepare official 
instructions calling on the two senators to vote for Thomas
51Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; RE, Sept. 29, Oct. 9, 1835.
52RE, Jan. 31, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, June 5, 1835, 
Rives Papers, LC; Benjamin Watkins Leigh to John Tyler, July 
5, 1835, Lyon G. Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers 
(3 vols. Richmond and Williamsburg, 1884-1896; reprint, New 
York: De Capo Press, 1970), 1:523.
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H. Benton's expunging resolution. Benton, a senator from 
Missouri and strong supporter of Jackson, had repeatedly 
proposed that the Senate's censure of the President be 
expunged from the official Senate record. The reprimand was 
not only unconstitutional, but insulting to the Hero of New 
Orleans and the highest elected official in the United 
States. It must be removed.53 Virginia Democrats in the 
legislature agreed with Benton, and forced through a 
resolution instructing Leigh and Tyler to vote for Benton's 
measure. If they could not carry out these instructions, 
they would be expected to resign. Governor Tazewell was 
called upon to deliver the instructions to Virginia's 
senators.54
Tazewell's refusal to forward the instructions to Tyler 
and Leigh, followed by their unwillingness to comply with 
them, touched off an extended debate in Virginia on the 
right of instruction and the responsibilities of elected 
officials. Ritchie and the Jacksonians castigated the 
governor and the state's senators for refusing to bow to the 
wishes of the people who had put them in office. They 
accused the three Whigs of imposing their wills on the 
majority of Virginians. "Which ought to prevail," a writer 
in the Enquirer asked, "two men, or the majority of the 
people?" Ritchie was incredulous about Tazewell's response.
53Remini, Course of American Democracy. 376-381.
^RE, Feb. 11, 25, 1836.
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"Is Mr. Tazewell the government of Virginia? Has it come to 
this, that nothing is now to be done ... which he does not 
approve?" The sacred right of instruction, fundamental to 
republican government, was at stake; Virginians must act to 
enforce it.55
While the Junto and the Jacksonians were making the 
most of the three men's refusal to comply with the 
legislative instructions, Virginia Whigs condemned the 
Democrat's actions as petty political vengeance. Pleasants 
noted repeatedly that Tyler and Leigh were being persecuted 
solely because of their party affiliation. The editor 
recommended that both men resign rather than follow the 
obnoxious instructions. This would prevent the Democrats 
from further exploiting the situation.56 The right of 
instruction was being employed, Tyler thought, as a "mere 
weapon of party warfare." Still, he found himself faced with 
a difficult decision. He could not vote for the expunging 
resolution, nor could he refuse to obey explicit 
instructions given to him by the voice of the Virginia 
electorate.57 Sensing that Tyler was wavering, fellow Whigs 
wrote to give him advice and encouragement. James Barbour 
told Tyler that whatever he and Leigh decided to do, they
55"Look to the 'Alternatives'," RE, Feb. 9, 1836; RE, 
Feb. 25, March 8, 10, 1836.
56Richmond Whig. Feb. 2, March 4, 8, 12, 1836.
57Tyler to William F. Gordon, Jan. 8, 1836, James Henry 
Rochelle Papers, Duke.
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must act together. "Should you and Mr. Leigh divide in your 
course, it will be the most fatal shock that the Whig party 
will have received." Tyler's close friend William Gordon 
explained that "obedience ... is not what your masters at 
Richmond desire; they want your place, and Leigh's.
Obedience will disappoint them woefully.... You suggest the 
propriety of resigning, and appealing to the people; discard 
the idea[;] power can only be controlled by power."58
Despite the advice of Barbour and Gordon, Tyler 
resigned his seat, while Leigh steadfastly refused to give 
in to the Jacksonians.59 This action revealed the rift in 
the Virginia Whig party between state rights men like Tyler, 
who could not bring himself to disobey the legislature's 
orders because of his commitment to the principle of 
instruction, and nationalists like Leigh, who argued that he 
was not bound to follow instructions that forced him to vote 
for an act that he considered unconstitutional.
Leigh's stubborn refusal to yield his senatorial seat 
also provided the Democratic party of Virginia with a 
popular issue for the upcoming presidential election. The 
Senator's high-handed actions, Jacksonians argued, was 
further proof of the degeneracy of the Whig party. Not only
58James Barbour to Tyler, Jan. 14, 1836; William F. 
Gordon to Tyler, Jan. 15, 1836, Tyler, Letters and Times of 
the Tvlers. 1:527-529.
59RE, March 8, 10, 1836; Ritchie to Rives, March 3,
1836, Rives Papers, LC; Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 18, 1836, 
Tazewell jtamily Papers, VSL.
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did the Whigs scorn the voice of the people, they also 
spread falsehoods about Martin Van Buren and were attempting 
to cause panic throughout the South by exaggerating the 
influence of northern abolitionists. If that were not enough 
to condemn the Whigs, a writer in the Enquirer pointed out 
that the Whigs represented the '’commercial and stock-jobbing 
interest," while the Democrats represented the "agricultural 
and labouring interest."60
Ritchie spoke out strongly against Whig efforts to 
portray Van Buren as an abolitionist. "The last hope of the 
Whigs," he wrote, "is to raise an Abolition Panic - to 
misrepresent the Free Negro vote of Mr. Van Buren ... and to 
exaggerate the strength and increase of the Abolitionists." 
To show the extremes to which the Whigs were willing to go 
on this matter, Ritchie related a story in his newspaper 
about a Richmond company that imported from the North some 
children's handkerchiefs imprinted with the letters of the 
alphabet and other "common figures." Upon opening the 
packages, the merchants discovered a few "abolition 
handkerchiefs" that had pictures of oppressed slaves printed 
on them. Immediately, Ritchie wrote, a "Whig in this City 
pounced upon these handkerchiefs" and displayed them to the 
people of Richmond as evidence of creeping abolitionism.
Soon other politicians were waving the "abolition
60"A Friend to Van Buren, Because a Friend to the South 
and the Union," RE, Jan. 5, 1836; "Common Sense," RE, Feb. 
23, 1836.
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handkerchiefs" at Whig rallies for dramatic effect. The 
upshot of all this, Ritchie noted with satisfaction, was 
that the state legislature was currently considering a law 
to prohibit the use "of all such pictures ... for political 
effect."61
Virginia Whigs, sensing their new-found political power 
slipping away, and horrified at the prospect of Van Buren as 
president, did in fact make extensive use of the abolition 
controversy in the campaign of 1836. Van Buren is "against 
us on the slave question," Abel Parker Upshur wrote 
Pleasants, and "very near an abolitionist.1,62 Pleasants 
needed no confirmation of that. In the columns of the 
Richmond Whig, he levelled a vituperative attack on the New 
Yorker, Ritchie's blind devotion to him, and the dangers to 
the South posed by Van Buren's candidacy. Launching his 
assault in early 1836, Pleasants noted that "It is time for 
the Southern people to awaken from the death sleep which 
Jacksonism, more potent than poppies or mandragons, has cast 
over them, and survey their true condition.... Danger, 
danger, dark and ominous, threatens the independence, the 
safety, the very existence of the Southern States.
Fanaticism threatens on one hand - political machinations 
whose success would usher in a central and consolidated
61RE, April 1, 12, 1836.
62Abel P. Upshur to John H. Pleasants, Jan. 5, 1836, 
Abel Parker Upshur Papers, VHS.
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Despotism, on the other." The editor warned against 
Virginians working for Van Buren's election. "What will it 
benefit you," he asked. "What will become of your principles 
and your safety, when Northern ascendancy is irrevocably 
established?"63
Pleasants was only getting started. He slammed Ritchie 
for slavishly following the dictates of Van Buren and his 
Albany Regency. The Junto leader, the "most depraved party 
hack in America," would swear "that white is black, and 
black white, to accommodate party interests." The "traitor 
Ritchie" had completely abandoned all of his republican 
principles to advance Van Buren's campaign. "Look at his 
language and course for 20 years," Pleasants told his 
readers, "and compare them with his language and course 
since his compact with Van. The bare inspection will 
convince you of his total apostasy to all your and his and 
Virginia's old principles."64
Pleasants also rebutted charges that the Whigs were 
attempting to throw the election into the House of 
Representatives by running various presidential candidates
“Richmond Whig. Jan. 30, 1836. For other attacks on Van 
Buren, see the Whig on Jan. 15, 19, Sept. 23, 1836. 
Surprisingly, the Whigs did not make much of Van Buren's 
reputation as a crafty politician bereft of principle. In a 
letter in the May 27, 1836, issue of the Whig, however, 
"Northampton" reminded Virginians that Van Buren "would walk 
upon the ashes of the Union, if his interest could be 
promoted."
“Richmond Whig. March 12, Jan. 30, April 19, 1836.
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in different regions of the country. The Jacksonians had 
claimed for months that the Whig strategy was to send the 
election to the House, where a deal similar to the one made 
in 1824 would be consummated and Van Buren would be denied 
his rightful place as president.65 Ritchie seemed 
particularly concerned about this possibility, and he 
ridiculed the Whig strategy by referring to them as "The 
Polycephalous Party - Or the Whig-White-Harrison-Webster- 
Tyler-Granger-Anti-Van Buren-Coalition party." Pleasants 
denied that the Whigs were working to send the election into 
the House, arguing that the party lacked the representatives 
needed there to reach an acceptable compromise on the 
presidency. Besides, he pointed out, the Whigs could never 
match the corruption and venality of the Van Buren forces in 
such a struggle.66
While Pleasants was attacking Ritchie and Van Buren, 
the Junto completed its return to power by assuming control 
of the New Yorker's campaign in Virginia. At a public 
meeting called in Richmond on January 9 to appoint delegates 
to the state presidential nomination convention, Daniel was 
appointed chairman and Ritchie served on a select committee 
that prepared and delivered an address berating the Whigs 
and calling for vigilance on the part of Virginia Democrats. 
The committee further moved that three delegates be
65RE, July 14, 1835; Sept. 2, 6, 9, 16, 1836.
66RE, June 17, 1836; Richmond Whig, June 21, 1836.
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appointed to represent the city at the state nominating 
convention to be held on January 11. Daniel was one of the 
three elected.67
At the convention, Ritchie, a "special delegate" 
representing Loudoun County, served as secretary. The 
meeting praised Van Buren as a "Northern man with Southern 
Principles." Ritchie, Daniel, Stevenson, John Brockenbrough, 
and Philip N. Nicholas were all appointed to the Central 
Committee, which coordinated the campaign and issued 
addresses to the voters of Virginia. Roane, ill in Hanover 
County, was named as an elector.68
In the months before the November election, the Junto 
defended Van Buren, criticized the Whigs for "using every 
exertion to unite the negro question and the Fanatics with 
the Presidential election," and attacked Hugh Lawson White 
and William Henry Harrison, the two main Whig candidates, as 
opponents of the state rights doctrines of Virginia.69 
Ritchie informed his readers that he supported Van Buren 
because he had proven himself to be friendly to the 
"Virginia doctrines" and because "his election is calculated 
to destroy those sectional distinctions, which might prove 
fatal to the Union of the States." Harrison, on the other
67RE, Jan. 12, 1836.
68RE, Jan. 12, 16, 1836.
69C. S. Morgan to Van Buren, Jan. 9, 1836, Martin Van 
Buren Papers, Duke.
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hand, "has no pretensions to the character of a member of 
the State rights school." As for White, Virginians "could 
not have been induced under any circumstances to support 
him."70
In two addresses published shortly before the election, 
the Junto-controlled Central Committee impressed upon the 
citizens of Virginia the need to support Van Buren and to 
prevent the election from being sent to the House of 
Representatives. Every Republican must do his duty and vote 
for the party of Jefferson and Jackson. The choice, they 
argued, was a clear one: "Will you, in a word, prefer a 
Latitudinarian Federalist, or a Democratic State Rights 
man?"71 Enough Virginians agreed with this assessment to 
give Van Buren a strong victory in the Old Dominion. The 
Vice-President captured 56.6% of the popular vote, compared 
with 43.4% for Hugh Lawson White. That represented a sharp 
decline from Jackson's 75% in 1832, but it was still a 
comfortable margin of victory.72
Flushed with victory, Ritchie admitted that he took 
"some credit" for Van Buren's victory in Virginia. By 
supporting the New Yorker, the state had "trampled under
70RE, Aug. 16, July 29, 1836; David Campbell to William 
Campbell, Jan. 21, 1836, CFP, Duke.
71RE, Aug. 2, Oct. 25 1836.
72Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections 
Since 1789 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), 94- 
95.
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foot any sectional & local feelings" and acted in the best 
interests of the nation. Neither he nor Virginia expected to 
be rewarded for doing their duty. "All she [Virginia] asks 
in return, is that M.V.B. should steer the ship by the 
Jeffersonian Chart. Unless he does this, we have to leave 
him."73
While Ritchie was proclaiming his state's devotion to 
the republican principles of Thomas Jefferson, other members 
of the Junto were reaping the rewards of party service. In 
the spring of 1836, Jackson had renominated Stevenson as 
ambassador to Great Britain and nominated Philip P. Barbour 
to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. On March 16, 1836, 
both men were confirmed by the Senate. That same month, 
Daniel was appointed Federal district judge for the eastern 
half of Virginia. Leigh finally gave into pressure and 
resigned his Senate seat in July of 1836, and Richard Parker 
was sent to fill the office. When he stepped down after a 
few months, Parker was replaced by Roane, who had recently 
turned down the lucrative job of Postmaster of Richmond. For 
good measure, the legislature appointed Philip N. Nicholas 
as a circuit court judge in the state early in 1837.74
The sudden appointment of so many Junto members to
73Ritchie to William B. Lewis, Nov. 20, 1836, Jackson 
Papers, LC.
74Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 110-111; Frank, Justice 
Daniel Dissenting. 138; Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 
215-216; Richmond Whig. March 7, 10, 1837.
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state and federal offices did not go unnoticed by the 
group's opponents. Speaking of Roane's election to the 
Senate, the Alexandria Gazette noted that "he belongs to the 
Richmond Junto and is 'one of the family' - a relation of 
Mr. Ritchie's - upon which family, offices have lately been 
liberally bestowed." Pleasants also complained about the 
spread of the spoils system that Jackson had instituted. 
"Sharp's the word and quick's the motion - catch who catch 
can - help your plate or you'll be dished - are the 
governing impulses of the time, the blessed times of the 
triumph and reign of the 'Spoils System.'"75 There was a 
good deal of truth to both of these claims. Before the 
bitter campaign of 1836, the Junto had for the most part 
declined offers of federal offices, insisting that it was 
working for the public good and not personal gain or glory. 
But the experiences of the past four years —  protracted 
partisan struggles, personal attacks, and lingering 
hostilities —  convinced many in the group to abandon their 
qualms about accepting spoils and to "catch who catch can." 
Besides, they convinced themselves, there was nothing wrong 
with being rewarded for helping to prevent the country from 
falling into the hands of the Whigs.
The Junto had dramatically improved its fortunes since
75Alexandria Gazette. March 18, 1837; Richmond Whig. 
Dec. 13, 1836.
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early 1835, but had little time to savor its victories. Even 
before Ritchie travelled to Washington to hear Van Buren's 
inaugural address, controversy over economic matters 
threatened to split the Virginia Democrat party. Debate on 
Jackson's Specie Circular and the redistribution of the 
Treasury surplus made clear that "the party was divided into 
a banking and anti-banking faction." The Junto attempted to 
avoid a showdown on the "troublesome banking and currency 
question," but the financial panic that struck in 1837 made 
that impossible.76 Virginia's banks, renowned for their 
stability, were forced to stop specie payments in May of 
that year. This development threatened to bring financial 
ruin upon the state because, under Virginia law, suspension 
of specie was grounds for revoking a bank's charter. After 
consulting with Rives, Governor David Campbell called a 
special session of the state legislature to deal with the 
banking crisis.77
Both Campbell and Rives had recently quarreled with the 
Junto, Campbell over the group's opposition to his election 
and Rives over the issue of currency reform, and both were 
now committed to minimizing the group's influence in the
76Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 80-111; quotes on pp. 
97, 111.
^James Rawlings to David Campbell, May 15, 1837; 
William C. Rives to Campbell, May 22, 1837, both in CFP, 
Duke; Richmond Whig. May 30, 1837. In this issue, Pleasants 
claimed that Ritchie and the "Junta" were opposed to 
Campbell calling the special session.
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upcoming session.78 As Campbell prepared his address to the 
special session, Daniel and Ritchie attempted to put their 
stamp on it. The editor borrowed a copy of the speech, kept 
it all day, made extensive notes, and asked Daniel to 
contact Campbell about suggested changes. The Governor 
refused both men's advice and noted their dissatisfaction to 
his wife. Ritchie "has been disappointed in not having a 
finger in the Message—  He and Judge Peter V. Daniel no 
doubt both thought I ought to consult them.... I am no 
favorite with these gentlemen," he continued, "and I shall 
hereafter be entirely on my guard."79
The Junto, like the state Democratic party, was split 
on the banking question. Daniel was flatly opposed to all 
banks, Ritchie feared a national bank and wanted additional 
restrictions placed on state banks so that they could never 
again endanger the state's welfare by suspending specie 
payments, and John Brockenbrough, long-time President of the 
Bank of Virginia, proposed only mild reform measures.80 When
78For Campbell, see C.W. Gooch to David Campbell, Jan. 
23, 1837; David Campbell to William B. Campbell, Feb. 2, 
1837; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, May 14, 1837, all in 
CFP, Duke. For Rives, see John Brockenbrough to William H. 
Roane, Feb., 1837, Harrison Family Papers, VHS.
Brockenbrough wrote that "Ritchie has completely given up 
Rives."
79David Campbell to Mary Campbell, June 14, 1837, CFP,
Duke.
“Daniel to David Campbell, May 15, 1837, CFP, Duke; 
Daniel to Andrew Jackson, July 11, 1837, Jackson Papers, LC; 
RE, June 2, 1837; Brockenbrough to Rives, May 20, 1837, Van 
Buren Papers, LC.
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Van Buren introduced his Independent Treasury, or sub­
treasury scheme, which called for the separation of the 
federal government from banking, the rift within the Junto 
widened and threatened to destroy the group.
Brockenbrough and Parker had been early advocates of 
the sub-treasury system, and Daniel also supported Van 
Buren's measure, largely because of his strong party 
loyalty. These men believed that the Independent Treasury 
bill would allow the federal government to distance itself 
from banking, yet still exercise necessary supervision over 
the financial system.81 Ritchie and Nicholas, however, 
opposed the scheme for a number of reasons. Most 
importantly, the editor noted, the President's proposal 
would probably fail and might lead to renewed calls for the 
restoration of a national bank. The sub-treasury plan would 
undoubtedly enlarge presidential patronage and endanger the 
"security of the public funds," and for these reasons 
Ritchie refused to endorse it, despite the consequences of 
differing with Van Buren and his most intimate friends.82
Concerned about the split in the Virginia Democratic 
party on the banking question, Ritchie worked feverishly to 
formulate acceptable alternatives. First he called for a 
"Convention of the Banks of the United States ... for the
81Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 123-125.
82Ritchie to Van Buren, Aug. 20, 1837, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; RE, Aug. 18, Oct. 20, 1837.
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purpose of devising means to bring about a resumption of 
specie payments." When that failed to achieve any results, 
he argued for a "Special Deposite" system, a variation on 
the existing pet bank program established by Jackson. Under 
Ritchie's plan, state banks would continue to receive 
federal deposits, but would be unable to "issue their paper 
upon the faith of these funds." This would make the state 
banks stronger, Ritchie argued, prevent the overspeculation 
that had brought on the current panic, and blunt calls for a 
new national bank as well. Few rushed to endorse Ritchie's 
proposal.83
Debate over banking produced divisions in the national 
party as well. An insurgent group of Democrats, known as the 
Conservatives and led by Nathaniel Tallmadge and William 
Cabell Rives, proclaimed their steadfast unwillingness to 
toe the party line on the sub-treasury issue.84 The 
Conservatives were well represented in Virginia, and they 
gave the Junto additional cause for concern. The group 
worried that Rives and the Conservatives would break away
83For Ritchie's support of a bank convention, see RE, 
July 18, 25, 28, Aug. 1, 4, 15, 22, Oct. 27, 1837. For the 
"Special Deposite" plan, see Aug. 18, Oct. 20, Nev. 28,
1837; Jan. 4, Feb. 6, 17, 24, May 4, 29, 1838; Ritchie to 
Rives, Aug. 10, [1837], Rives Papers, LC.
MFor a good examination of the Conservative movement, 
see Jean Friedman, The Revolt of the Conservative Democrats. 
Studies in American History and Culture, No. 9 (UMI Research 
Press, 1976). Friedman contends that the Conservatives were 
primarily an "antiparty" faction upset at Van Buren's 
financial policies and the rise of partisanship. (54)
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from the Democratic party and join with the Whigs to defeat 
Van Buren's measure and to gain control of the state 
legislature.85
The Junto soon realized the urgent need to set aside 
its differences on the banking question and work for party 
harmony. Ritchie called upon his fellow party members to 
"manifest ... a tolerant and conciliatory spirit" while this 
problem was being resolved. He reminded them that they 
disagreed with each other only on the Independent Treasury, 
while they differed with the Whigs on nearly every issue.
The editor also announced flatly that he was not abandoning 
the party or Van Buren. He was, in fact, "disposed ... to 
sink or swim with his administration."86 Brockenbrough now 
swung around to endorse Ritchie's special deposit system in 
the name of party unity, and Daniel and Parker travelled to 
Washington to impress upon Van Buren and Rives the need for 
compromise. Stevenson wrote from London to tell Van Buren of 
the Junto's devotion to him and willingness to work for a 
settlement. Brockenbrough urged Rives to rejoin the party so 
that it could prevent the Whigs from gaining control in 
Virginia. The banker added that Rives's fellow senator, 
William H. Roane, was willing "to co-operate in any measure
85Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 135-138.
8SRE, No v. 28, 1837, Jan. 13, 1838. See also the issues
of March 24 and April 24, 1838.
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that will preserve the union and integrity of the party."87
Efforts on the part of the Junto to keep the Democratic 
party united proved to be too little, too late. The Whigs 
successfully capitalized on the internal bickering of the 
Democrats and captured control of the Virginia legislature 
in 1838. Ritchie had dragged out old warnings about the 
dangers of a national bank, claiming that the Whigs were 
exploiting the political situation in an effort to recharter 
the Bank of the United States. "Mark the course which the 
Bank of the U.S. is pursuing," he informed his readers:
"Mark its object! See how it attempts to sweep on to a re­
charter with a step as steady as time and an appetite keen 
as death!"** Ritchie's rhetoric failed to rouse the 
Democrats of Virginia, and the editor placed much of the 
blame for the party's defeat on widespread voter apathy.89
Other observers were quick to fault Ritchie and Rives 
for the Whig victory. Jackson condemned the two as "prodigal 
political sons" who had done much damage to the party. 
Remembering Ritchie's response to the removal of the
*7Brockenbrough to Van Buren, Aug. 7, 1837, Van Buren 
Papers, LC; Brockenbrough to Roane, Sept. 13, 1837, Harrison 
Family Papers, VHS; Parker to Van Buren, Jan. 18, 1838; 
Daniel to Van Buren, Jan. 23, 1838; Stevenson to Van Buren, 
Jan. 5, 1838; Brockenbrough to Rives, Aug. 5, 1837 (copy), 
all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
**RE, April 13, 1838.
*9RE, May 4, 1838.
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deposits, Jackson wrote that "then, as now, he went off 
hastily, & did us much injury." John Letcher was convinced 
that Ritchie and Rives had "done more in the space of six 
months to divide, and distract the Administration Party, 
than all the Whigs in the Union could have effected in a 
lifetime." Thomas Jefferson Randolph bluntly informed Van 
Buren that the Democrats had lost in Virginia because of the 
"course pursued by Mr. Rives and Mr. Ritchie on the Sub 
Treasury bill."90
More ominously, other members of the Junto were also 
willing to criticize Ritchie for his course during the sub­
treasury debate. Brockenbrough informed Stevenson that "our 
friend of the Enguirer has ... done infinite mischief to our 
party by the middle course he has taken and I think has 
permanently injured his own standing."91 Early in 1838,
Daniel reported to Van Buren that the editor "must now be 
given up as incorrigible.... He is inseparably wedded to 
Rives and the Banks." Ritchie could no longer be trusted, 
Daniel wrote four months later, because "he is still dealing 
in his old fooleries about special deoosites." By the end of
^Jackson to Van Buren, Oct. 24, 1837; John Letcher to 
Ely Moore, April 28, 1838; Letcher to Van Buren, May 12, 
1838; Thomas Jefferson Randolph to Van Buren, May 6, 1838, 
all in Van Buren Papers, LC. Pleasants took special relish 
in attributing the Whig victory to the "skulking course of 
the Enquirer, and the treacherous one of Mr. Rives." 
Richmond Whig. May 18, 1838.
91Brockenbrough to Stevenson, Jan. 1, 1839, Stevenson 
Papers, LC.
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1838, relations between Daniel and Ritchie were decidedly 
cool.92
The Whig victory, Daniel's criticism, and the continued 
debate on the sub-treasury plan combined to weaken Ritchie's 
resolve and to lessen his enthusiasm for partisan struggles. 
"I am more & more sick of politics,” the editor confided to 
Rives, "and would to Heaven! it were in my power to return 
to the Shade of private life."93 Still, Ritchie continued to 
speak out for harmony, for party unity, for an end to 
bickering over "this vexatious question" of banking. "I go 
for a compromise," he noted, adding that "my whole heart is 
in this."94
Ritchie's desire for a compromise was given impetus by 
two developments. First, a union between the Conservatives 
and the Whigs looked more likely than ever in 1838 and 1839. 
Pleasants issued an invitation "To the Conservative Party of 
Virginia" to join the Whigs in "common cause" to defeat the 
administration, claiming that the "Conservatives can never 
again act with Mr. Van Buren's branch of the party. The 
gulph between them is impassable.1,95 Rives resigned his seat 
and his membership in the Democratic party in March of 1839,
92Daniel to Van Buren, Jan. 23, May 23, Aug. 8, Oct. 20, 
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
93Ritchie to Rives, Feb. 3, 1838, Rives Papers, LC.
^Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2, 1838, Ritchie to [?], 
[May?, 1838], (copy), both in Van Buren Papers, LC.
95Richmond Whig. July 27, Nov. 20, 1838.
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insisting that "I have not abandoned my party; they have 
abandoned me." He denied that he had formed a "corrupt 
coalition with the Whigs," but the Junto were not convinced. 
Brockenbrough noted that Rives had "given unequivocal 
evidence of his union with the Whigs," and Ritchie, who had 
worked closely with Rives throughout the sub-treasury 
debate, finally abandoned him in the summer of 1839.95
The second development that concerned Ritchie and the 
Junto was the increased influence of John C. Calhoun in the 
Democratic party. The South Carolinian had rejoined the 
Democrats on the Independent Treasury question, and moved 
quickly to exert control over the national party.97 Ritchie 
remained hostile to Calhoun and his supporters, and warned 
Van Buren to avoid the "infatuated councils of those bitter 
Hotspurs." The South Carolinian, Ritchie claimed, was 
attempting to exploit the rift in the party for his own 
advantage. "Mr. Calhoun is for agitation - agitation," he 
notified Van Buren, "but you know him sufficiently to know, 
how far he is to be trusted, for motives or for measures."
In an editorial, Ritchie denied that he had welcomed the 
South Carolinian back into party ranks. "Mr. Calhoun has not 
gained our confidence by his recent moves on the chess­
96William Cabell Rives, "To the People of Virginia," 
March 18, 1839, Broadside, VHS; Brockenbrough to Stevenson, 
Jan. 1, 1839, Stevenson Papers, LC; RE, June 28, 1839; 
Ritchie to Stevenson, April 14, 1839, Stevenson Papers, LC.
^Remini, Course of American Democracy. 437-439.
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board.... He is too much of a metaphysician for us."98
Faced with Calhoun's ambition, Rives's defection, and 
an upcoming presidential election, Ritchie slowly yielded 
his objections to the sub-treasury scheme in an effort to 
solidify the Virginia Democratic party.99 "Ritchie's recent 
conduct has merit enough in it to cover all his past sins," 
James Buchanan informed Van Buren in May of 1839, and Parker 
was convinced that his brother-in-law had resumed his 
position as leader of the administration forces in 
Richmond.100 To preserve the party and atone for his past 
actions, Ritchie worked especially hard in the elections of 
1839 and 1840, winning further praise. "I have never felt a 
deeper interest in my life," he told Stevenson in 1839, and 
more than one observer credited the editor with 
strengthening the influence of the Democratic party during 
those two campaigns. "Mr. Ritchie ... is all zeal & action." 
Van Buren was informed, "endeavoring to stimulate others by 
efforts that are almost supernatural."101
98Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2, 1838, Van Buren Papers, 
LC; RE, Oct. 3, 1837.
"Ritchie to Stevenson, Aug. 4, 1839, Stevenson Papers,
LC.
IOOJames Buchanan to Van Buren, May 11, 1839; Parker to 
Van Buren, June 4, 1839, both in Van Buren Papers, LC. See 
also John Rutherfoord to Stevenson, June 4, July 28, 1839, 
Stevenson Papers, LC.
101Ritchie to Stevenson, April 14, 1839, Parker to Van 
Buren, April 6, 1840, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; 
Rutherfoord to Stevenson, April 10, June 4, 1839, Stevenson 
Papers, LC.
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Ritchie's "supernatural" exertions were not enough, 
however, to put the Democrats back in control of the 
Virginia legislature between 1838 and 1840. After the 
party's defeat in the spring elections of 1840, the Junto 
grew worried about the upcoming presidential election. The 
Whigs were unified, organized, and eager to excoriate Van 
Buren on the banking question and on his aristocratic 
pretensions. The "zeal of our opponents has run into a 
species of fanaticism," Ritchie told Van Buren. Roane 
thought that "at no past time have our adverseries [sic] 
manifested more zeal, or been perhaps so well organized as 
now.11102 Despite such ominous signs, the Junto remained 
optimistic that Van Buren would defeat the Whig candidate, 
assumed to be Clay until the national convention selected 
William H. Harrison, a popular military hero from Ohio.
In the campaign, the Democrats portrayed the Whigs as a 
new brand of Federalists whose sole object was "to swell the 
powers of the Federal Government at the expense of the 
States, and the great body of the People." They argued that 
the "great principles which our democratic ancestors 
struggled to establish by the civil revolution of 1801" were 
at stake. Only the Democrats could protect and preserve 
those fundamental principles. The party stood for strict 
construction, opposition to a national bank and "all other
I02Ritchie to Van Buren, June 1, 1840; Roane to C.W.
Gooch, Feb. 8, 1840, Gooch Family Papers, UVA.
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incorporations by the Federal Government,1 the Independent 
Treasury, and the "supremacy of the popular will."103 The 
Whigs, on the other hand, represented corruption, the abuse 
of power, and aristocratic rule. That made the choice facing 
the voters an obvious one. The "old war is renewed between 
the friends of an equal and well-regulated liberty, and the 
partisans of privilege and monopoly." Virginia must support 
Van Buren and the Democrats.104
In case these platitudes did not have their intended 
effect, the Democrats borrowed a page from the Whigs and 
attacked Harrison as an abolitionist sympathizer. In 
response, the Whigs revived charges of Van Buren's support 
of free black suffrage, and the campaign soon degenerated 
into name-calling, shameless accusations, and gaudy 
pageantry.105 When the smoke finally cleared, Van Buren had 
eked out the slimmest of victories in Virginia, tallying 
43,757 votes to Harrison's 42,637.106 Once again, the Junto
•“"Proceedings of the Democratic Republican Convention, 
Held at Richmond Feb. 20, 1840," Broadside, VSL. Ritchie, 
Daniel, and Brockenbrough all played keys roles in this 
meeting.
’“"Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention Held 
at Charlottesville, Va., September 9 and 10, 1840," 
Broadside, VSL. Both Ritchie and Daniel attended this 
convention, and Roane delivered a speech there.
105See, for instance, Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 28, 
1840, Van Buren Papers, LC; Daniel to William Brent, Jr., 
Oct. 14, 1840, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Dent, "Virginia 
Democratic Party," 274-281.
‘“Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Presidential 
Elections. 96.
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had been influential in pushing the state towards a 
Democratic candidate. But the role of another group, the 
Calhoun Democrats, was perhaps equally important in securing 
Van Buren's victory in Virginia. The South Carolinian's 
reentry into the party had led some prominent Virginians, 
men like Littleton Waller Tazewell, Robert M.T. Hunter, and 
William 0. Goode, to abandon their flirtation with the Whigs 
and rejoin the Democratic fold. These men followed Calhoun's 
lead and supported the New Yorker, and the "Calhoun-Van 
Buren alliance ... probably saved Virginia [for] the 
Democrats."107 As a consequence, the Calhoun Democrats moved 
to increase their power within the Virginia Democratic party 
at the expense of the Junto.
The Junto prevailed in 1840, but just barely and at a 
terrible cost. Unlike its remarkable comeback in 1836, 
reversing two years worth of defeats, the Junto was unable 
to sustain the attacks of the Whigs and the Conservatives, 
the challenge posed by the Calhoun Democrats, and the 
painful division over the sub-treasury scheme. Barbour's 
appointment to the Supreme Court and Stevenson's selection 
as ambassador to Great Britain in 1836, coupled with 
Parker's death in 1840, left the Junto even weaker. 
Brockenbrough largely retired from political affairs after 
his brother William and his adopted daughter died in late
107Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 286-287; quote on 
page 287.
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1838, and Daniel and Ritchie were still distrustful of each 
other after their bitter quarrel over the banking question. 
When Daniel was selected to replace Barbour on the Supreme 
Court after the latter's death in 1841, only Ritchie 
remained to represent the group in Richmond.108
Looking back on political developments since 1834, 
Ritchie was dismayed and saddened. He had spent too much 
time attempting to reestablish "harmony & peace ... in our 
ranks," he told his old friend Stevenson. But the worst part 
had been the divisiveness of the banking controversy. "No 
circumstance of my whole political life has given me so much 
pain as differing from you, Mr. Van Buren, Judge Parker, 
D[octor] Brockenbrough & other friends" on this matter.109 
In truth, the sub-treasury debate had "splintered the 
Virginia Democratic party and initiated the disintegration 
of the Richmond Junto."110 From the heights of its success 
in 1836, the group found itself practically defunct in 1840. 
Nor could it take much satisfaction in Van Buren's triumph 
in Virginia, its crowning achievement, for Harrison had won 
the national contest. The Whigs controlled the White House, 
and the Junto faced the beginning of a hostile 
administration for the first time since 1825.
108Brockenbrough to Stevenson, Jan. 1. 1839, Stevenson 
Papers, LC; Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting. 154.
109Ritchie to Stevenson, Aug. 4, 1839, Stevenson Papers,
LC.
110Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 215.
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CONCLUSION:
The Richmond Junto and Politics in Jacksonian Virginia
After the election of 1840, the Junto's influence in 
Virginia politics declined steadily. The Whigs had 
controlled the state legislature since 1838, and when the 
Democrats finally regained control in 1842, it was largely 
because of the actions of the Calhoun Democrats and not the 
Junto. In fact, the group spent most of its time between 
1841 and 1844 fighting the Calhoun branch of the party and 
attempting to restore Van Buren to the presidency. Ritchie 
worked especially hard for his old friend. The editor 
regarded Van Buren's election in 1844 "as essential to the 
purity of Republican principles," John Letcher told Thomas 
Hart Benton, and "as the only fitting and proper rebuke to 
the log cabin and coonskin fooleries of 1840." Other members 
of the Junto, including Roane, Brockenbrough, and Nicholas, 
supported Van Buren as well. "There are at least two things 
I never change," Roane informed Van Buren in late 1843, "the 
one - a well tried old friend - the other my politics." He 
closed by saying he would travel to Richmond to "see what I
238
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can do towards keeping our crew steady.111
Just a few months after Roane's statement, the Junto 
dropped its endorsement of Van Buren over the question of 
the annexation of Texas. There were indications that 
Virginians would not support the New Yorker in 1844, even 
before he made clear his opposition to Texas annexation. Van 
Buren's position on the protective tariff question, once 
again an issue, caused concern among his supporters in the 
state, and Ritchie, as head of the Democratic Central 
Committee, received numerous letters in early 1844 detailing 
the lack of support for Van Buren around the state. "They 
wish for a new man," one elector wrote of his fellow 
citizens.2
The biggest issue facing Van Buren, however, was the 
question of what to do with Texas. Southerners had made 
annexation of the independent nation the primary goal of the 
1844 campaign. Whigs and Democrats across the region held 
public meetings supporting annexation, and by late 1843, the
'John Letcher to Thomas Hart Benton, Dec. 15, 1842;
William H. Roane to Martin Van Buren, Feb. 9, 1843; Samuel 
Denoon to Van Buren, June 14, 1843, all in Martin Van Buren 
Papers, Library of Congress.
2For the tariff issue, see R.B. Gooch to Auguste Davezac, 
Dec., 1842; H.L. Hopkins and others to Van Buren, Feb. 17, 
1843; R. Wallace to Van Buren, Feb. 18, 1843; Peter V. Daniel 
to Van Buren, July 6, 1843, all in Van Buren Papers, LC. For 
comments about Van Buren's general unpopularity, see Austin 
Brockenbrough to Thomas Ritchie, April 21, 1844; William Byars 
to Ritchie, April 27, 1844; James Hoge to Central Democratic 
Committee, May 3, 1844; R.J. Paulson to Ritchie, May 3, 1844, 
all in Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College of William and Mary. 
Quote from Brockenbrough to Ritchie, April 21, 1844.
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issue had swept all other questions aside as insignificant. 
At first the Junto considered the fuss over Texas to be a 
ploy by the Calhounites to discredit Van Buren, but they 
quickly discovered the potency of the controversy.3 "This 
Texian question has grown up rapidly in the whole South to a 
size and extent of which you can form no just idea," Roane 
informed Van Buren in late April of 1844, "and it is still 
increasing." Silas Wright was convinced that it was the only 
question that mattered in the presidential race in Virginia. 
No man could hope to win who did not strongly and without 
reservations endorse annexation.4
Van Buren's letter detailing his opposition to the 
annexation of Texas in April of 1844 ended his chance of 
victory in the Old Dominion. Virginians instantly spoke out 
against the New Yorker and began searching for another 
candidate. Letters flooded Ritchie's office demanding that 
the party drop Van Buren and select someone in favor of 
annexation; this was "the only means of saving Virginia and 
keeping up a united Southern party."5 Even the Junto parted
3Andrew Stevenson to Van Buren, Oct. 8, 1843; John
Letcher to Ritchie, Sept. 23, 1843, both in Van Buren Papers, 
LC. For an expression of southern unity on the Texas question, 
see I.N. Powell to Van Buren, March 27, 1844, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
4Roane to Van Buren, April 30, 1844; Silas Wright to Van 
Buren, April 1, 1844, both in Van Buren Paper, LC.
5James McDowell to the Members of the Central Democratic 
Committee, May 6, 1844; W.M. Watkins to Ritchie, May 7, 1844; 
John R. Edmunds to Ritchie, May 12, 1844; S. Bassett French to 
Ritchie, May 23, 1844, all in Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College
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company with its old colleague. "You are deserted" in 
Virginia, an observer told Van Buren on May 1. "Ritchie, 
Roane, & Stevenson are all out against you on the Texas 
question; positively, openly. and unequivocally against you. 
Arrangements are now, at this very hour, being made, to take 
up some other candidate, and of this be assured if there be 
a God in Heaven." Official confirmation of the group's break 
came four days later when Ritchie wrote to the ex-president. 
The editor told Van Buren that it pained him to admit that 
"we cannot carry Virginia for you" in the upcoming election. 
The furor over his anti-annexation stance compelled the 
Junto to seek another candidate more suited to the temper of 
the times. Of course, Ritchie added, should Van Buren 
capture the party nomination at the Baltimore convention, 
the clique would support his campaign.6
When the Democratic convention met in late May, 
however, Roane delivered a rousing speech announcing 
Virginia's support for James K. Polk, who went on to capture 
the nomination. Ritchie's work on behalf of Polk's campaign 
was rewarded after his victory, when the editor and long­
time Junto leader accepted an offer in early 1845 to edit
of William and Mary. Quote from Edmunds to Ritchie, May 12, 
1844.
6"Q in the corner" to Van Buren, May 1, 1844; Ritchie to 
Van Buren, May 5, 1844, both in Van Buren Papers, LC. Daniel, 
now in Washington, broke with his Richmond friends and 
supported Van Buren. See Daniel to Van Buren, June 11, 1844, 
Van Buren Papers, LC.
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the administration's paper in Washington, the Union. With 
Roane's death that same year, and with Stevenson and 
Brockenbrough retired from public affairs, the Richmond 
Junto ended its long tenure as a key player in political 
affairs in Virginia.7
The careers of the remaining Junto members after 1845 
were marked by a noticeable turn to the politics of 
sectionalism. Ritchie edited the Union for nine years, until 
his death in 1854. During his time there, he strongly 
supported the expansionist policies of the Polk 
administration and became increasingly defensive about the 
South and the institution of slavery.8 Daniel sat on the 
Supreme Court until his death in 1860, described by his 
biographer as the "last Jeffersonian to hold public office 
in the United States." He too became a fervent spokesman for 
the southern cause, and was the only justice to agree 
completely with Taney's arguments on the Dred Scott case 
(1857).9 Stevenson, after briefly trying to win the vice-
7Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., "Oligarchs and Democrats: The 
Richmond Junto," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 
Vol. 78 (1970), 188.
8For Ritchie's later career, see Thomas R. Hietala,
Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian
America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Charles
Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A study in Virginia Politics
(Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913), 219-300.
9John P. Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of 
Peter V. Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964), vii-viii; Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery. Law, and
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presidential nomination in 1844, retired from politics and 
died in 1857. According to Francis Wayland, Stevenson's last 
years provided "an example of how the slavery question 
gradually changed a Jacksonian nationalist into a 
conditional secessionist."10 As a final irony, Parker's son, 
also named Richard, presided at the trial of John Brown, and 
John Brockenbrough's mansion on Shockhoe Hill, where the 
Junto held many of its meetings, became the White House of 
the Confederacy.
Perhaps this association with militant sectionalism and 
the defense of slavery represents the ultimate tragedy of 
the Richmond Junto. The members of the Junto considered 
themselves to be Jeffersonian republicans fighting not only 
for the rights of the states, but also for the preservation 
of the Union. The group formed its political philosophy from 
an older generation and attempted to apply it to the issues 
and debates of a rapidly changing society. During the 
Junto's reign, political, social, and economic matters were 
all transformed, and try as it may, the Junto failed to 
adapt completely to the new order. It was slow to accept the 
dynamics of the second party system, with its emphasis on 
party discipline, control from the national level, and
Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 216-222.
10Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1949), 249.
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elaborate organization. The group did acknowledge that 
sectional compromise was an integral part of national 
politics, and debate over such issues as the tariff, 
banking, and the relative merits of presidential candidates 
"provided for the formation and subsequent development of 
the second party system in Virginia" during the 1820s,
1830s, and 1840s.11
For almost thirty years, the Richmond Junto was the 
most potent political force in Jacksonian Virginia. While 
the group's political fortunes rose and fell throughout the 
period, it remained an accurate gauge of the mood and 
sentiment of many Virginians. In this respect, the group's 
ideas and actions serve as a window through which the 
historian can view the ways in which Virginians, and 
Southerners, responded to the challenges posed by the 
maturation of the American political, economic, and social 
system in the decades before the Civil War.
"Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic 
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1974), 358.




College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia: 
Austin-Twyman Papers 
John Marshall Papers 
Ritchie-Harrison Papers 
John Tyler Scrapbook
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina:
Campbell Family Papers 
Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers 
Edward Lucas and William Lucas Letters 
James Henry Rochelle Papers 
Martin Van Buren Papers
Library of Congress, Washington, DC:
John Floyd Papers
Andrew Jackson Papers (microfilm copy)
James Madison Papers (microfilm copy)
James Monroe Papers (microfilm copy)
Wilson Cary Nicholas Papers
John Randolph Papers
William Cabell Rives Papers
Papers of Andrew and John White Stevenson
Martin Van Buren Papers (microfilm copy)
David Watson Papers
Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill:
Duff Green Papers
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia: 
Papers of the Ambler and Barbour Families 
Barbour Family Papers 
Cabell Family Papers 
Peter V. Daniel Papers 
General Collection 
Gooch Family Papers 
James Madison Papers 
Madison-Todd Papers 
Morris Family Papers 
Randolph Family Papers
245
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 6
Thomas Jefferson Randolph Papers 
John Wickham Papers
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia: 
William H. Brodnax Letters 
Francis Otway Byrd Papers 
Gooch Family Papers 
Harrison Family Papers 
Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers 
Abel Parker Upshur Papers
Virginia State Library, Richmond, Virginia: 






Niles' Weekly Register 




Adams, Charles Francis (ed.). Memoirs of John Ouincv 
Adams. Philadelphia, 1874-1877.
Bassett, John Spencer (ed.). Correspondence of Andrew 
Jackson. Vols. 3, 4. Washington: Carnegie 
Institute of Washington, 1926-1935.
Christopher Quandary [Benjamin Watkins Leigh]. Some 
Serious Considerations on the Present State of 
Parties. With Regard to the Presidential Election. 
Richmond: Thomas White, 1827.
Colton, Calvin (ed.). The Private Correspondence of 
Henry Clay. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1971. Reprint of 1855 edition.
"Correspondence of Judge Tucker." William and Mary 
Quarterly■ Series One, Vol. 12 (1903): 84-95.
Fitzpatrick, John C. (ed.). Autobiography of Martin Van 
Buren. Vol. II, American Historical Association 
Annual Report. 1918. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1920.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 7
Ford, Paul L. (ed.). The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 
Vol. 10. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899.
Ford, Worthington Chauncy (ed.). The Writings of John 
Quincy Adams. Vol. 7. New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1917.
Giles, William Branch. Political Miscellanies.
Richmond, 1829.
Hamilton, Stanislaus Murray (ed.). The Writings of 
James Monroe. Vol. 6. New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1902-1903.
Hunt, Gaillard (ed.). The Writings of James Madison. 
Vol. 4. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900-1910.
Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia ... 1819. Richmond: Thomas Ritchie,
1819.
Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia ... 1820. Richmond: Thomas Ritchie,
1820.
Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia —  1825. Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 
1825.
"Letter of John Brockenbrough to Andrew Stevenson."
John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolnh-Macon 
College Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911): 253-254.
"Letters of Thomas Ritchie - Glimpses of the Year 
1830." John P. Branch Historical Papers of 
Randolph-Macon College Vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1902): 
147-154.
Letters on the Richmond Party. Bv a Virginian.
Originally Published in the Washington Republican. 
Washington City, 1823.
"Minute Book of the Agricultural Society of Albemarle." 
Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association Vol. 1 (1918): 263-349.
"Missouri Compromise: Letters to James Barbour, Senator 
of Virginia In the Congress of the United States." 
William and Mary Quarterly. Series One, Vol. 10 
(1901-1902): 5-24.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 8
Moser, Harold D. (et. al., eds.). The Papers of Andrew 
Jackson: A Microfilm Supplement. Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1968.
"Preamble and Resolutions of a Meeting ... Disapproving 
the Election of Gen. Andrew Jackson to the 
Presidency of the United States." Richmond: T.W. 
White, 1827.
Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State
Convention of 1829-1830. Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 
1833.
"Proceedings of the Democratic Republican Convention, 
Held at Richmond Feb. 20, 1840." Broadside, 
Virginia State Library.
"Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention Held as 
Charlottesville, Va., September 9 and 10, 1840." 
Broadside, Virginia State Library.
"Resolution and Address of the Charlottesville Jackson 
and Barbour Convention." Charlottesville: Cary & 
Watson, 1832.
"Resolutions of Town Hall Meeting in Winchester,
Virginia," April 5, 1824, Broadside, Virginia 
Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
Richardson, James D. (ed. and comp.). A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789- 
1897. 10 vols. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1896-1899.
Rives, William Cabell. "To the People of Virginia." 
March 18, 1839. Broadside, Virginia Historical 
Society.
"Roane Correspondence." John P. Branch Historical
Papers of Randolph-Macon College Vol. 2, no. 1 
(June 1905): 123-142.
"Roane on the National Constitution - Reprints from the 
Richmond Chronicle and Richmond Enquirer." John P. 
Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College 
Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905): 47-122.
Roane, William H. "To the Voters of Hanover." [1831]. 
Broadside, Virginia Historical Society.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 9
Shorey, Kenneth (ed.) Collected Letters of John
Randolph of Roanoke to Dr. John Brockenbrough, 
1812-1833. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988.
Taylor of Caroline, John. An Inquiry into the
Principles and Policy of the Government of the 
United States. Fredericksburg: Green and Cady, 
1814.
"Unpublished Letters of Thomas Ritchie." John P. Branch 
Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College Vol.
3, no. 3 (June 1911): 199-252.
"Virginia Opposition to Chief Justice Marshall -
Reprints from the Richmond Enquirer, 1821." John 
P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon 
College Vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1906): 78-183.
SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Abernethy, Thomas P. The South in the New Nation. 1789-
1819. Vol. IV of A History of the South. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961.
Ambler, Charles H. The Life and Diary of John Flovd. 
Richmond: Richmond Press, Inc., 1918.
________________. Sectionalism in Virginia From 1776
to 1861. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1910.
________________. Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia
Politics. Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co.,
1913.
Ammon, Harry. "The Richmond Junto, 1800-1824." Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 61 (1953): 
395-418.
Anderson, Dice Robins. William Branch Giles: A Study in 
the Politics of Virginia and the Nation From 1790 
to 1830. Menasha, Wi: George Banta Publishing Co.,
1914.
Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 0
Beach, Rex. "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto."
William and Mary Quarterly. Second Series, Vol. 22 
(1942): 1-17.
Bruce Jr., Dickson D. The Rhetoric of Conservatism: The 
Virginia Convention of 1829-1830 and the 
Conservative Tradition in the South. San Marino: 
The Huntington Library, 1982.
Cole, Donald B. Martin Van Buren and the American
Political System. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections 
Since 1789. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly, 1987.
Cooper Jr., William J. The South and the Politics of 
Slavery. 1828-1856. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1978.
Craven, Avery. Soil Exhaustion As a Factor in the 
Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland. 
1606-1860. University of Illinois Studies in the 
Social Sciences. Vol. 13, no. 1 (1925).
Crofts, Daniel W. Old Southampton: Politics and Society 
in A Virginia County. 1834-1869. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1992.
Dangerfield, George. The Awakening of American
Nationalism. 1815-1828. New York: Harper & Row, 
1965.
Dawidoff, Robert. The Education of John Randolph. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979.
Egerton, Douglas R. Charles Fenton Mercer and the Trial 
of National Conservatism. Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1989.
Ellis, Richard. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian
Democracy. States' Rights, and the Nullification 
Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Fehrenbacher, Don E. Slavery. Law, and Politics: The 
Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Frank, John P. Justice Daniel Dissenting; A Biography 
of Peter V. Daniel. 1784-1860. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 1
Freehling, Alison Goodyear. Drift Toward Dissolution; 
The Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.
Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965.
Friedman, Jean. The Revolt of the Conservative 
Democrats. Studies in American History and 
Culture, No. 9. UMI Research Press, 1976.
Gunther, Gerald. John Marshall/s Defense of Mcculloch 
v. Maryland. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1969.
Harrison Jr., Joseph H. "Oligarchs and Democrats: The 
Richmond Junto." Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography Vol. 78 (1970): 184-198.
Hietala, Thomas R. Manifest Design: Anxious
Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985.
Jordan, Daniel P. Political Leadership in Jefferson7s 
Virginia. Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1983.
Kirk, Russell. John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in 
American Politics. Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 
1978.
Lowery, Charles D. James Barbour. A Jeffersonian
Republican. University, Al: University of Alabama 
Press, 1984.
McCoy, Drew. The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and 
the Republican Legacy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989.
Malone, Dumas (ed.). Dictionary of American Biography. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962.
Originally published 1934.
Miller, F. Thornton. "The Richmond Junto: The Secret
All-Powerful Club - or Myth." Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography Vol. 99 (1991): 63-80.
Moore, Glover. The Missouri Controversy. 1819-1821. 
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 2
Ninety-Second Congress, First Session. Biographical 
Directory of the American Congress. 1774-1971. 
United States Government Printing Office, 1971.
Niven, John. Martin Van Buren: The Romantic Age of 
American Politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983.
Oates, Stephen B. The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner's 
Fierce Rebellion. New York: Mentor Books, 1975.
Peterson, Norma Lois. Littleton Waller Tazewell.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1983.
Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of
American Democracy. 1833-1845. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984.
_______________. Andrew Jackson and the Course of
American Freedom. 1822-1832. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1981.
_______________. The Election of Andrew Jackson.
Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 
1963,
_______________. Martin Van Buren and the Making of
the Democratic Party. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959.
Risjord, Norman K. The Old Republicans: Southern
Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1965.
Robert, Joseph Clark. The Road From Monticello: A Study 
of the Virginia Slavery Debate of 1832. Durham: 
Trinity College Historical College, 1941. Reprint 
New York: AMS Press, 1970.
Sellers, Charles. The Market Revolution: Jacksonian 
America, 1815-1846. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991.
Shalhope, Robert. "The Emergence of an Understanding of 
Republicanism in American Historiography." William 
and Mary Quarterly. Third Series, Vol. 29 (1972): 
49-80.
_______________. John Tavlor of Caroline: Pastoral
Republican. Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1980.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 3
Simms, Henry H. The Rise of the Whigs in Virginia. 
1824-1840. Richmond: William Byrd Press, 1929.
Simpson, Craig M. A Good Southerner: The Life of Henry 
A. Wise of Virginia. Chapel Hill and London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Sutton, Robert P. "Nostalgia, Pessimism, and Malaise: 
The Doomed Aristocrat in Late-Jeffersonian 
Virginia." Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography Vol. 76 (1968): 41-55.
Sydnor, Charles S. The Development of Southern
Sectionalism. 1819-1848. Vol. V of A History of 
the South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1948.
Tyler, Lyon G. The Letters and Times of the Tylers. 3 
vols. Richmond and Williamsburg, 1884-1896.
Reprint New York: DeCapo Press, 1970.
Watson, Harry. Liberty and Power: The Politics of
Jacksonian America. New York: Noonday Press, 1990.
Wayland, Francis Fry. Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and 
Diplomat. 1785-1857. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1949.
Wood, Gordon. The Creation of the American Republic. 
1776-1787. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1969.
DISSERTATIONS AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
Ammon, Harry. "The Republican Party in Virginia, 1789 
to 1824." Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 
1948.
Brown, Richard H. "Southern Planters and Plain
Republicans of the North: Martin Van Buren's 
Formula For National Politics." Ph.D. diss., Yale 
University, 1955.
Buckley S.J., Thomas E. "The Declension of Virginia, 
1776-1860: An Historiographical Perspective." 
Unpublished paper, 1990.
Dent Jr., Lynwood Miller. "The Virginia Democratic
Party, 1824-1847." Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State 
University, 1974.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 4
Dingledine Jr., Raymond C. "The Political Career of
William Cabell Rives." Ph.D. diss., University of 
Virginia, 1947.
Gelbach, Clyde C. "Spencer Roane of Virginia, 1762-
1822: A Judicial Advocate of State Rights." Ph.D. 
diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1955.
Horsnell, Margaret E. "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate 
of Jeffersonian Principles." Ph.D. diss., 
University of Minnesota, 1967.
Malone, Katherine Ruth. "The Virginia Doctrines, the 
Commonwealth, and the Republic: The Role of 
Fundamental Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798- 
1833." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 
1981.
Moser, Harold D. "Subtreasury Politics and the Virginia 
Conservative Democrats, 1835-1844." Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin, 1977.
Mutersbaugh, Bert Marsh. "Jeffersonian Journalist:
Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond Enquirer. 1804-
1820." Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1973.
Tomlinson, Robert Hume. "The Origins and Editorial 
Policies of The Richmond Whig and Public 
Advertiser. 1824-1865." Ph.D. diss., Michigan 
State University, 1971.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
V IT A
Wade Lee Shaffer
Born in Springfield, Missouri, May 25, 1963. Graduated 
from Richland High School in North Richland Hills, Texas, 
May 1981. Received Bachelor of Arts Degree from The 
University of Texas at Arlington, May 1985, and Master of 
Arts degree in History from The University of Texas at 
Arlington, July 1987.
In August 1987, the author entered the College of 
William and Mary as a graduate assistant in the Department 
of History. During the 1992-1993 school year, the author 
served as Visiting Assistant Professor of History at the 
College of William and Mary.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
